November 22, 2005: After the Presidential Elections: A wake-up call to all!
By Sathya
The outcome of the Presidential Election with all the excitement and disappointments of a one-day match is in the opinion of Sathya a wake up call to all, including Sathya whose hibernation was once again rudely disturbed.
Firstly, it was a wake up to the Tamil People. It was indeed a cruel irony that their self-proclaimed "sole representative" was bent on defeating Ranil Wickremesinghe, the Presidential candidate that the vast majority of the Tamil people wanted to see emerge as the victor! Of course, it was not the love for Ranil, but the fear of the Sinhala hardliners arrayed behind Mahinda Rajapakse that propelled the Tamil voters in Ranil's direction.
Ultimately, the Tamil people living in areas under the direct military-intelligence and propaganda control of the LTTE were disenfranchised by the LTTE. It was not a boycott by the Tamil people. It was instead a boycott call by the LTTE backed by coercion, intimidation and force. So how come that the Tamil people behaved in a manner that was diametrically opposed to that of their "sole representative", as evidenced by their preference when they came out in their numbers and voted for Ranil in areas where the Tigers could not directly and physically enforce their control? Well, that is the question that the LTTE will have to ponder over.
Meanwhile, the decision of the LTTE to disenfranchise the Tamil voter at this Presidential Election (in contrast to the creation of phantom voters at the last General Elections!) could well be the third historical blunder of the LTTE - the other two historical blunders being the expulsion of the Muslim people from the "traditional Tamil homeland" compelling the Muslim people to distance themselves from the Tamil national struggle and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi which compelled India to list the LTTE supremo and his intelligence chief as the most wanted criminals in India.
If the LTTE reckoned that the International Community would empathise with it if Mahinda Rajapakse is elected with the support of Sinhala hardliners, they are in for another rude shock which is bound to follow the earlier shock treatment meted out by the European Union by imposing a travel ban on LTTE delegations.If Anton Balasingham, Thamilselvan or LTTE's international lobbyists were to complain to the West about the "hardliners" in Colombo, they are bound to be admonished for not allowing the people that they claim to "solely" represent to vote and ensure a victory for Ranil Wickremesinghe, their favoured candidate.
The writing is already on the wall with the comment by John Cushnahan, EUs Head of the Election Monitoring Mission at the media briefing following the elections that he would take up LTTE "discriminatory" and "unacceptable" behaviour with the Council of the European Union.The second wake up call is to Ranil Wickremisnghe. His policy of appeasement of the LTTE is not winning him any votes amongst broad sections of the Sinhala people as well as the Muslim people - not to mention the remnants as well as the fledgling Tamil democratic alternatives to the LTTE. Further, the emphasis on negative peace (i.e. the mere absence of war) with a so-called international security net to bail him out if things go wrong and the notion of an agreement only with the LTTE, with the SLFP being made a fait accompli is not exactly firing the imagination of the people in the South.
Ranil would also have realised that this is not the first time that the Tiger bit the hand that fed it. It is imperative that Ranil should now put into practice his campaign preachings about removing the peace process from partisan politics and to extend support to Mahinda Rajapakse's fresh approach to the peace process based on inclusivity and human rights that goes beyond a mere "deal" between the Government of the day and the LTTE.
The third wake up call is to Mahinda Rajapakse. He must put into practice and in deed his stirring words following the taking of oaths that he no longer represents his voters and allies, but all sections of the Sri Lanka society. He can neither pursue the peace process, manage a mixed economy aimed at equitable growth or for that matter govern the country if he allows himself to be held hostage to the forces of ethnic and religious extremism and obscurantism in the south.
He has to put into practice and deed his words following the taking of oaths ceremony that he stands for an honourable peace for all the Peoples of Sri Lanka. While inclusivity in the peace process was sorely lacking in the manner in which it was being managed by Norway, LTTE and the Government of the day since the signing of the ceasefire agreement, Mahinda Rajapakse should recognize that once the process of consultations aimed at a broad consensus is advanced, there will come a time when the principle of "sufficient" consensus may have to be put into place based on the principles of democracy, secularism, pluralism. It is a consensus based on these principles that would ensure sustainability and equality.
The fourth wake up call is to the JVP. The JVP must realize that democracy, devolution and development are inseparably linked and that one cannot be advanced without the other.
In fact power-sharing and resource-sharing could well be the key link between democracy and development and is imperative particularly in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural country like Sri Lanka. Diversity and differentiation rather than uniformity and homogeneity is the essence of Marxist ideology and philosophy. It is incumbent on the JVP, if it is truly a vanguard of the working people and the oppressed masses as it perceives itself to be, to take forward the cry of devolution rather than dismiss it as being archaic and obsolete.
In this regard, statements by the JVP during the election campaign that if the LTTE were to give up its demand for a separate state then the South would be prepared to go beyond a unitary State is welcome and could well be the basis for future negotiations. The responsibility now lies with the JVP as the vanguard of the working people to go before the people with that message rather than wait for a referendum and then call on the people to vote against devolution.
The role of a vanguard Marxist party (as the JVP perceives itself to be) is to raise the level of mass consciousness, rather than to get bogged down in false consciousness.
The fifth wake up call is to the religious organizations which are bent on playing politics. Every religion has its essentials and non-essentials. While the essentials of all religions are the same, it is the non-essentials like rites, rituals, and the institutionalization of religion with their personality cults that divide Peoples along religious lines.
State patronage to one religion in a multi-religious society leads to the alienation of other religions, just as much as the proselytizing based on global financial networks is the worst form of intolerance and threat to religious freedom and harmony between religions. The despicable manner in which religious organizations and personalities dabbled in politics during the election campaign is a wake up call to the people who espouse those religions to be vigilant against self-proclaimed messengers and servants of God.The final wake up call is of course to Sathya to stop throwing brickbats at others and to start looking inwards into the chasm that governs word and deed of Colombo-based "civil" society to which he belongs! More on this at an "appropriate" time!
November 22, 2005
[Previous:June 21, 2005]
June 21, 2005: JM, P-TOMS, TRC or “WHATEVER”: The fear of the unknown
By Sathya
The last time that Sathya woke from his deep slumber was when tsunami wrecked havoc with the lives and livelihood of peoples of Sri Lanka, irrespective of religion, ethnicity or any other identity for which we are prepared to lay down our lives as well as consume the lives of others.
In that column, Sathya made a passionate case for imagination and courage in converting the tragedy into an opportunity of linking tsunami recovery and rebuilding with a redesigned peace process. To recall, “What we need at this moment is imagination, creativity and singularity of purpose.
Perhaps, then we may still stand a chance. If not we are all doomed. Disasters, natural or man-made, can well lead to a new era of opportunities and equality for all peoples of Sri Lanka, if we so will collectively and act in unison. (See Daily Mirror, January 4, 2005).
With those wise words Sathya went into hibernation till he was rudely woken by the thunder and lighting associated with the proposed Tsunami Joint Mechanism (JM), which later metamorphosed into P-TOMS (Post-tsunami Operations Management Structure) and the Tsunami Relief Council (TRC). The term “mechanism” apparently when translated into Sinhala had a terrifying impact on the Sinhala psyche. However, it was not so terrifying on the Tamil psyche which when translated into Tamil (podhu kattamaippu) means a “common structure” and comes closer to the reality that a “joint mechanism”.
But then I guess Sinhala opinion is what matters and therefore the term “joint mechanism” which the President said was a creation of the media in any case, was replaced with the term “Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure” and subsequently with the more populist and less technical “Tsunami Refugee Council”. In a fit of extreme exasperation Sathya will in this column use the term “WHATEVER”, till the name is settled one way or the other.
The most convincing argument in favour of “WHATEVER” is that this the first time since the militarization of the ethnic conflict and after several interludes of peace processes that the LTTE would be part of a structured institution of the Sri Lankan State. This would be by way of representation of the Government, the LTTE and the Muslim polity in the apex, regional and district-level institutions which would work closely with the State’s existing bureaucratic structures.
This however should not be confused as a case of democratization of the LTTE, since bureaucratic control is not sufficient to ensure the democratization process, just as much as the capacity building of the LTTE does not necessarily lead to transformation. On the contrary, the empowerment of the LTTE without transformation, can only lead to the reinforcement of what is.
The second argument advanced in support of the “WHATEVER” is that the rights of the Sinhalese and Muslims in the North-East would be both represented and guaranteed. That is certainly reassuring, but it implies that the LTTE would look after the Tamil interests (i.e. LTTE=Tamils), while the Government and the Muslim polity would look after the Sinhalese and Muslim interests, respectively.
The recent media blitz by the National Peace Council (NPC) in advocating a case for the “WHATEVER”, for instance, observed with absolute sanctity that the ‘WHATEVER” would bring together the Government, Muslim community and the LTTE in a common endeavour.
But, how about bringing together the “Peoples” (in the plural). Why did the NPC forget the Peoples? And, what of the rights of the Tamils living in the North-East who live under the diktat of the LTTE and have to contribute cash to the LTTEs coffers and children to its fighting forces and all the other rights that we cherish like the right to dissent and the right to life? Are we therefore saying that it is a matter between the LTTE and the Tamil people to sort out as some Sinhalese democrats with a Sinhala guilt seem to argue and who feel that the North-East is not ready for democracy? But then can it be otherwise? These are questions that arise not from Sinhala chauvinists, but by Tamil democrats. In this context, the absence of a human rights clause in the WHATEVER document is indeed worrying.
The third argument advanced in support of the “WHATEVER” is the classic “what then is the alternative argument”. It is premised that the existing `No War, No Peace” scenario could be threatened by not conceding to the LTTE its fetishism of being the “sole representative” and the “sole arbiter” of Tamil interests hinged on the notion that nothing shall reach the Tamil people till it reaches the LTTE first.
It is argued that any move to check this fetishism would lead to the LTTE raising its clarion call of “War or Peace”. But then, for how long can one allow the peace process to be held hostage to the repeated and constant threats of war? And, can one have a peaceful environment in a “No War, No Peace” situation where children continue to be conscripted, dissidents on both sides continue to be killed, and dissent is silenced by terror? For that matter, can the prevailing “No War, No Peace” situation be sustained in the absence of peace negotiations aimed at a durable, just and a permanent solution? But then, can it be otherwise?
These are some questions that is haunting Sathya. But, on the other hand, as Sathya the rational thinker as opposed to Sathya the conscience keeper keeps reminding, should we confine ourselves to the strait jacket of looking at the future, only through the past. Does it matter to the victims of tsunami what lies ahead, when their concerns are located in the here and the now? And, cannot today’s terrorist become a pacifist democrat tomorrow? (Of course, a peacenik may go further and pose the question cannot the Tiger change its stripes?!) Has Sathya forgotten his passionate appeal soon after tsunami to seize the opportunity and to link post-tsunami recovery and reconstruction to advance the peace process? Should not the President who, when compared to her predecessors and contemporaries amongst Sinhala political leaders in Sri Lanka, clearly has the vision and the determination to address the unresolved Tamil Question but is impeded by Sinhala extremism and obscurantism, be given another chance of restarting the stalled peace negotiations and the peace process through the evolving WHATEVER?
These are also questions that Sathya cannot simply dismiss.
Hence, Sathya has taken the decision to support the “WHATEVER” as well as the bold and courageous initiative taken by the President as a necessity based on humanitarian and practical considerations, but not as a principled position since there are many principles that will be violated in the name of peace, just as many lives were consumed and human rights violated during the ceasefire period in the name of peace.
As to whether the JVPs concern that the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty would also be violated, although remote given the safeguards built into the “WHATEVER”, cannot be ignored given LTTE’s singularity of purpose in seizing every opportunity in its march towards “Thamil Eelam” and the donor community’s vacillation.
The concerns of the JHU and religious extremists, on the other hand, stems more from Sinhala racism rather than from the teachings of Lord Buddha and will ironically only pave the way for LTTE’s ‘Thamil Eelam” and its perceived manifest destiny.
With that Sathya returns to his deep slumber till the next time he is woken up. Hopefully, then it would be the sound of the peace tolls and not the death knell.
June 21, 2005
[Previous:June 4, 2005]
9th August, 2004: The Troubled Peace Process – Time for a Reality Check
By Sathya
The peace process is clearly stalled. There are no signs of the recommencement of direct negotiations which was suspended last year when the LTTE sent a letter to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe dated 21st April, 2003 that it had “decided to suspend its participation in the negotiations for the time being”. However, the LTTE stressed that it was still committed to a negotiated settlement and was not pulling out of the peace process, although its spokespersons on several occasions characterised the 6 rounds of talks from September 2002 to March 2003 in venues spanning Oslo to Hakone as a “waste of time”.
While direct negotiations ( “Track One” Negotiations in conflict resolution jargon) remains suspended, the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) signed on 22nd February 2002 by then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and LTTE leader Velupillai Pirabhakaran with the stated objective of “bringing an end to armed hostilities” and create “a positive atmosphere in which further steps towards negotiations on a lasting solution can be taken” has so far prevented a large scale outbreak of hostilities or war between the two parties. However, the period since the signing of the ceasefire agreement also witnessed gross human rights violations that included child conscription, political killings, abductions and extortion from the very inception. The perpetrator was the LTTE. The recent round of killings and child re-recruitment, particularly in the Eastern province, although a direct fall-out of the internecine conflict within the LTTE has spilled over into the heart of Colombo city as well as, according to unconfirmed reports trickling in last week, into the LTTE’s nerve centre in Vanni.
To further compound the deteriorating security situation, neither Colombo nor Kilinochchi seem to be clear about the agenda of talks, if and when they do start. While the LTTE has been consistently insisting that “institutionalizing” its Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) Proposal forwarded to the UNF Government in November, 2003 should form the sole basis for negotiations and should be de-linked from the process of seeking a final political solution, the present UPFA Government has been equally persistent that any interim arrangement should be part of a final political and constitutional settlement.
However, it now appears that President Chandrika Kumaratunga is willing to show some flexibility in commencing negotiation on an interim authority as indicated by the press release, following her meeting with Norwegian deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgessen on 27th July, where it was stated that her government was “willing and is keen to commence negotiations on an interim authority within the framework of a united state”. The hawks in her ranks, however, managed to insert a lead story in the Daily News of last Wednesday (4th August) with screaming headlines, “UPFA says `no’ to LTTE’s ISGA proposals”. The story attributed this stance to President Kumaratunga and cited SLFP General Secretary Maitripala Sirisena as the source. As a case of confusion confounded or as confusion clarified, the Daily News the following day carried the following clarification that “ the Government emphasises that that these media reports attributed to the statement said to have been made by the President at the Executive Committee Meeting of the Alliance Government at the President’s House recently are totally misleading the public. In fact, what was stated at the meeting by the President was that the Government’s stance on the resumption of peace talks with the LTTE remains unchanged.”
So, what exactly is the stance of the Government? This was clarified in the Government’s official website which comes directly under the President’s secretariat, where it was stated that “The president maintains that the government of Sri Lanka is willing to discuss with the LTTE its proposals for an interim administration alongside the talks to reach a final solution acceptable to all communities”. But, the issue remains contentious since the LTTE has been insistent on its position that its ISGA proposal should constitute the sole basis for negotiations. In other words, we may well be heading towards a uni-linear and a single-issue agenda trajectory which is precisely what the LTTE has been propelling the peace process towards.One may recall that at the 2nd Session of Talks at Rose Gardens, Thailand from 31 October to 3 November, 2002, a decision was taken by the Government and the LTTE to set up 3 Sub-committees. These were the Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North-East (SIHRN), the Sub-Committee on De-escalation and Normalization and the Sub-Committee to commence work in connection with relevant political matters.
As regards SIHRN, great pains were taken to demonstrate that it was not an interim administration. This was once again seen as a pragmatic and innovative measure to accommodate LTTE concerns that the formation of an interim administration within existing constitutional provisions would tantamount to it accepting the Sri Lankan constitution as it presently stands. This is seen as an anathema by the LTTE After several months of intense activities centred around SIHRN the LTTE in a letter addressed to the Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister on 21st May 2003, requested him to inform Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe that the LTTE now wanted an “interim administrative structure” to be set-up with “adequate powers to undertake Northeastern reconstruction and development activities”. Several months earlier the LTTE had already withdrawn from the Sub-Committee on De-escalation and Normalization in view of issues relating to High Security Zones (HSZs) in Jaffna.
What is further revealing is that the Sub-Committee on political parties where it was decided that “the parties will jointly and separately address in depth, at the current stage of the peace process, relevant subjects such as other peace processes, political solutions to ethnic conflicts, models and systems of governments, issues of post-conflict transition, coordination of international assistance, and reconciliation processes” never even met. As a matter of fact at the 6th Session of talks in Hakone Japan from 18-24 March, 2003 the Government and the LTTE decided to “expand some preliminary issues and a framework for political matters into a `complete plan’ at the 7th Session of talks. This of course did not take place since a month later the LTTE opted out of direct negotiations and Track One negotiations went into a state of limbo.
From the above it is evident that the LTTE set the agenda and shaped events where the agenda for talks finally became reduced to a single issue, namely the setting up of an interim administration for the North-East with full plenary powers of governance over the North-East under the hegemony of the LTTE, ideally through extra-constitutional means. This is clearly spelt out in the ISGA proposals of the LTTE which was unveiled with much fanfare in late October, 2004.
So, where does one proceed from here? Firstly, it is imperative that the UPFA Government should assume a clear and a consistent position as regards the agenda for negotiations. The constituent members of the UPFA Government should understand that the term “Government” includes all its consistent members. In this, it is imperative that the SLFP and the JVP, should clarify their respective position on the agenda for talks. Despite differences between the JVP and President Chandrika Kumaratunga on how to advance the peace process, which may have well prompted her to step down from the chair of the Executive Committee of the UPFA as a signal that she would proceed with her peace strategy with or without the JVP, the observation made by a high ranking member of the JVP and Minister of Agriculture and Livestock Anura Kumara Dissanayaka at the Cabinet briefing last Thursday is encouraging and should be a sufficient basis for the SLFP and the JVP to formulate a common negotiation strategy vis a vis the LTTE. The observation was that, “there should be an administrative structure for the North and East, during the transition period from the current situation to a final settlement. But our stand is that the Interim Authority must be part of the final solution”.
It is for the UPFA Government and its “think tank” now to formulate a clear proposal that embodies the above and link the entire transitional process spanning the interim to the final. Where appropriate the proposal should draw on the LTTE’s ISGA proposal which in fact contains core political issues as perceived by the LTTE. The time has also come for civil society to take a more proactive role in formulating its own proposals which may be placed before the Government and the LTTE and all other stakeholders as a means of breaking the current impasse.
Meanwhile all steps should be taken to ensure that the ceasefire holds and that the parties adhere to the ceasefire agreement. Despite the deficiencies in the ceasefire agreement, the entire peace process at present hinges on the scrupulous adherence to the provisions in the ceasefire agreement. Any tendency towards adventurism at this stage by the two parties could well signal the total collapse of the peace process and the renewal of war. However, it is also imperative that adherence does not mean appeasement. The transition from an administrative mechanism to the interim to the final cannot be just a mechanical process that is devoid of human rights, including pluralism, democracy and the right to life. Contrary to perceptions in sections of civil society as well as the international community that human rights, pluralism and democracy over-burden a fragile peace process, it is the recognition and observance of these principles that nourishes and sustains any peace process. If today the peace process in Sri Lanka is fragile it is precisely due to the violation of human rights, and the principles of pluralism and democracy. This is something that we in civil society should understand, even if the Government and the LTTE fail to do so.
09th August, 2004
January 4, 2005: After tsunami: Linking peace building with reconstruction
By Satiya
Reports of Sinhalese volunteers, from districts adjoining the North-East and elsewhere, streaming into the affected areas to give relief and succour to their Tamil and Muslim brethren is reflective of the sentiments in the south. There were also reports of security personnel in the North contributing 300 pints of blood to the Vavunia base hospital. Further, the statements issued by the Presidential Secretariat and the Peace Secretariat calling on the LTTE to join hands with the Government in a concerted and coordinated effort at overcoming the calamity were timely.
Tsunami, which washed away lives and wrecked havoc on properties and sources of livelihood regardless of religion and ethnicity, has undoubtedly contributed to the bonding of human relations across the ethnic divide.
As President Chandrika Kumaratunga reflected in her address to the nation, "the tsunami has devastated our land with relentless indifference to regions, provinces, ethnicities and religions and all other man-made frontiers".
Reports of Sinhalese volunteers, from districts adjoining the North-East and elsewhere, streaming into the affected areas to give relief and succour to their Tamil and Muslim brethren is reflective of the sentiments in the south.
There were also reports of security personnel in the North contributing 300 pints of blood to the Vavunia base hospital. Further, the statements issued by the Presidential Secretariat and the Peace Secretariat calling on the LTTE to join hands with the Government in a concerted and coordinated effort at overcoming the calamity were timely.
These sentiments were also reciprocated by the head of the LTTE's political wing, S.P.Thamilselvan following his meeting with the Norwegian Ambassador. He is reported to have said that "this new tragic situation has laid the foundation for both parties to come together and work towards closing the division between the two parties.
The LTTE is very happy and encouraged by the government's offer and this would help break the rift between the two parties". But there have been other reports which are deeply disturbing. Reports of the LTTE preventing relief operations in areas under their control, the seizure of relief items from relief convoys elsewhere and the stage-managed protest against the visiting Government delegation headed by Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse in Jaffna and Valvettithurai once again reveals the innate hegemonic trait of the LTTE that nothing can move in the North-East without passing through it.
Further, the puerile and infantile attitude of the TNA Members of Parliament in boycotting the national efforts initiated by the Government has only served to bring disrepute to the Tamil people who are only too willing to share their grief and succour with their Muslim and Sinhala brethren.
Likewise, the Government should ensure that politico-military strategy and agenda is not introduced into relief efforts in the North-East and that the sole driving force should be its responsibility as a government to its citizens irrespective of class, caste and ethnicity - not to mention politics.
There are similarly shocking reports of vultures in the south swooping on the relief items being sent to the North-East. In particular there seems to be an organized move by certain Sinhala extremists' forces in Trincomalee to prevent supplies sent by TRO from reaching the besieged and the suffering people of the North-East.
Although it is known that TRO is an arm of the LTTE that is no reason for preventing it from engaging in relief and humanitarian work. That these vultures are also swooping down on their own people in the south by stealing jewellery items and other valuables from the deceased victims of Tsunami is another matter.
In all this gloom and agony left behind by Tsunami, perhaps there is a silver-lining as is the case with most disasters.
The Tsunami waves may have in fact rolled back the war clouds by venting its fury on the naval infrastructure of the security forces and the LTTE in Jaffna, Mullaitivu and Trincomalee.
Yet another factor that would make both the LTTE and the GoSL think twice, if not ten times, before embarking on or provoking hostilities is the combined might of national and international opinion following the Tsunami horror.
As far as national opinion is concerned, the sheer weight of the tragedy, the immediate priority relating to relief efforts and the magnitude of the future task of reconstruction will surely make the people, irrespective of their ethnicity, rise up against any military adventurism by their sole or democratic representatives. As far as international opinion is concerned, any move by the two parties to resort to war mongering and sabre rattling will lead to both the Government and the LTTE being reduced to a pariah status.
The LTTE in particular which prior to the tsunami had intensified its conscription drive and appear to be continuing after tsunami by exploiting the vulnerability of the survivors and the displaced should take note.
But this alone is not sufficient if one is to ensure that the task of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction of the war-ravaged areas that stalled because of the stalemate in the peace process, as well as the challenge of relief and reconstruction of the areas ravaged by Tsunami is to proceed without threats of war breaking out.
Firstly, the LTTE or its proxies the TNA should immediately join the Special Disaster Management Task Force set up by the President in the national effort at providing immediate relief to the people affected, salvaging the destruction caused by Tsunami and taking forward the task of reconstruction.
Such a move in addition to benefiting the besieged and suffering people in the North-East would contribute to confidence-building measures and allay any distrust and suspicion in the South as regards LTTE's motives and intentions.
The Government should reciprocate by giving priority to the establishment of an interim authority for the North-East with due pride of place to the LTTE, while guaranteeing pluralism.
The LTTE, similarly, should take the initiative in bringing to an end the bloody internecine killings, which should be reciprocated by the coalition formed by Karuna following the split within LTTE.
Other Tamil political parties like the EPDP, EPRLF and PLOTE should be allowed to engage in relief and reconstruction activities in the North-East without hindrance by the LTTE in a spirit of cooperation and fraternity.
Secondly the Government and the LTTE should jointly amend the ceasefire agreement (CFA) to remove the clause which allows the parties to withdraw from the CFA after giving two weeks notice and replace it with a moratorium against all forms of offensive military operations for a period of 4 years.
In addition, the districts of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi, which were excluded from the CFA in a misplaced exercise in creative ambiguity, should be brought within the ambit of the CFA. During this 4-year period all attempts should be made to go beyond the establishment of an Interim Authority for the North-East with pride of place to the LTTE, to the forging of a final constitutional and political settlement to the Ethnic Question that guarantees democracy, pluralism and power sharing based on self rule and shared rule.
Simultaneously and parallel, all parties in the South should declare a moratorium against all forms of narrow partisan politics and strive to form an Interim National Government of Reconciliation and Reconstruction.
An Interim Constitution may be considered for the purpose of institutionalising an Interim Authority for the North-East with pride of place to the LTTE, the abolition or reform of the Executive Presidential System and power sharing between the ruling coalition and the opposition during this period.
A final and a comprehensive constitution that addresses all other areas relating to governance, including an equitable and a durable solution to the vital Ethnic Question, should be finalized before the completion of the 4-year period. A framework on Fundamental and Human Rights should inform the process from the outset.
Thirdly the international donor community, based on the above commitments by the relevant actors and forces within Sri Lanka, should release the aid commitment totaling US$ 4.5 billion made at the Tokyo donor conference of last year without any delay.
In order to ensure that the commitments by the Government and the LTTE are adhered to and funds distributed equitably, a group of countries representing the donor community as well as India may consider sending a Multi-National Peacekeeping and Reconstruction Force which would monitor and enforce the ceasefire agreement as well as assist in the task of reconstruction.
Norway could concentrate on its role as the facilitator and not be burdened with the monitoring of the CFA which has proven to be ineffective and contentious in any case.
What Sathya has spelt out above may sound out of the world. But so was tsunami till it hit us. Peace-building and Reconstruction, with international support and monitoring, need to go hand in hand.
Further it needs no elaboration that Peace and Reconstruction are indivisible and cannot be confined to just one part of the country. What we need at this moment is imagination, creativity and singularity of purpose. Perhaps then we may still stand a chance. If not we are all doomed.
Disasters, natural or man-made, can well lead to a new era of opportunities and equality for all peoples of Sri Lanka, if we so will collectively and act in unison. May we all face up to the challenge in the year 2005 and years to come with unity and purity in thought, word and action.
January 4, 2005
[Previous:August 09] [Next: June 21, 2005]
2nd August, 2004: July 1983 Pogrom – An Historical Apology
By Sathya
Twenty-One Years after one of the most meticulously planned and executed state-sponsored pogrom in world’s contemporary history by the then President J.R.Jayawardene and his henchmen in the cabinet, the present Head of State President Chandrika Kumaratunga apologized to the Tamil people and the Nation. The occasion for this historic apology was a symbolic ceremony on Friday 23rd July at the Presidential Secretariat, where some of the victims of `Black July’ were awarded compensation, following the findings and recommendations of the Presidential Truth Commission. Although the setting-up of the Truth Commission under the PA Government a few years ago was dictated largely by partisan politics aimed at creating maximum embarrassment for the UNP and did not conform to the norms and practices of Truth Commission elsewhere, the apology by the President was unconditional and was by no means partisan. The operative section in her address needs to be etched in our collective memory, so that the barbarism demonstrated by the State and by the mobs mobilized by it for the purpose of terrorising the Tamil people into submission is never repeated. Sathya likewise wishes to etch these words in his column.
To quote: “At least now I believe that I and we as a nation and especially the Sri Lankan State should come of age, look the truth in the face and make a national apology, first to all the victims of that day in Black July and then beyond them to the entire Nation. Perhaps it is the responsibility of the State and the Government to engage in that exercise first and foremost, and then all of us as the Nation, every citizen in this country should collectively accept the blame and make that apology to all of you here who are the representatives or the direct victims of that violence, and through you to all the other tens of thousands who suffered by these incidents. I would like to assign to myself the necessary task on behalf of the State of Sri Lanka, the Government and on behalf of all of us, all the citizens of Sri Lanka to extend that apology. It is late but I think it is still not too late”.
The response on the part of the LTTE and their proxies in parliament was typical. For instance, S. Elilan Trincomalee District political head of the LTTE at a public meeting in Trincomalee in memory of the victims of the Welikada prison massacre in July 1983 is reported by the TamilNet website as saying, “We regard Sri Lanka’s President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s public apology for the 1983 pogrom against the Tamils as a deceptive attempt, driven by political expediency rather than principles to placate the Tamils”. The TNA parliamentarians present typically took the cue and in their speeches cast aspersions on the motives of Chandrika Kumaratunga.
Sathya, who left the professional and social mainstream to join the Tamil National Movement precisely because of July 1983 pogrom, accepts the apology of the President unconditionally and without inhibitions. It was indeed an act of courage for Chandrika Kumaratunga to have articulated not only her sentiments, but the sentiments of the vast majority of the Sinhalese who were themselves horrified by the 1983 July pogrom. The burning of the Jaffna Library in 1981 and the anti-Tamil pogrom of 1983 which were entirely State-sponsored stand as symbols of eternal shame to the UNP. Sathya recalls the anger he felt when President J.R.Jayawardene and his key UNP cabinet ministers paraded before the TV after maintaining a deafening sound of silence for four long and bloody days of sheer barbarism by hoodlums and security personnel under the patronage of prominent UNP politicians. They in their statements simply ignored the traumatized Tamil People and instead sought the apology of the Sinhalese people for the shortages and long queues that had formed to buy bread because of the riots. The Tamils who had survived the carnage, of course, were either in refugee camps or too terrified to join any queues. Ranil Wickremesinghe was then a cabinet minister. He must acknowledge this, assume individual and collective responsibility, and apologise to the Tamil People if he is serious about reconciliation.
Likewise, it would have been morally, politically and historically more correct had the President also referred to mistakes made by her Government as well as the party that she belongs to. The passage of the “Sinhala Only” Act of 1956, the attack on Federal Party MPs by hoodlums in Galle Face Green as they were staging a satyagraha facing the Parliament, and the heckling of these Tamil MPS as they walked into parliament with blood-drenched shirts by Sinhalese parliamentarians, including Prime Minister S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike, the anti-Tamil riots of 1956 and 1958, the discriminatory education policy under the guise of `standardization’ in the early 70s, and the indiscriminate arrests and incarceration in prison of Tamil youth political activists all contributed to the erosion of self-respect of the Tamils and the eventual resort to armed resistance by Tamil youths as a means of re-establishing that self-respect that their parents had lost.
Sathya also recalls with regret the feudal ceremony that was conducted to celebrate the capture of Jaffna from the grip of the LTTE following Operation Riviresa in 1995. Although the Tamil People also abhorred the manner in which the LTTE engineered a forced exodus of civilians out of Jaffna during Operation Riviresa that led to immense deprivation and massive displacement of the people of Jaffna, it is clear that the public ceremony with Colonel Ratwatte walking up to President Kumaratunga to hand over the scroll announcing the capture of Jaffna was feudal, silly and pompous. It also hurt the sensitivities of the Tamil people, including those who bitterly resented the LTTE. Victories in battles are not something to be celebrated, since there are also defeats that may follow. That is the nature of War as the disastrous “War for Peace” campaign later revealed, when the State lost territory as well as manpower.
Be that as it may, this is supposed to be peace times. Although, we are not in a post-conflict situation, the time for reconciliation is NOW. It is neither too early nor too late. In this context, the time has also come for the LTTE as well as other Tamil ex-militant organizations which entered the democratic mainstream, to extend an apology to the Sinhala and Muslim Peoples for attacks against innocent civilians and ethnic cleansing that took place in the name of “liberation”. The Anuradhapura massacre on Poya Day on May 14, 1985 when more than 150 pilgrims who had thronged the city were mowed down and the ethnic cleansing of the Muslims from the North, including massacres in mosques in the East, in the 90s although carried out by the LTTE are just two of numerous such atrocities that were carried out by the LTTE and other Tamil militant organizations. They, in the same manner that President Kumaratunga extended an apology on the part of the State as well as all Sri Lankans for the 1983 July pogrom, owe the Sinhala and Muslim Peoples an unconditional apology on behalf of the Tamil People in whose name these atrocities were committed. In any event, Sathya, a one time spokesperson and a member of the leadership of a Tamil politico-military organization which later joined the democratic mainstream only to soil its hands in that polluted stream, extends an apology to the Sinhalese and Muslim peoples. He expects his former comrades to do likewise.
The lessons that Sathya learnt about the seeds of violence in relation to the ethnic conflict can be summed as follows. Firstly, the peaceful and non-violent forms of struggle against institutionalised discrimination by the State may not have taken a violent form if not for the use of violence by the State to crush these non-violent and democratic forms of struggle. The ethnic conflict may well have become protracted and intractable. But, it was the violence unleashed by the State to crush all forms of dissent that led to the ethnic conflict itself becoming violent. Secondly, the victims of violence soon become the mirror image of the perpetrators of violence. That is what happened to Tamil militancy. It began to acquire the ugly face of the State that it was fighting against.
The lesson that Sathya learnt (or is in the process of learning) on the seeds of peace and reconciliation can be summed as follows. While the past must be addressed in order to reach the future, the present is an all important key to reconciliation, since it is in the present that the past ends and the future begins. Let us acknowledge the past, but not get bogged down in it. Let us rectify ourselves in the present and envision a better future, since the future is always carved out in the present. To be overburdened by both the remorse of the past and the anxieties of the future only lead to a state of paralysis.
In sum, let us walk hand in hand in the collective endeavour of making this island of ours one country that belongs to all, while recognizing the full richness of our respective ethnic, religious and cultural diversities. It is not utopia. It is the only existential path to survival.
2nd August, 2004
[Previous:July 26] [Next: August 09]
July 26, 2004: Unethical religious conversions: Is there a role for legislation?
By Sathya
Now that an Anti-Conversion Bill has been placed on the Order Paper in parliament by the JHU, the issue of unethical conversion as well as responses to it are back again on the agenda. Another proposal initiated by Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake but diplomatically titled, "Act for Protection of Religious Freedom", although not tabled in parliament is doing its rounds.
The responses to the Bill itself by way of a flurry of petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Bill is further bound to keep alive the issue. The purpose of this week's Sathya column is not to bring the draft bill and the proposed legislation under scrutiny, but to pose the more fundamental question, is there a role for legislation aimed at preventing unethical conversions and, if not, what then is the remedy.
My simple answer to the question is No, there is no role for legislation, but, Yes, there is something called `unethical' religious conversions which needs to be addressed and redressed. Sathya does not accept the argument that there is no such thing as unethical religious conversions in Sri Lanka and that nothing can or must be done to neutralise the threat that unethical conversions pose to religious co-existence, social stability and cohesiveness.
Let me elaborate on both these positions which may appear to be a contradiction - but, is not.
Let us begin with the question of recourse to legislation in a bid to prevent religious conversions. I do not believe that it would work. Neither is it desirable. The reason is not that, as some would argue, such legislations cannot be implemented or its implementation regulated. There are numerous legislations on social issues spanning child labour to ragging which cannot be totally implemented or regulated to our satisfaction. Yet, these legislations are important since they act as an indicator of basic norms of conduct - they set certain social standards which are necessary for the establishment of a humane society as well as basic decency in human conduct.
The reason that I do not accept legislations to curb religious conversions is also not because it infringes on basic choice as some would argue. Religious conversions are in fact a fundamental right based on personal faith and beliefs. However, when conversions are justified on grounds that religion is no different from market place transactions and that there is no such thing as a "free lunch", then it militates against my notion of religion. Unhindered "freedom" is akin to the Elephant singing "Each Man for Himself and God for All" as it danced amongst the chickens.
Sathya's primary opposition to legislation to curb religious conversions stems from his perception and belief that there is no single path to salvation and that faith is essentially also about choice. That path could vary from intense devotion (Bhakthi), to intense self-less action (Karma), to the search for knowledge and wisdom (Gnana). Hinduism, the religion that Sathya was born into, rebelled against and has returned to like the prodigal son, caters to individuals with diverse personalities who may be located at varying levels of consciousness and existence. For instance, the concluding section of Bhagavad Gita, following a discourse on the different paths to salvation and liberation between Krishna and Arjuna, has Krishna proclaiming: " Thus, has the Wisdom, more secret than all secrets, been declared to you by Me; having reflected over it fully, you act as you choose". (Ch 28, Sloga 63).
My opposition to legislation to curb religious conversions also stems from my social democratic instinct that opposes any form of hegemony. In the Sri Lankan context any legislation to curb religious conversions is bound to proclaim the pride of place that our constitution bestows on Buddhism. This opens up space whereby any legislation to curb religious conversions may actually be used to establish the hegemony of one religion over the others. Such legislation could also be used against charitable and social service organizations set up by religious bodies (other than Buddhist) to help the needy and the destitute.
But, as a social democrat who leans more towards social rights and duties as opposed to the unfettered rights of individuals, Sathya is also concerned about the manner in which ‘unethical’ conversions adversely impact on the individual psyche as well as our society which is multi-religious and where stability can be maintained only through religious co-existence - not, religious hegemony. We would be playing the ostrich if we were to pretend that the `unethical' conversions taking place at present and the reactions and resistance to it are not social issues. In fact `unethical' conversions are a real issue that could lead to an explosive situation if not addressed and contained.
But, how does one define "unethical" conversions? In order to answer this, one needs to look a bit more closely into the concept of Christian `charity'. The doling out of material benefits and charity certainly is a laudable act. But, the motive and intentions are equally important.
An act in itself is neither good nor bad. It is the intention behind that act that determines the quality of that act in relation to the doer. That act of charity also becomes an issue if in the process it does violence to the self-respect and self-esteem of those who receive them. In this context, instances where converts are asked by their "shepherd" to demonstrate their renunciation by burning the scriptures and the symbols of the religion that they hitherto believed in are clearly acts of violence. It also does violence and is a case of intolerance, if the recipient of charity is urged to embrace another religion not out of conviction, but out of economic and material necessity. The methods used range from the crude to the subtle, but there is no doubt in Sathya's mind that those who seek to convert know this.
So, how does one respond to "unethical" conversions without recourse to legislation? Clearly and needless to say, violence and attacks on churches is unacceptable and should be met with the full force of the law and order machinery.
The response to unethical religious conversions is a matter that must be addressed at the level of the community as well as inter-faith dialogue and self-criticisms. The exact modalities and areas of intervention should be explored and made use of.
Firstly, it must be clearly recognized and acknowledged that there is something called "unethical" conversion. To call for empirical evidence as the prerequisite for a dialogue is a non-starter, since the methods employed are ever so subtle and sophisticated. Further, the mainstream Christian institutions have on several occasions conceded that some fundamentalist Christian sects do in fact practice an aggressive form of proselytizing that demonstrates intolerance to other religions and insensitivity to the adherents of those religions. The public perception that stands testimony to this also cannot be ignored.
Secondly, it must be recognized that Religion to an individual can either be one of faith or of identity - or, both. As a faith, attempts at conversion cease to be a problem. Anyone grounded in a particular religion out of faith and is anchored in that faith is in all likelihood bound to look at all religions as one, but with different trajectories all ultimately heading towards the same orbit and destination. To such persons conversions, ethical or unethical, ceases to be a problem. But, such persons who have reached that high level of spiritual evolution and consciousness are in a clear minority. The vast majority, however, see religion as an identity.
It is precisely when one religious identity purports to be superior to another religious identity and seeks to convert on that basis or alternatively where one religious identity uses violence or the full might of the State to prevent such conversions, that the seeds of disharmony, discontent and violence are planted.
The alternative to legislation clearly lies in an on-going inter-religious dialogue between religions as well as within local communities and civic organizations. However, it is imperative that there is a parallel process of intra-faith dialogue that takes place within religions or their institutions. All religions or ideologies, when they become institutionalized invariably begin to subordinate that ideology or theology to that institution.
All religions and their institutions need to be introspective and examine their role and location within society if Sri Lanka is to continue to boast that it is an Island cohabited by the believers of the four great religions of the world. If we fail in this endeavour that boast could well turn out to be a curse.
19th July,2004
[Previous:July 12] [Next: July26th]
July 5, 2004: Forgotten Children of War: Whose Responsibility?
By Sathya
The treatment of the Karuna affair, if it may be called that, by the media (including last week’s Sathya column) as well as by policymakers has largely focused on matters relating to security and impact on the peace process. In the process, a humanitarian problem of immense proportion has been by and large ignored. This is the plight of the under-age recruits who were demobilized by Karuna following the `Good Friday’ putsch against his forces by the Vanni-based leadership in April. This then constitutes the theme of this week’s Sathya column which was prompted by two reports that he chanced to read last week.
The two reports in question are that of the Human Rights Watch and a document circulated by human rights activists under the name `Collective for Batticaloa’, both of which portray a bleak and a heart wrenching situation facing the demobilized children of war in the Batti-Amparai region. Incidentally Sathya prefers the term `children of war’ to child soldiers, since not all of the under-age recruits were deployed in direct combat, though a considerable number were.
The Human Rights Watch report prepared by its South Asia researcher Tej Thapa highlighted the fact that over the last three weeks, the LTTE had commenced the forced “re-recruitment” of child combatants released by Karuna. In a stinging indictment, the report accused the LTTE of, “stealing children from their homes to put them on the firing line. Despite all their promises, they are demonstrating absolute disregard for the most vulnerable part of the population it claims to represent”.
Although the above issue has been in the public domain for some time, Sathya also wishes to share with the readers a lengthy passage from a report issued by the `Collective for Batticaloa’, which refers to a humanitarian problem that remains etched in Sathya’s psyche and has tormented him over the past week . To quote: “It has been estimated that approximately 60 percent of the returned children are young girls. Many of them are instantly recognizable because of their very short hair. While the hair may grow longer, issues of anxiety that these young women face may not disappear. Returning to school is not easy. Some have outgrown in age their level of school knowledge…Social ostracization and fear surrounding the returnee impedes easy integration. As one respondent said, the child has to walk alone to school. Nobody would walk along with her out of fear. Parents of the other children are scared that their own children might be recruited in a new wave of recruitment if they befriend these children…Schools too are worried about how returning children might either `lure’ other children into the fold of the LTTE or be a threat to the well being of their own children. They are marked people. They, the children are `shy’, reticent and withdrawn for the most part….Girls with their closely cropped hair are highly visible and are marked. At many check points they are singled out for scrutiny, making all heads turn and look at them. Previously, before the release, the short hair, acted as a deterrent to their running away as they would have been easily discovered. At present they are targets for re-recruitment and social ostracization. It is a psychologically traumatic state of mind for the child”.
Yes, it is psychologically traumatic not only to the child, but to all those who come face to face with these children of war or read reports that high light their plight. Those of us who are not traumatized, need to have our heads examined.
And, this brings Sathya to the issue relating to who is responsible and what is to be done? Certainly, one `actor’ (to use a hackneyed cliché) is of course the LTTE. But, it is futile appealing to that `actor’ since like all good actors the LTTE would deny responsibility. The other actor or actors who shoulder responsibility is the Government as well as the UNICEF. It is these actors who need to be told to stop acting and to fulfill their responsibilities, not only in addressing the cause of the problem (which may be beyond their control), but certainly in addressing the consequences of the problem. Reports from the ground indicate that the proverbial buck is being passed around. NGOs dealing with humanitarian and psycho-social trauma seem to think that the under-age recruits are the concern of the UNICEF which is mandated with an Action Plan for the rehabilitation of child soldiers. The UNICEF on the other hand while having a mandate to intervene, seem to think that their mandate is only the ‘Action Plan’ that involves the setting-up of Transit Centres for the rehabilitation of child combatants handed over by the LTTE directly to UNICEF.
But, herein lies the `Catch 22’. The Action Plan that the UNICEF entered into with the LTTE through its humanitarian arm, the TRO, covers only the child combatants handed over by the LTTE to UNICEF. Notwithstanding that the LTTE continue to release children with one hand while recruiting with the other, the UNICEF’s Action Plan does not cover the child combatants and under-age recruits who were demobilized by Karuna and who went directly to their homes and respective families. UNICEF must be credited for going public on these recruitments in recent times, despite its earlier stance of appeasement of the LTTE and remaining mum. It is also commendable that UNICEF is going through the rituals of registering these children. But having registered them, the UN agency does not seem to have a clue as to what to do next. Further, it is ridiculous to expect the affected families of the children of war demobilized by Karuna to hand over their children to the UNICEF-TRO run Transit Centres in Kilinochchi, and with no guarantee that UNICEF will be able to take the children out of the LTTE-controlled areas in the event of outbreak of hostilities..
Likewise, the Government cannot wash their hands off this humanitarian catastrophe and treat the issue of demobilization of the children of war in the East as a matter that is internal to the LTTE. The Government would then be abdicating its responsibilities to its citizens. In Sathya’s opinion, what is required is for the Government and UNICEF to formulate a separate Action Plan that involves the families of the demobilized children as well as the local community. For obvious reasons, this can be made operational only in Government-controlled areas, with the option of setting-up rehabilitation centres in areas outside the East, if the need arises. Care must be taken that these rehabilitation centres do not end up as another Bindunuwewa. In view of the forces of chauvinism and vigilantes lurking within State structures, the UNICEF and other international humanitarian NGOs should be given the primary responsibility for the running of these camps as well as the rehabilitation and re-integration programmes for the affected children.
In this regards, Sathya also wishes to address a related issue. There have been reports of some families showing resistance against the LTTE’s recruitment drive. There are some intellectuals who feel that ultimately this is the most effective deterrence to the LTTE’s recruitment drive. Some of these intellectuals and activists seem to feel that the `liberal’ intervention that involves lobbying with the Government and the international community would come to naught and that what is required is the `radical’ intervention aimed at strengthening the resistance capacity of the families and local community against the LTTE.
The latter option suggested by arm chair radicals, in the opinion of Sathya, is more romantic than radical. Or as Subramanya Bharathi, the Tamil poet penned, “brave only in words” (Vaaisolil Veerar). The resistance being shown by some families in the East to the LTTE is largely individual and based on a parental instinct to protect their children. It is yet to assume the form of collective resistance. In fact, recent reports indicate that the LTTE has already commenced a drive against the parents who are defying the LTTE that includes physical assault as well as death threats. Given the LTTE character, it will not be long before these death threats are executed, literally speaking.
Given the magnitude of the humanitarian problem highlighted above and the nature of the LTTE which has scant regard for human rights and continue to feed children to their war machinery, the responsibility lies squarely with the Government and the international community, through the UNICEF and INGOs, to rehabilitate the demobilized children of war and to protect them from re-recruitment, at least in the Government-controlled areas. It is then that the local community can become empowered or at least feel empowered enough to collectively resist the inhumane practice of child recruitment. To romanticize individual resistance from families at this juncture and giving it exaggerated publicity will only do more harm than good to the children and their families.
5th July, 2004
[Previous: June 28][Next:July 12]
June 21, 2004: An Emerging Proxy War via the Media?
By Sathya
The day following President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s address to the Nation on Saturday the 12th June, the trilingual print and electronic private media gave full publicity to a TamilNet website lead story datelined Sunday the 13th June and headlined, “Tigers lambast Kumaratunga’s political duplicity”. By Monday it was generally assumed by the public, policymakers and the international community that the LTTE had officially rejected the President’s thinking on the modality to be followed in recommencing the peace talks with the LTTE. On a closer scrutiny it would have become obvious that the TamilNet was in fact citing a lead story of the LTTE official organ, “Liberation Tigers” which appeared in May 2004!
This perception that the LTTE had officially responded to the President’s address to the Nation was on the assumption that the TamilNet website is a front of the LTTE which, of course, no one would deny. However, the TamilNet is not LTTE’s official organ. Further our private print and electronic media did not check the veracity and the sequencing that went behind the report. It was as though the media was either relishing the sensationalism that goes along with bad news or were taking an overtly partisan line aimed at embarrassing the Government. As to what impact that this form of reporting would have on the peace process was lost sight of. In this particular case, the private media clearly lacked conflict sensitivity, not to mention professionalism.
However, it would also be somewhat naïve to assume that the TamilNet would have re-carried the story the day after the President’s address without clearance from the LTTE. And, the lead story in “Liberation Tigers” issue of May’ 2004 did castigate the President for her perceived dilatory tactics and duplicity by resorting to a “dilapidated and timeworn strategy of cheating of the LTTE and the donor nations”, further adding that, “weakening the LTTE, diluting the strength of Tamil nationalism, distorting Tamil unity are the areas in which the President’s forces are keenly interested in”. The article in LTTE’s official organ, the “Liberation Tigers” did also end with a chilling message that if the international community did not prevail on the President to mend her ways, to quote, “the foundation for peace laid with international assistance during the last three years would be shattered and Sri Lanka will again be converted into bloodbath. War or Peace? The answer as of date is in the hands of donor nations and their actions alone will decide whether it is war or peace”.
Hence, while the above is not an official reaction by the LTTE to the broad peace strategy that the President enunciated in her address to the Nation, the fact that the TamilNet chose to carry an earlier article in LTTE’s official organ, “Liberation Tigers” the day after the address, is a clear case of a proxy propaganda war that is presently being carried out by the LTTE. In fact, another LTTE proxy, Suresh Premachandran of the TNA, did repeat the same chilling message in a telephone interview to the MTV Newline Programme on Friday the 18th June in response to a question on the significance of the detection of the suicide kit in Grandpass, Colombo the previous day. He said that while it was not clear to him as to whom the suicide kit belonged, ultimately it is for the President and her UNFA Government to decide whether there would be war or peace.
This is indeed a perverse reversal of the clarion call addressed at the TULF by Prime Minister J.R. Jayawardene following the 1977 anti-Tamil riots, “if you want to fight, let there be a fight; if it is peace, let there be peace….It is not what I am saying. The people of Sri Lanka say that”. The proxy of the people of Sri Lanka repeated it once again in 1983, when following the anti-Tamil pogrom of the July 1983, President J.R.Jayawardene (he had meanwhile made the quantum leap by transforming himself from a Prime Minister to an Executive President) took steps to remove the TULF from parliament on the grounds that “it is the natural request and desire of the Sinhala people to prevent the country being divided”. He was now speaking as the proxy of the “Sinhala people”.
Coming back to the proxy propaganda war being waged in the media and by the media, one cannot similarly ignore the complaint made to the Norwegians by the LTTE as regards the SLBC direct broadcast of a one hour programme of the Tamil Broadcasting Corporation (TBC) London called `Oorodu Uravada’ (i.e. “In Conversation with our community”). According to the TamilNet, the LTTE head of its political wing, S.P.Thamilchelvan complained to the Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar, during their meeting in Kilinochchi on 16th June that Sri Lanka’s state media engaged in a `malicious and false’ propaganda regarding the situation in Batticaloa district.While Sathya is strongly supportive of space and air time being given in the State media to an “alternative” democratic Tamil opinion at a time when the Tamil private print and electronic media either engage in false and malicious propaganda for the LTTE or are silenced, Sathya is also of the opinion that the TBCs “Oorodu Uravada” programme in SLBCs Tamil National Service does tend to transgress the divide between projecting an alternative opinion and crass propaganda aimed at justifying some of the counter-terrorism engaged in by Karuna and his faction against sympathizers of the Vanni-based LTTE leadership. This has clearly got to stop, if the broadcast is to continue to play its legitimate role in projecting an independent as well as an alternative Tamil democratic opinion to its Tamil listeners, who are starved of an independent and an alternative opinion. But under no circumstances can any programme in the State media be used to justify killings of civilians, irrespective of who does the killings and who the victims are. As regards reports of fighting between the armed formations of the LTTE and the Karuna factions, it is indeed the responsibility of the State and private media to highlight the dangerous situation developing in the Eastern province, after having checked the veracity of these reports.
In conclusion, the State as well as the private print and electronic media have a responsible role to play in ensuring that there is objectivity and sensitivity in reporting events and analysis, particularly when it come to the peace process. The LTTE, similarly, having obtained funding from donor agencies for its Peace Secretariat and acquired license from the previous Government to import sophisticated radio and transmission equipments, has to be more responsible in how they engage in propaganda. There is a distinct danger that while during the 1994-95 PA-LTTE talks, the heavy reliance on exchange of letters between the two parties led to that exchange turning into a propaganda war, we may now have a classic case of propaganda war by proxy using the media.
This is indeed detrimental to trust building and the articulation of the respective interests of the parties and other stakeholders in the peace process in a manner that recognizes their self-respect as well as mutual respect.
21st June, 2004
[Previous: June 14] [Next:June 28]
June 7, 2004: Duplicity in Killings
By Sathya
The cowardly killing of Aiyadurai Nadesan a reputed political columnist, writer and a Tamil nationalist, is yet another act of brutality in the on-going serial internecine killings that plagues the Batti-Amparai region, following the split in the LTTE. These killings have generated both a fear psychosis as well as revulsion amongst the people, with neither the Vanni-based leadership nor the Karuna faction paying heed to these concerns and condemnations. It is meaningless looking into who started it first, although it is no secret that the Vanni-based LTTE leadership did choose to resort to the force of arms to quell dissent from Karuna and his rank and file in the Batti-Amparai region.
Although the initial victims in the bloodletting, following the move by the Vanni-based LTTE leadership to wrest control of the Batti-Amaparai region from the Karuna faction, were the functionaries and cadres on both sides, the victims in the recent spate of killings are what could be termed as “soft targets”. These soft targets include a politician (Sathyamurthy), an academic (Thambiah) and a journalist (Nadesan), while a senior bureaucrat (Maunaguruswamy) and another academic (Thirchelvam) survived an assassination attempt. The “soft targets” also include pauperized sections of society as well as former members, whose only mistake may have been to give food and shelter or provide information to this or that faction of the LTTE under duress and paid a heavy price as a result.
That, in all these cowardly acts, both the LTTE as well as the breakaway Karuna faction were involved is beyond any doubt. In this bloodletting, there is also an interesting difference in the propaganda and rhetoric adopted by both sides. On the part of the LTTE, it has consistently claimed that the perpetrators of these killings are the military and Tamil paramilitary groups. There is almost an aversion at pointing the finger directly at Karuna’s group, lest this belies its claim that the Batti-Amaparai region has been cleared of the Karuna menace. Further, in those cases where the LTTE is the perpetrator, it adopts its usual stoic silence, while allowing its media fronts to do the necessary justification, cover-up or plain news blackout in the Tamil media. The Karuna faction on the other hand appears to be falling over backwards in a might hurry to either claim responsibility for some of these killings or justifying them, so as to register their presence on the ground to the public as well as the international community.
In all this the role of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission is typically ambivalent. When the LTTE went on the rampage last year by resorting to an orgy of political killings of its adversaries who do not recognize them as the sole representatives, as well as Tamil members of the Sri Lankan intelligence, the SLMM took the position that they came within the ambit of a law and order problem and not a violation of the ceasefire agreement and, therefore, was not within its mandate. However, in the present spree of killings where the supporters of Vanni-based LTTE had suffered more at the hands of the Karuna faction, as Nadesan pointed out in his last article in the Sunday Veerakesari, the SLMM has suddenly begun expressing horror at the barbaric killings. They have also secured the commitment of the LTTE to track down the “criminal” elements. It is to its credit that Norway has suddenly woken-up, although it may have prevented the killings in the past had they done so then. It now remains to be seen as to how the SLMM would respond when the Vanni-based LTTE leadership unleashes its counter- retaliatory killings (if there is such a term) against soft targets in the endless orgy of killings and counter-killings. The recent firing on devotees at a Hindu temple in Batticaloa and the decapitating of two persons who were abducted from the temple is indicative of the anarchy prevailing in the Batti-Amparai region is a case in point.
Another factor which needs close scrutiny is the Sri Lankan security apparatus in the Eastern province. The killings, in particular, of Thambiah, the don from Eastern University and Nadesan in the heart of Batticaloa, widely believed to be the work of the Karuna faction, have led to allegations of complicity in the killings by the military-intelligence apparatus. Whether it is true or not, it is somewhat naïve to assume that the security personnel would be unhappy about the internecine killings. When the politicians and policymakers in Colombo associated with the peace process under the UNF Government (with temptations on the part of the UPFA government to follow suit) were not too disturbed about handing over the Tamil people to the LTTE as their “sole representative” (and may have even cynically thought to themselves, “they deserve each other in any case”), one cannot rule out the temptation on the part of the security apparatus to fish in troubled waters.
Be that as it may, Tamil society continues to be bedeviled by internecine and fratricidal killings. It has spread like cancer and has eroded the very legitimacy of the struggle for justice and equality vis a vis the Sri Lanka State. The LTTE, including its alienated Karuna faction, continue on the path of nihilism of destroying everything that stands in its way. The Tamil people, despite the military might of the LTTE and their sabre-rattling proxies in parliament, are becoming increasingly orphaned and powerless. Other
ex-militant groups who have entered the so called democratic mainstream are yet to go beyond being half-democrats with ambitions of becoming the sole alternative to the sole representative. Their failure in projecting a common democratic front to the LTTE proxies is a case in point. The notion that “if you are not one of us, then you are a traitor” is what consumed the lives of Tamil intellectuals and political activists who were committed to ensuring the dignity, security and socio-economic advancement of the People of the North-East, along with the Peoples of other regions. The list is far too long to be cited in this column. In fact it may need a separate column to merely list out the names. Pluralism and political diversity has become an anathema to those who claim to struggle for emancipation and justice. It is also a contradiction that will continue to dog Tamil nationalism in its struggle against Sinhala chauvinism. Tamil nationalism is fast losing its high moral ground. Perhaps it already has and is fast decaying.Aiyadurai Nadesan (or G.Nadesan as he signed off his columns in the Veerakesari) loved his People more than his pen. He was more a Tamil nationalist than a journalist. Hence he embodied all the contradictions contained in Tamil nationalism. The Tiger flag placed across his body at the funeral perhaps epitomizes this contradiction. As D.B.S.Jeyaraj observed about Nadesan in his column in the Sunday Leader, “His comments too never go to the extent of unbridled LTTE sycophancy like some others, since he himself is a Tamil nationalist and much of what he wrote was from that perspective….Since he was a `pro-Tiger’ due to compulsion rather than conviction, he sometimes took on a `Tigerish’ line. This was the case with many journalists in his position.”.
Sathya couldn’t agree more. Yet, whatever be the contradictions, Nadesan had the right to live and write as he sought fit, in keeping with his conscience. That right was denied to him by his assassins.
7th June, 2004.
[Previous: May 31][Next: June 14]
July 12, 2004: Colombo Suicide Blast – LTTE denies and Government ponders
By Sathya
Yet another female suicide bomber attained martyrdom and entered the famed photo gallery of Black Tigers by blowing herself up after having failed to get her target Douglas Devananda, the leader of EPDP and cabinet minister. The LTTE, promptly and predictably, denied responsibility, condemned the suicide attack and blamed it on “some elements who are working to disrupt peace efforts”, aimed at confusing the “people who are hoping for peace and disrupt the prevailing environment”. The LTTE in short said all the right things in public with the Canadian Foreign Minister giving the denial credibility by proclaiming that, “No person or group has claimed responsibility for this deplorable act. I urge all parties to refrain from casting blame while an investigation is under way”. It was as though the Canadian Government’s intelligence services never really knew that the LTTE never claims responsibility to suicide attacks and that martyrdom is bestowed and publicly proclaimed only after a period of time. But the targets are rarely admitted in public.
The US Embassy, on the other hand, in its statement wagged its finger at the LTTE which was carried in the Government-controlled Daily News with screaming headlines. Contrary to the feigned wisdom shown by the Canadian Government, the statement issued by the US Embassy, obviously with clearance from the US State Department, said that “although no one has claimed responsibility for the bombing, the incident bears the hallmarks of an LTTE attack”.
So, what has our own Government got to say as to who is responsible and why? Before Sathya turns his antenna in that direction, suffice it to say that the LTTE would certainly be disappointed if the Government actually believed its denial, since the suicide attack was in fact meant to be a message to the Government! The denial of the LTTE was of course for international consumption.
Now, what would have prompted the LTTE to strike at that given time and at that particular target? The answer in Sathya’s opinion is that the hit on LTTE members in Batticaloa on Black Tigers Day on July 5, a day venerated by the LTTE in recognition of its martyrs (but, undoubtedly despised by the loved ones of the victims of Black Tigers and by those who see such suicide attacks as acts of cowardice by those who order it), it was just a matter of time that LTTE leader Pirabhakaran would order a retaliation to what was clearly a case of extreme provocation. It was a message to the Government in the language that the LTTE speaks and unfortunately thinks is the only language that its enemies understand. In this instance, it was the language of the suicide blast in the vicinity of the Prime Minister’s Office, a strategically located police station, three foreign missions and two ministries. The message was, literally speaking, loud and, figuratively speaking, clear.
In short the message was that if the Government does not rein in Karuna’s hit squads or cease what the LTTE perceives as a “proxy war” waged through Karuna or in the name of Karuna, then it will strike. And, such strikes would not be confined to the Eastern theatre, but will reach into the heart of the capital city. If Douglas Devananda was targeted, it was a case of trying to kill two birds with one stone by also removing a threat to its `sole representative’ status. That Douglas Devananda had always been in LTTE’s hit list and will continue to be so is another matter.
The Government clearly had no illusions about LTTE’s involvement when it issued a statement that “the perpetrators of this act show callous disregard for human lives and are reverting to violence as means of settling disputes”. Although the LTTE was not named, the reference to “reverting” to violence was an oblique reference to the LTTE. Yet, the Government could not get itself to even say that it had the hallmarks of an LTTE attack, while its political spokespersons have gone out of their way to say that even if it was the LTTE, the target was after all a Tamil political opponent and therefore not a matter of grave concern as far as the peace process is concerned.
Every government of the day have this uncanny way of demonizing the LTTE when a war is on and having to dress the LTTE up as an angel or as an enemy of someone else, if it wants to talk to the LTTE. Why the devil cannot one speak to the demon? (Pardon the cynical pun, which has now become a habit to Sathya). Certainly, the LTTE does not come forward to negotiate with the Government of the day, because it sees it to be an angel? The pendulum swing from demonizing to evangelizing the LTTE is what makes successive Governments suspect in the eyes of the Tamil people as well as the international community, not to mention its own people – the Sinhalese. Sathya regrets having to refer to the Government in relation to ethnicity. But, that is precisely what the Governments have done by washing its hands off internecine and fratricidal killings within the Tamil community. This takes Sathya to two cases of black humour which invariably accompanies tragedy.
The first is the wisdom displayed in sections of the Tamil media that since the suicide bomber wore a nylon suicide jacket, as opposed to the denim jackets normally worn by LTTE suicide bombers, that it could not have been the LTTE. And, another newspaper while carrying the caption that the LTTE denies responsibility, indicated in its second heading that the female accomplice of the suicide bomber and worked in the EPDP office in Jaffna. The implication was that the LTTE could not have done it. Somehow the Tamil journalists who either filed the story or gave those stories the loaded headings seem to think that the readers are so gullible to think that the LTTE is not capable of technological innovation by switching from a bulky denim jacket to a less conspicuous nylon jacket. Or, that LTTE does not know the art of infiltration.
The other case of humour was the statement issued by the UPFA General Secretary Susil Premjayanth that “it was revealed in the police investigations that the sole intention of the suicide bomber was to kill Douglas Devananda’. So, the sole representative was after the sole alternative. That humour turned black when the Reuters quoted a Government spokesman of saying “It is the LTTE going after a political opponent. It is that and absolutely nothing else. It is resorting to violence to kill an opponent; it is not reverting to hostilities”. Clearly the Government was trying to neutralize the UNPs prankish campaign that peace was on the rocks and that the suicide bombers were back in Colombo in view the UPFA’s mishandling of peace process. Pirabhakaran must indeed be gnashing his teeth if he thought that the Government had not really got his message and may well be tempted to repeat the message. But, this time around it may not be a Tamil political opponent.
But, coming back to the point, the several statements coming from politicians in the SLFP also revealed a lurking chauvinism that grips most southern politicians. This is manifest in the mindset that as long as Tamils kill Tamils, there is no problem. So, when the LTTE engaged in its orgy of political killings including the killing of Tamil intelligence officers during the UNP’s lap around the peace track, the UNP and the Colombo establishment turned a blind eye. It was after all a case of Tamils killing Tamils. Now, it is the turn of the SLFP taking a similar position. Some things do not change. Chauvinism is not always crude. It can be very subtle indeed, akin to the commonly heard refrain “some of our best friends are Tamils” or “some of our best friends are Sinhalese”. Sathya’s antenna never fails to go up when such patronizing statements are made. In fact, with such friends who needs enemies!
In this case, the Sinhalese progressive are also not above guilt. In this context, Sathya wishes to reproduce a paragraph from his very first column titled, “Peace and Democracy are Indivisible” which was penned several months ago, but in another context. To quote: “It is forgotten by those well-meaning Sinhalese progressives who, perhaps as a result of their Sinhala “guilt”, see the LTTE as having given the Tamils their self-respect…. Those who speak eloquently today about the need to empower the LTTE in the process of transforming them were quite unconcerned when other Tamil ex-militant organizations were going through the painful process of transforming themselves in the face of continuing chauvinism by the State and adventurism on the part of the LTTE. The same applies to international NGOs who take the task of engaging the LTTE with a missionary zeal, but view with contempt those Tamil militant organizations which laid down arms and entered the democratic mainstream. It is about time that Sinhalese progressives and democrats, who give expression to a collective Sinhala `guilt’ by extending to LTTE the credit of giving the Tamil people their self-respect and dignity, do some soul searching. Their position is untenable and also contrary to the principles of Democracy, Human Rights and Peace. These principles cannot be realized and enjoyed in one of the part of the country, while the people living in another part are denied these cherished values which alone give meaning to human existence, dignity and self-respect.”
Sathya’s stand taken then has become reinforced now in view of the utterances by spokespersons of the UPFA Government that the bomb blast in Colombo was no big deal, since the target was “only” a Tamil political opponent.
12th July,2004
[Previous:July 05] [Next: July 19]
June 28, 2004: The `Karuna Factor’: A Challenge or Obstacle to the Peace Process?
By Sathya
`Colonel’ Karuna is once again in the news, after his retreat and demobilization following the `Good Friday’ (9th April) putsch by the Vanni-based LTTE leadership against the Karuna forces in the Batti-Amparai region. The `news’ as revealed to the media by Karuna’s woman comrade Nilavini, who surrendered to the Vanni-based LTTE last week, is that the military-intelligence establishment provided Karuna, his family and some of his comrades protection in Colombo, a few days after the Good Friday offensive. Further, Ali Zahir Moulana a UNP National List Member of Parliament and a close confidante of Ranil Wickremesinghe, with equally close contacts with the Vanni-based LTTE leadership, revealed publicly that he had established contacts with Karuna at the request of LTTE Batti-Amparai leader Ramesh in order to escort Karuna and his comrades to Colombo as part of a deal aimed at offering Karuna an `exit’. He explained that he had done so on humanitarian grounds.
Following these revelations Ali Zahir Moulana resigned his seat from parliament so as to save his leader Ranil Wickremesinghe and the UNP from any embarrassment. That the UPFA was going to seize the opportunity to embarrass the UNP was also evident in the press briefing by Media Minister Mangala Samarasinghe and the reportage in the State media institutions which went to town on the Ali Moulana-LTTE nexus (read UNP-LTTE nexus). The UNP (indirectly) and the LTTE (directly) , on the other hand, accused the UPFA Government of duplicity and adventurism in extending support to Karuna and that its action could threaten the peace process and the ceasefire agreement. This allegation was denied by the UPFA Government, although the Media Minister Mangala Samaraweera did not rule out the possibility of individuals in the military-intelligence apparatus of establishing contacts with Karuna.
Meanwhile Douglas Devananda, leader of EPDP and cabinet minister, went public and declared that he had established contacts with Karuna after his retreat to extend political and morale support, but that he did not intend extending such support if Karuna resorted to armed action against the Vanni-based LTTE leadership.
It is clear from all these developments that the `Karuna factor’ is very much an issue that either needs to be `factored’ into the peace process or neutralised. It is not something that can be ignored or would fade away. It is for this reason that Sathya has posed the question as to whether the `Karuna Factor’ is a challenge or an obstacle to the peace process, which constitutes the theme of this week’s column. The answer to this key question is possible only after having considered the following series of ancillary questions most of which are, in the typical Sathya style, leading questions!
Firstly, why should anyone, UPFA Government and opposition UNP included, be apologetic about giving protection to Karuna at a time when the Vanni-based LTTE leadership deployed its fighting forces to quell an internal dissent through the force of arms and, in the process, violated many provision in the ceasefire agreement? It must be noted that the incidents exposed by Nilaveni, the one time comrade of Karuna, refers to the period immediately following the `Good Friday’ military putsch by the Vanni-based leadership against the Karuna forces, which resulted in him demobilizing his main armed formation and abandoning or destroying some of the heavy weaponry. Further, Karuna had then clearly stated his position that his decision to withdraw was to avoid a bloodbath and that his intention was to work towards the upliftment of the People of the Eastern province.
So, why should any Government of the day have any qualms or inhibitions in having given Karuna and his comrades protection either on humanitarian or on political grounds? Further, the issue of protection also applies to a large number of child soldiers who were demobilized by Karuna before retreating and who found their way to their respective homes and families, only to be hounded and re-recruited by the Vanni-based LTTE leadership. So, why should not the Government, including UNICEF and other humanitarian agencies, give protection to these underage recruits who had voluntarily returned to their homes? And, if they do give protection, why be apologetic?
In this context, despite attempts by the Media Minister Mangala Samaraweera to discredit the UNP through the Ali Zahir Moulana-Karuna episode by using the State media institutions in an highly partisan and unethical manner, one must give him credit for making a principled position that the Government’s offer to provide security to Karuna stands to date. Further one should welcome his mature statement, “We are duty bound to provide security to any citizen whose life is under threat. That offer stands, but the internal conflicts in the LTTE must be resolved within”. (Cited in Daily Mirror, 25th June).
But, there is the proverbial “other side of the coin” as well, which can be best summed through another series of (leading) questions. Having enjoyed the protection of the State, should Karuna and his forces be allowed to abuse the protection extended on political or humanitarian grounds by engaging in hostile operations or a proxy war against the Vanni-based LTTE in the Eastern province and elsewhere, including the intimidation and killing of their civilian sympathizers, particularly when there is a peace process on? Should the Tamil Broadcasting Corporation, London (TBC), which has a daily one hour prime slot in the Tamil National Service of the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation(SLBC) and whose Board members domiciled in Europe were subject to death threats from the LTTE for carrying news and analysis focusing on issues relating to human rights, pluralism and democracy in Tamil society and polity, now compromise itself by functioning as an `organ’ supportive of what the Karuna faction says and does (explicitly as well as implicitly) by carrying statements in a manner that is clearly propagandistic, provocative and inflammatory? This was already highlighted by Sathya in last week’s column.
In fact, during the whole of last week, the TBC broadcast in the state-owned SLBC carried interviews and an “Appeal to the Tamil people” by one Maaran, identified as spokesperson Batti-Amparai LTTE (Karuna Wing), virtually declaring war on Pirabhakaran and the “Vanni LTTE” and promising to bring the Eastern province under its total control within three months. The tone and the voice modulation behind the broadcast of these statements were clearly unprofessional, biased and jingoistic. By abusing the prime time obtained in the State-owned SLBC to engage in propagandistic materials aimed at fuelling an already inflammatory situation prevailing in the Batti-Amparai region and in endorsing the armed propaganda strategy of the Karuna faction, has made some including Sathya wonder whether the TBC is deviating from its original commitment of instilling a culture of tolerance, democratic dissent, humanism, pluralism and democracy to a brutalized and a dehumanized Tamil society and polity. While the Karuna faction has every right to exercise its right to self-defence, it should not be allowed to take the form of a proxy war that could scuttle the ceasefire and lead to the collapse of the peace process.
At the same time, maximum pressure should be exerted on the LTTE by the international community, the Government and the human rights lobby to cease immediately the hounding and the targeting of members and civilian sympathizers of the Karuna faction, the re-recruitment and conscription of underage recruits and adults demobilized by Karuna and who chose to return to their homes to lead a normal life. The genesis of the on-going orgy of killings and the climate of fear in the Eastern province clearly lies in the use of force by the Vanni-based LTTE leadership to settle internal differences and its failure (or inability) to recognize the specificity of the Eastern province as well as the principle of pluralism.
In conclusion, Sathya fully agrees with Jayadeva Uyangoda in his last weeks’ column to the Daily Mirror, where following a recent visit to Batticaloa he observed, “The issues raised in the Vanni-Karuna dispute are essentially political ones and should be resolved through political means, and not by means of internecine war and violence. Actually, the present crisis in the Tamil nationalist movement is one that will test the capacity of the LTTE as well as its breakaway faction to bring about any degree of political emancipation to the Tamil nation. It is quite an irony that both factions of the LTTE on this particular issue of the split have proved the critics of Tamil national struggle correct”.
Of course, Jayadeva Uyangoda, as a Sinhalese will not face any danger to his life for having made the above observation. However, Sathya being a Tamil, and who had got used to looking behind only one shoulder, now will have to learn to look behind both shoulders! Of course, in the process he may forget to look at the danger lying in front of him!! Such has been the plight of Tamil intellectuals, political activists and social reformers whose lives were claimed by self-appointed sole representatives and sole protectors of all variants for trying to arrest the slide into nihilism of the just and (once) peaceful struggle of the Tamil people for their identity, self-respect and social progress within a unified Sri Lanka.
But, Sathya is not prepared to roll over and play dead, so that he may live, while others around him die. That would be the most degrading form of existence.
28th June, 2004
June 14, 2004: Chandrika-TNA Talks – Cautious Optimism
By Sathya
The meeting that President Chandrika Kumaratunga had with members of the Tamil National Alliance on the night 10th June was eventful, to say the least. The first indicator of the seriousness of the talks was that the President did not keep them waiting (for too long) and that the meeting went on till around mid-night. That was certainly a good beginning. The second indicator was the responsible and an objective account of what transpired at the meeting given to the media by the TNA spokesperson R.Sampanthan, who is usually more prone to theatrics.
And, basically what transpired was that Chandrika Kumaratunga had agreed to commence negotiations with the LTTE, centered around the LTTE’s ISGA proposals, despite some reservations about the LTTE proposals for an interim mechanism for the North-East. The President, according to R.Sampanthan, had further indicated that negotiations on the core political issues will have to be taken up for negotiations at some stage, in the not too distant future. The above account was confirmed by the President in her address to the Nation on 12th night. She said that while the Government was committed to a dialogue with the LTTE on a lasting solution (read “core issues”), the Government was also ready to discuss with the LTTE interim measures (read “ISGA proposals”) that addresses the urgent need for development work in the North and East.
The green light given by the LTTE to the TNA to go ahead with the meeting with President Kumaratunga and Mr. R.Sampathan’s responsible rendition of the broad areas discussed to the media, despite attempts by our favourite morning telephone talk show moderator in the electronic media to ask him and Gunadasa Amerasekera the usual provocative and leading questions aimed more at embarrassing the UPFA Government than in enlightening the public of events and analysis, augurs well for the recommencement of peace talks between the Government and the LTTE. In this, the media has a responsible role to play as a custodian and watchdog, rather than as an agent provocateur.
Mr Sampanthan, of course, also had to engage in the public posturing that invariably goes parallely with negotiations. The Tamil Net cited the TNA spokesperson of having raised issues relating to the High Security Zones, the Prevention of Terrorism Act and that “the Tamils couldn’t be deceived any more by the Sinhala political leadership”. The Daily News of 12th June, on the other hand, in an inspired leak reported that Government sources said that the talks with the TNA were “cordial and constructive” and that “as a sequel to the discussions, the Government was `cautiously optimistic’ that direct talks would resume soon and that direct talks with the LTTE would be resumed soon and the peace process would go forward”.
But, this is only the beginning and there is a long way to go before we can go to sleep – including Sathya. The cynics would argue that Chandrika Kumaratunga’s move has an ulterior motive. The motive being, the need to neutralise the TNA members in parliament and secure their support to her Government. or, at least prevent its collapse. But, then it is motives and enlightened self-interest that galvanizes people into action. In that, it could also be argued that the Government was also galvanized into action by the communiqué of 1st June issued by the Sri Lanka donor Co-Chairs (i.e. the United States, the European Union, Japan and Norway) following their review meeting in Brussels. The Joint Press Release, began with the rather ominous tone, “in a world of competing crises, Sri Lanka Co-chairs came together and urged in the strongest possible terms a rapid resumption of the peace negotiations so that Sri Lanka can benefit from the generosity of the international community. They noted that, with so many other demands on donors, donor attention and funding might go elsewhere unless the peace process makes progress”.
While the above operative section in the Joint Press Release of the Co-Chairs was a clear signal to the Government, it is also clear that a strong signal was sent to the LTTE, both, in relation to human rights as well as the need for a pragmatic interim-interim arrangement for the North-East, till such time as negotiations conclude on the LTTE’s ISGA proposals. In addition to the ritualistic call on the LTTE to cease recruitment of children, not to mention the problem of re-recruitment of children following their demobilization by Karuna, and to release all remaining “underage soldiers”, the Co-Chairs appear to have recognized the reality that the ISGA Proposals do not contain the ingredients for a speedy agreement between the two parties. In its concluding paragraph, the Co-Chairs noted that “until effective administrative structures are in place in the North and East, the Co-Chairs encouraged the parties to agree on the establishment of effective delivery mechanisms for donor-financed development activities in the North-East”. (read” interim-interim measures”)
However, where the Co-Chairs are unclear is as to what they exactly mean by “progress” in the peace talks. The fact of the matter is that the two parties (i.e. the Government and the LTTE) have different perceptions of “progress”. To the LTTE, progress implies institutionalizing the ISGA and ensuring absolute control over the North-East for a protracted period. The “core” issue to the LTTE is precisely this, while the task of addressing the causes of the conflict has become more academic in view of its self-projection as a ‘state-in-the-making’. To the UPFA Government, “progress” implies addressing the core issues (i.e. the causes of the conflict) as a means of forging a durable and a permanent settlement that would eventually lead to the demilitarization and demobilization of the LTTE.
The paradox, as Sathya pointed out in an earlier column, is that while the ISGA proposals of the LTTE contain all the elements of the `core’ issues relating to self-rule for the North-East, but bereft of shared rule, the UPFA has embarked on a process of constitutional reforms in the South that is bereft of core issues (i.e. Self-rule and devolution of power to the North-East). This contradiction must surely make the Co-Chairs swivel in their chairs! But, as President Chandrika Kumaratunga observed in her address to the Nation, there is a “coincidence of interests” between the Government and the LTTE and it is perhaps this which may yet lead to a breakthrough – or a speedy collapse, after the coincidence of interests reach their maturity and the conflicts of interest resurface.
Be that as it may, confidence building measures, such as the meeting between CBK and TNA, should be intensified, while the fears and apprehensions of other political formations in the North-East and the South should be addressed and allayed through parallel negotiations aimed at making the process truly inclusive and durable. On its part, the LTTE should abandon its dubious claim to be the sole representative of the Tamil People and cease its attempts at establishing its hegemony over Tamil polity and society through the silencing and annihilation of dissent, and the denial of political diversity and pluralism through violence. Likewise, the security apparatus should stop fishing in troubled waters aimed at exacerbating internecine conflicts and rivalries within the Tamil movement.
But if all this can be achieved, then where is the problem? This is where Sathya is prone to the criticism that his advocacy is replete with idealism and bereft of real politic and pragmatism. It also raises an interesting debate on choice and free will, on the one hand, and fate and determinism, on the other. The answer lies concealed in a discourse between a sage and his disciple on an inquiry into fate and free will that Sathya came across recently. To paraphrase the conclusion that the sage and his disciple reached through their dialectical conversation: “The problem of conflict will be solved only at the end of conflict. But at that time the problem will have ceased to have any practical significance. Not only so, it will cease to exist. In other words, before the conflict begins, the problem is incapable of solution and, after the conflict ends, it is no longer necessary to find solution.”
Likewise. the debate as to whether the ISGA (not to be confused with interim-interim) or the Core Issues should come first is as fruitless as embarking on the inquiry as to the relative strength of fate and free will. Since, they are in fact one and the same.
Any takers for this Sathya riddle?
14th June 2004
[Previous: June 07] [Next: June 21]
May
31, 2004: Sole Representative
– Much Ado About Nothing!
By Sathya
The UPFA Secretary Susil Premjayanth on Saturday 9th May issued a statement which sought to clarify the UPFA’s stand on LTTE claim that they are the sole representative of the Tamil People. The statement further sought to clarify an observation made by Lakshman Kadirgamar that the Government by “implication” recognizes the LTTE as sole representative of the Tamils.
The JVP, a constituent member of the UPFA, however, issued a statement the following day on 10th May, that “that the LTTE should be a principal party to the negotiations. We will not accept the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamils”.
So, what exactly is LTTE’s status? This then constitutes this week’s Sathya Column.
Going back to the UPFA statement, the following is the operative section: “Negotiations concerning the resolution of the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka have always been conducted between the Government of the day and the LTTE except at Thimpu. On all such occasions the Government and the LTTE have been the principal negotiating partners. This was so during the time of President Premadasa, during the first administration of President Kumaratunga and during the two year regime in which former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremsinghe’s government was conducting the negotiations on behalf of Sri Lanka. This historical fact is reflected in the current Ceasefire Agreement which was signed only by the leader of the LTTE and the former Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. Thus, taking into account the political and ground realities concerning the conduct of the negotiations it is clear that the two principal parties at the negotiation table can only be the Government and the LTTE. It is on this basis that Foreign Minister Kadirgamar was correctly quoted by the “Island” Newspaper on 30th April 2004 under the headline, “Govt recognizes by implication LTTE as sole representative of Tamils”.
Firstly, it is factually incorrect that all negotiations after Thimpu on finding a negotiated settlement had taken place only between the Government and the LTTE. To set the record straight, following the collapse of the Thimpu Talks in mid-1985. the Government of India, playing the role of a mediator, initiated a series of “proximity talks” that involved primarily the Sri Lankan Government and the TULF. However, all other Tamil politico-military organizations represented at Thimpu (i.e. LTTE, EPRLF, TELO, EROS and PLOTE) continued to be consulted. The “proximity” talks were based initially on what was called the “Draft Framework of Accord and Understanding” of 30th August 1985 which later evolved into what came to be termed the “December 19” proposals of 1986. The Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987 recognized these two proposals as the basis for future negotiations. Unfortunately and, this remains the main flaw in the Accord, future negotiations on “residual matters” were to be conducted only between the two Governments. But, the point to be noted is that all Tamil parties that took part in Thimpu were invited to a meeting with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on the eve of the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord in July 29, 1987 to ascertain any apprehensions or observations that they may have on the terms of the Accord and related matters. This meeting took place the day before Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi left for Colombo
If one moves on to the tragic developments following the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord and the renewal of armed hostilities, this time between the LTTE and the IPKF, what we had was the passage of the 13th Amendment which was rushed through parliament without any meaningful negotiations on “residual matters”. Be that as it may, elections to the North-East Provincial Council were held in November 1988 and the EPRLF-led coalition formed the first and the only elected N-E Provincial Council to date. That the polls were severely flawed with the EPRLF-led coalition enjoying the full patronage of the IPKF is no secret. But, what is relevant to the issue is that negotiations commenced between Chief Minister Varadarajaperumal of North-East Provincial Government and President Premadasa on giving effect to devolution of power embodied in the 13th Amendment to the Constitution. In fact, the North-East Provincial Government in its first policy statement on assuming office declared that the powers devolved under the 13th Amendment “hardly satisfy the aspirations of the Tamil speaking people of the North East province” and that it would commence negotiations with the Premadasa Government with a view to “working out a satisfactory package of devolution”. That the outcome of these negotiations was far from satisfactory is another matter. But the fact of the matter is that negotiations did take place with Tamil political parties other than the LTTE. This again belies the statement issued by the UPFA that negotiations after the Thimpu Talks, concerning the resolution of the ethnic problem, had been held only between the LTTE and the Sri Lanka Government.
Again, one cannot ignore that in both the All Party Conference convened by President Premadasa in 1989-90 as well as in the Mangala Moonesinghe Parliamentary Select Committee of 1991-92, the Tamil interests were represented by Tamil political parties other than the LTTE. Neither were these parties the “proxies” of the LTTE. In fact, when the issue of de-merger cropped-up, seven Tamil organizations, TULF, EPRLF, ENDLF, ACTC, EROS and PLOTE presented a Joint Memorandum to the Chairman of the Select Committee stressing that “We are of the considered view that, as far as the Tamil People are concerned, any meaningful attempt at solving the Tamil Question can only be on the basis of an unified politico-administrative entity” for the merged North-East”. Here again, the issue that Sathya is raising here is not the pros and cons of merger/de-merger, but the fact that Tamil political parties, other than the LTTE were in fact engaged in negotiations on resolving the Ethnic Question during this period.
Still again, following the collapse of the PA-LTTE peace talks of 1994-95, for the first time in Sri Lankan contemporary history, the Government of the day recommended the dismantling of the unitary state and its replacement with a “union of regions” based on the federal idea. One of the architects was the late Dr Neelan Tiruchelvam, a Tamil intellectual cum politician, who was by no means a LTTE ideologue or a LTTE proxy! He was in fact blown to bits by a LTTE suicide bomber!
In sum, the stand taken in the UPFA statement that “Negotiations concerning the resolution of the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka have always been conducted between the Government of the day and the LTTE except at Thimpu.” is, to put it mildly, untenable.
Now let us proceed to the claim by the LTTE that it is the sole representative of the Tamil People and the statement of the UPFA that the LTTE are the sole representative by “implication”. That the LTTE should explicitly assert that it is the sole representative of the Tamil people is understandable and predictable. It cannot be otherwise. That is the very nature of the LTTE which stands for everything that is a negation of democracy!
But, pray how could anyone else imply or confer the “sole representative” of the Tamil people on the LTTE or on anyone else for that matter? The LTTE, obviously, has a role to play as the principal negotiator when it comes to negotiations and the direct talks. But that is negotiations. How does that make the LTTE the sole representative of a People? While the term “principal” negotiator is consistent with the principles and norms of negotiations given the ground politico-military reality, the term “sole representative” has far reaching connotations and consequences. The very term itself is obsolete, archaic and un-democratic.
It is indeed ironic that many cite the outcome of the polls in the North-East as sufficient cause to extend to LTTE this status of “sole representative”. That the manner in which both the election campaigning and the electoral process was conducted was farcical is now well recorded and will no doubt resurface if the election petition of the EPDP and the Fundamental Rights Case of Anandasangary are taken up by the judiciary . But, even if one were to assume that the LTTE proxies swept the polls in a free and fair elections, does it make the victors the sole representative of an entire people for all times? Are we then saying that there is no need for elections in the North-East in the future? Are we not ignoring the fact that although the LTTE may be monolithic, Tamil society is not? Are we not rejecting the principles of pluralism and political diversity? Or, if one takes the national level, is it in fact necessary for a political party to be represented in parliament to be considered as representing the interests of those who voted for them? For instance prior to 1994, when the JVP had no representation in parliament, could one have argued that the JVP did not represent sections of the Sinhalese People? Or. Conversely could one have argued that the UNP and the SLFP together constitute the sole representatives of the Sinhalese People?
As H.L.de Silva, with whom Sathya had locked horns on several occasions in the past and across the ethnic divide, noted in a recent public lecture, “there can be no question of a single group being the `sole representative’ of a people, even though they claim to be their liberators and the repositories of ultimate wisdom. That is naked hegemonism which is the very anti-thesis of self-determination”. Suffice it to say, the concept of Sole Representation has no place in any discourse on democracy or for that matter in any democratic society.
The notion of a principal negotiator, on the other hand, is quite consistent with acceptable norms and principles of negotiations. In this context, the clarification of Lakshman Kadirgamar during the discussion that followed his presentation at the Brookings Institute in Washington D.C last week that the Government sees the LTTE by implication as the sole representative of the Tamil people only “at the negotiating table” and would include “the whole community outside the negotiating table to ensure that everyone understands the issues and the progress in negotiations” somewhat salvages the confusion created by the earlier reported comment when he was in India.
It was in the end all a case of much ado about nothing!
May 31, 2004
[Previous: May 24] [Next: June 07]
May 24, 2004: Core Issues or ISGA? – A Classic Case of a False Question!
By Sathya
“ Institutionalize ISGA, then the core issues can be discussed!”. This was the headline in the LTTE Peace Secretariat website given to a lead news item as regards LTTE’s position on the agenda for future talks, following the meeting that Norway’s Special Envoy Erik Solheim had with Thamilselvan, the Head of LTTE’s Political Wing on 26th May. In further elaborating, Thamilselvan is quoted as saying, “institutionalizing the ISGA should take place first so that we can demonstrate to the people that their urgent humanitarian needs would be effectively met with by the ISGA”.
Although the official position of the Government is not known at the time of writing this column, the LTTE website quotes Erik Solheim of saying that the “President is of the view that the discussion on ISGA proposals should take place parallel to the discussion on core issues”. To digress a bit, the LTTE Peace Secretariat’s added observation that “the Norwegian team agreed with the sentiments expressed by Mr. Tamilselvan” must clearly be an embarrassment to Norway, who continue to claim that they are only a postman and a facilitator and not a mediator.
Be that as it may, the theme of this week’s Sathya column is not Norway’s role, but the implications of “parallely vs stage-by-stage” debate that dominated the 1994-95 peace talks between the then Kumaratunga Government and the LTTE and which has now come back to haunt the on-going peace process.
The 1994-95 PA-LTTE Talks perhaps is the forum where the interconnectedness between Substance (or core issues) and Process were discussed extensively – but, with no agreement reached on the relative importance of each at a given conjuncture. To digress once again, that these “discussions” took place through a series of exchange of letters perhaps also underscores the importance of a neutral third party facilitator. To return to the theme of this column, the PA Government’s position perhaps was most explicitly stated in the letter of 9th March 1995 by President Chandrika Kumaratunga to LTTE leader Velupillai Pirabhakaran, when the negotiations were already beginning to go awry. To quote: “The government has also insistently stated that negotiations to (these matters) need not delay the commencement of political talks since the two could proceed parallely”. The letter further proposed that “ talks regarding the political settlement of the ethnic problem should commence on any dates between 2nd to 10th April…Our package of proposals for a political settlement would be sent to you in advance.” These talks, of course never took place. The LTTE pulled out leading to the commencement of Eelam War 3, hence reinforcing the commonly held belief that the LTTE shuns negotiations on core political issues, since it would necessitate the public abandonment of its goal of a separate and a sovereign State of Tamil Eelam.
The LTTE’s perspective on this issue, on the other hand, is best brought out by Anton Balasingham in his analysis of the 1994-95 talks in his book Duplicity in Politics: “…there was a total misreading in the government circles that the LTTE was avoiding political negotiations…. It was our concern that a permanent political settlement should satisfy the political aspirations of the Tamil people and also alleviate the apprehensions of the Sinhala masses. We knew this to be a difficult task. It would require a great deal of mutual dialogue; possibly over a long period of time. It was precisely for this reason we wanted the urgent day to day problems of the people to be addressed and resolved in the initial stages of the dialogue”.
It is not the intention here to look into the pros and cons of the stance taken by both sides, then. What is relevant now is that the debate (i.e. parallely or stage-by-stage) is once again occupying centre-stage in the peace process, except that this time around there is a concrete proposal by the LTTE to establish what it terms “An Agreement to Establish an Interim Self-Governing Authority for the NorthEast of the Island of Sri Lanka” or popularly known as the ISGA. The explicit purpose according to the proposal is to provide for the urgent needs of the people of the NorthEast relating to resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development in the NorthEast.
However, what the LTTE refuses to concede in public is that its ISGA proposals go far beyond the task of setting up an appropriate institutional mechanism to absorb and disburse humanitarian assistance so as to address the day-to-day problems of the people of the NorthEast. On the contrary, the ISGA embodies core political issues and is in a sense a proto-model of both an autonomous State within a unified Sri Lanka or a separate and a sovereign State of Tamil Eelam State. The ISGA proposals address issues that span “plenary power for the governance of the NorthEast” and “revenue raising including imposition of taxes, revenue, levies and duties, law and order, and over land”, “separate institutions for the administration of justice”, all expenditures in or for the NorthEast “shall be subject to the control of the ISGA”, “powers to borrow internally and externally, provide guarantees and indemnities, receive aid directly, and engage in or regulate internal and external trade” and, if Sathya is allowed to take a deep breath, so on.
If all of the above are not core political issues relating to self-rule and autonomy, then what are core political issues? This clearly demonstrates that the debate between core political issues versus ISGA or the debate relating to addressing the causes of the conflict as opposed to the consequences of the conflict, in fact becomes a false debate. Paradoxically, the LTTE by placing its ISGA proposals has in effect brought the core political issues into agenda for talks, and the sooner it acknowledges this reality the better as far as the re-commencement of peace talks are concerned. Alternatively, the LTTE, if it wants an interim administration only for the purpose of addressing the day-to-day problems of the people and related humanitarian and developmental activities, then its proposal for an interim administration should be so structured.
Likewise, if the UPFA Government insists on parallel negotiations on core political issues, then it has to reveal its package of proposals relating to devolution and regional autonomy. It is conceivable that the Government may well refer the LTTE to the devolution proposals spanning the 1995 August proposals to the 2000 Draft Bill. It is not clear, however, as to how JVP, a key constituent member of the UPFA, would respond to these sets of proposals. A Party that considers devolution to be obsolete and speaks only of decentralization of administration will have to go through the same process of transformation that the LTTE will have to undergo in being able to address the issue of self-rule and shared-rule within a transformed Sri Lanka State. The same applies to the UNP which although remaining coy on the ISGA issue and despite the Oslo declaration on exploring federal structures has not taken a clear position on these vital issues.
So, how does one break the impasse?
Para 4 of the Preamble to the ISGA proposals in fact states that the LTTE is “Determined to establish an interim self-governing authority for the NorthEast region and to provide for the urgent needs of the people of the NorthEast by formulating laws and policies and, effectively and expeditiously executing all resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development in the NorthEast, while the process for reaching a final settlement remains ongoing” (Italics mine). This is a clear recognition of the reality that any interim arrangement can only be an integral part of a final negotiated political and a constitutional settlement to the Ethnic Question. Is this not a sufficient base to commence negotiations on the in interim as well as the final? So why is the LTTE balking at stating the obvious and why is the Government excluding devolution from the brief given to Advisory Committee on Constitutional reforms, if it is committed to negotiating on core political issues?
The answer to Sathya is obvious. The principal parties in the history of our past attempts at a negotiated settlement are invariably the principal culprits in violating all the norms and rules of principled negotiations. To Sathya principled negotiations is all about firstly knowing one’s own interests and then placing them at the table up-front, so that both sides know exactly what they are negotiating about and why. In the context of a lack of either clarity or a surfeit of duplicity on both sides, a dignified and a just peace will remain elusive to all peoples of this country.
May 24, 2004
[Previous: May 17] [Next: May 31]
May 10, 2004: Recommencement of the Peace Process – Continuity or Change?
By Sathya
The agency wires, print media as well as the grapevine were clogged with reports and analysis relating to the renewal of the stalled peace talks between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. The catalyst was, of course, the recent visit to Colombo by the Norwegian deputy foreign minister Vidar Helgessen and Special Envoy Erik Solheim, to be followed by a high-ranking visit by the Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Peterson scheduled for next week. The itinerary includes meetings with President Chandrika Kumaratunga and the LTTE leader, Velupillai Pirabhakaran.
Some of the issues currently occupying centre stage can be listed as follows: Will the LTTE continue to be recognized as the `sole representative’ in the talks or will there be greater inclusivity? Will the Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) be the sole basis for negotiations or would it be based on a multiple-agenda? Will Norway continue to wear the two hats as the sole mediator in negotiations and the Head Monitor of the Ceasefire Agreement? Would the CFA itself undergo any fundamental change?
In fact all of the above boils down to one key question, namely, will the recommencement of the stalled peace talks as well as the advancing of the peace process be a continuity from where it stopped (or stalled), or would there be any re-designing of the process and a possible disjuncture? In short, will there be continuity or change?
At the outset it can be safely assumed that the LTTE clearly prefers a continuity and to proceed along the same “principles” and “atmosphere”, as it indicated in a recent press release issued from Kilinochchi . In fact it has every right to prefer a continuity given that the peace process, as it was conducted by the UNF Government with inputs from Norway over the past 2 years, led to the LTTE consolidating itself in terms of territory, arms and ammunition, cadres and legitimacy, not to mention the extermination of perceived “traitors”, whether be it Tamil members of the Sri Lankan military-intelligence operatives or activists and leaders of Tamil political parties which refuse to recognize the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil people.
The LTTE’s perception of “continuity” is based on the assumption that the peace talks stalled only after President Chandrika Kumaratunga assumed the Defence Portfolio on November 4, 2003, just a week after the LTTE unveiled its proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority for the North-East (ISGA). It is therefore assumed that
the peace talks should commence with the ISGA as the “sole” basis for negotiations. It is also an assumption that the opposition UNP seems to favour, although it remains conveniently coy on its actual position on the ISGA.It is Sathya’s contention that the above assumption is fundamentally flawed. The official peace talks or Track One negotiations in fact stalled not in November 2003, but in April of 2003 when the LTTE took the decision to suspend its participation in official talks with the Government. In a letter sent to then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe dated 21st April, 2003, the LTTE declared that it had “decided to suspend its participation in the negotiations for the time being” and to not attend the Tokyo donor conference in June 2003. The reasons cited by the LTTE included frustration at not being invited for the international donor conference in Washington on 14 April 2004 and delays in restoring normalcy in the Tamil areas and in addressing the grievances of the internally displaced persons.
However, it is interesting that the LTTE should have decided to suspend its participation in official negotiations precisely at the moment when human rights issues as well as core political issues were being brought into the agenda. It may be recalled that at the 6th Session of Talks in Hakone, Japan from 18-24 March 2003, the parties asked their international human rights advisor, Ian Martin, to draft a Declaration of Human Rights and Humanitarian Principles, the planning of a programme of human rights training for LTTE cadres and government officials and the strengthening of the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka to enable it to develop the capacity for increasingly effective monitoring throughout the country.
It was further agreed to expand some preliminary issues and a framework for political matters into a “complete plan” at the 7th Session of talks. This was in reference to the Sub-Committee on Political Matters which was mandated to go into federal structures in accordance with the Oslo Declaration of December 2002, which committed the Government and the LTTE to “explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka.” It is Sathya’s contention that the un-stated reasons for the LTTE to suspend its participation in direct talks in April 2003 were its reluctance to engage on issues relating to human rights as well as on matters relating to a final negotiated political and constitutional settlement.
Be that as it may, if there is to be any continuity in the peace talks, it is logical to argue that it must continue not from the ISGA proposals unveiled in October 2003, but from the decisions taken at the 6th Session of Talks in March 2003 and from the situation prevailing when the LTTE opted out of the talks in April 2003. Herein lies the duplicity in LTTE’s stand as well as in the stance of those who argue in favour of continuity having only the ISGA in mind, whilst ignoring matters relating to humanitarian issues, human rights and a final constitutional and political settlement. In this context, it is unrealistic to demand that the ISGA should be the “sole” basis for negotiations, although it can and must constitute one of many items in a multiple peace agenda.
Let us now take the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). It is clear that from the time it was signed in February 2002 by LTTE leader Velupillai Pirabhakaran and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, without the knowledge and consent of President Kumaratunga, the Head of State and the Commander-in-Chief, the CFA had undergone numerous changes. In fact, the LTTE did at one time demand its re-negotiation so as to incorporate sea movement of LTTE cadres into the agreement, , with Norway coming out with a proposal that sought to give de jure status to the de facto LTTE naval units. In addition, it is now abundantly clear that the UNF Government was prepared to look the other way when the LTTE brought in shiploads of arms and ammunitions. This was all done in the name of maintaining a “military balance”. As Austin Fernando the former Secretary to the Ministry of Defence conceded recently in an article to the Daily Mirror (8th May,2004), “many are not aware that the Ministry of Defence, Peace Secretariat, Security Forces, SLMM and LTTE have come into provisional arrangements, which are not clear in the CFA”.
It is therefore clear that the CFA is not something that can be expected to be static. It is bound to evolve to such a point that it would either require formal amendments to give its many ad hoc measures a legal standing or the removal and replacement of those provisions that are inimical to the smooth implementation of the CFA. Further, the CFA has to go beyond being an instrument that only regulates relations between the two standing armed forces and venture into areas where these forces infringe on the collective and individual human rights of civilians. This includes political killings, child recruitment, the High Security Zones, extra-judicial killings and so on which continue to plague the peace process. In short the re-negotiation of the CFA is unavoidable when the peace talks recommence. To argue otherwise is to play the ostrich.
Finally, one cannot run away from LTTE’s insistent claims that it is the sole representative of the Tamils and that the Government should speak to no one other than itself. But, does that mean that the principle of inclusivity should be sacrificed? The answer is simply NO. The LTTE can be conferred the status of “sole” representative at the “head table” as before where only three actors were seated, namely representatives of the Government of Sri Lanka, LTTE and Norway. Even here, injustice was done to the Muslims of the Eastern province when despite assurances given that there shall be a separate Muslim delegation, it was never implemented. This lacunae needs to bridged when peace talks recommence. Further, the LTTE cannot insist on its “sole representative” status at the “long table” comprising other political parties and legitimate stakeholders, including civil society. That ‘long table”, where broad consultations could take place, was not evident in the UNF-Norway-LTTE scheme of things. In fact, this was seen as an hindrance by the holy trinity. This must change. Inclusivity is an essential prerequisite to ensure the durability, sustainability and equity in any peace process. This does not necessarily mean that the “head table” and the “long table” should be located at the same venue and at the same time.
Lastly, the LTTE should realise that it is a part of the Tamil people and society and not vice versa, In fact, when the ISGA proposals were being formulated, the LTTE merely informed its parliamentary proxies, the TNA of its decisions. The TNA was not in any way consulted or even allowed to partake in the deliberations that led to the formulation of the ISGA. It is therefore clear that even in relation to Tamil interests the “sole representative” status of the LTTE should be qualified and confined only to the “head table”. It should not obstruct the wider Tamil opinion and interest from being articulated and incorporated into the wider peace process.
In sum, it is Sathya’s contention that continuity for the sake of continuity is not necessarily a good thing. At times a disjuncture is necessary to take a process forward and evolve to a higher stage. Neither the LTTE, the UNF nor Norway should in any way feel threatened by the notions of re-designing the peace process, if there is such a need. Likewise, the UNFA and, in particular, the JVP should not try to use the re-designing of the peace process as a means of scuttling it. Herein lies the need for civil society to intervene so as to ensure that a balance between change and continuity is maintained.
May 10, 2004
[Previous: May 03] [Next: May 17]
May 3, 2004: Resumption of Norwegian Role: A Reassessment
By Sathya
The Norwegians are back in town! By the time this column appears in print, the Norwegian delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgessen and including Special Advisor Erik Solheim would have arrived in Colombo with a meeting scheduled with President Chandrika Kumaratunga and the leader of LTTE Political Wing Thamilchelvan in Kilinochchi. The turn of events followed a telephone conversation between the President and the Norwegian Prime Minister on April 22, which was highlighted in a press release issued by the President’s Secretariat, calling on the Norwegian Government to resume its facilitator role. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs likewise issued a press release a few days later on 27th April stating that “the Norwegian delegation will explore with the two parties possible ways to take the peace process forward and how Norway might assist in this regard”.
So, what are the implications of this development? This then the theme of this week’s Sathya’s column.
Firstly, it may be recalled that at a media briefing in Colombo on Friday the 15th November, 2003 the Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgessen announced quite dramatically that Norway will “go home and wait” till there is clarity as to who is holding responsibility on the side of the government. Further, the operative paragraph in the prepared text that was circulated to journalists at the media briefing stated, “ As far as our mandate goes, we have one clear conclusion: peace talks could have started tomorrow, provided there was clarity about who is holding responsibility on behalf of the Government for the continuation of the Ceasefire Agreement. Until last week there was such clarity. Today there is no such clarity”.
This was in relation to the move by President Chandrika Kumaratunga to assume the Defence portfolio, amongst other portfolios, on 4th November, 2003, sparking a political crisis and paving the way for the subsequent holding of General Elections of February 2, 2004. The timing as well as the manner in which Norway temporarily halted its role as a facilitator/mediator was widely interpreted by many political commentators, as an attempt at shaping events in the national political scene as well as in forging international opinion against the move by President Chandrika Kumaratunga. The fact that Norway took no such decision to suspend its role, when the LTTE decided to pull out of official negotiations in April last year, was often cited as a case of duplicity on the part of Norway. In this context, it was also predictable that when the Karuna episode erupted the SLMM pulled-out, allowing the Vanni-based LTTE leadership to send in reinforcements to the East in clear violation of the ceasefire agreement.
That is now history. The recently concluded General Election has thrown up a Government which, although a minority Government, does not face the problem of cohabitation between an Executive President and a Prime Minister who belong to different political formations. However, it remains to be seen whether the constituent members of the UNFA can cohabit amongst themselves! But, that is another matter. The fact of the matter now is that the UNFA in its election manifesto clearly stated that the ceasefire would continue and negotiations will recommence with the LTTE, but along a “correct” path.So, what is the “correct” path envisaged by the UNFA and would the LTTE agree? For instance, LTTE’s chief negotiator and political advisor (also known as the “ideologue”) Anton Balasingham, soon after the President’s announcement calling on Norway to resume its role, told the Jaffna-based Uthayan newspaper, “Before resuming the peace process, our leadership is deeply and clearly examining President Chandrika Kumaratunga government’s true position in relation to the key areas of the process. We will invite Norway on our part only if the leadership is satisfied with the situation. Our leadership will not show any urgency in this regard”.
The LTTE has also clearly stipulated that its proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) will constitute the basis for future negotiations. It can be expected that the LTTE may want to re-define the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in a manner that addresses the issue of High Security Zones (HSZs) and sea movement. And, if the issue of re-negotiating the CFA were to crop up, it is conceivable that the Government may want the districts of Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu, which were excluded from the CFA as well as from the purview of the SLMM, to be included. The other vexed issue relates to inclusivity vs sole representative status for the LTTE. These are issues that will be addressed as the peace process gains momentum. On the other hand, it is conceivable that they may well be placed on the back-burner, while a process of Confidence-building Measures (CBMs) are initiated and implemented prior to the commencement of direct talks, facilitated/mediated by Norway.
But returning to Norway’s role, one area that needs to be re-examined is its hitherto dual role as the facilitator/mediator and monitor. As a facilitator/mediator, Norway’s primary concern is to the peace process and not rocking the peace boat. As such, when it comes to its role as the Head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), it has sought to subordinate its monitoring role to its mediatory role, to the extent of turning a blind eye to gross ceasefire and human rights violations by the LTTE and sometimes the Government. In the context that the SLMM has no powers of enforcement, it has to rely on “naming and shaming” as the main instrument of deterrence. This, Norway has unfortunately desisted from doing for fear of embarrassing the LTTE. It also goes contrary to its agenda of empowerment and legitimization of the LTTE as a “partner” in the peace process. The outcome of this deficiency has been the virtual granting of a licence to the LTTE to engage in child conscription and political killings.
It is in this context that Norway should take seriously the recommendation made by a team of concerned academics and intellectuals (i.e. Tyrol Ferdinands, Kumar Rupesinghe, Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, Jayadeva Uyangoda and Norbert Ropers) in their monograph, “The Sri Lankan Peace Process at Crossroads”. To quote: “ Explore together with the parties how the leadership of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) could be handed over to another country without endangering the stability of the truce in order to ensure no conflicts of interest between the roles of facilitator and of the monitor”.
In conclusion, while Sathya is appreciative of the intentions of Norway which is to assist the parties in taking the peace process forward, the consequences of the methodology adopted by it so far has been inimical to pluralism, democracy and human rights. The Norwegian Government must realise that when it involves itself in the affairs and problems of the peoples of other countries and nations, it has a far greater responsibility than when handling the affairs of its own people. This applies to Sates as well as individuals.
May 3, 2004
[Previous: April 26] [Next: May 10]
May 17, 2004: Some Lessons from the two General Elections across the Palk Strait
By Sathya
The recently concluded General Election in India came as more of a shock to the pollsters and stock exchange speculators than to the masses. All election forecasts relating to the outcome of the elections turned out to be woefully wrong. They were so badly off the mark that they sounded more like weather forecasts. All polls predicted that the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) would get the most number of seats. Where the various polls differed was in relation to the margin of the victory and over whether the NDA would be able to get an absolute majority. In the end Congress Party(I) ended up getting more seats than the BJP.
In contrast, the pollsters in Sri Lanka came out with flying colours. Although the various polls conducted and published were not exactly election forecasts, but polls on election-related issues, a reading between the lines clearly indicated that there was widespread alienation with the UNP. It was clear from these polls that except on matters relating to the absence of war, the UNP had alienated itself from the broad cross-sections of the Sinhalese People, barring the urban rich and the rural-urban middle classes.
So, Lesson One is that while election forecasts are as fickle as weather forecasts, polling on election-related issues are safer. In the case of the latter, one cannot be proven to be totally wrong with immense possibilities for multiple correlations and multiple interpretations to get away with, if the projections go wrong.
Another matter of stark contrast between the two General Elections across the Palk Strait is the manner in which the out-going Prime Ministers interpreted the outcome of the polls. Atal Behari Vajpayee, in his address to the Nation even before the Election Commission had announced the final results, epitomized dignity and won over the hearts of even those who voted against him when he declared that although his party had lost, the elections was a victory for India. Our own Ranil Wickremsinghe, on the other hand, was all defiance in his first public statement after it had become clear that his party had suffered a comprehensive defeat. Not only did he take some time to resign, but also when he did he made it clear that he would anxiously be-in-waiting!
On the other hand, the immediate post-election situation, in both cases, were punctuated by controversies and delays in the formation of the Government. In the case of Sri Lanka, the standoff between the SLFP and the JVP over the allocation of portfolios led to a considerable delay in the formation of the full cabinet. In the case of India, there was again a delay in the formation of a Government, although of a shorter duration, over the high drama linked to Sonia Gandhi’s decision not to assume the Prime Ministerial portfolio and the left parties deciding not to join the government, but to support it from outside. The gimmicks by the inimitable Laloo Prasad Yadav further added colour to the proceedings in the run-up to the formation of the Cong (I) led Government.
Hence, Lesson Two is while there should be dignity in defeat, victory by itself does not imply stability, in the short run. As to what happens in the long run is any body’s guess. But what cannot be disputed is Maynard Keynes’ wry comment that, “in the long run we are all dead”.
There were also striking similarities in the factors that led to the outcome of the two General Elections across the Palk Strait. For one, despite impressive macro economic indicators in India and fairly stable indicators in Sri Lanka, they clearly did not have an impact on the micro situation. In particular the trickle down effect was non-existent or not enough to ameliorate rural poverty and low agricultural incomes. The rural masses voted overwhelmingly against neo-liberal economic reforms programmes advocated by the IMF and the World Bank and faithfully implemented by the two Governments, but with some differences in emphasis.
The “Shining India” slogan of the BJP and the “Regaining Sri Lanka” slogan of the UNP were based largely on what is now popularly known as “euphoric” economies. Those who were euphoric, incidentally, were the urban rich and the upper-middle classes, the business sector, stock exchange speculators and the Central Banks which release the figures. At least in the case of India, the growing middle class to a large extent acts as a cushion by providing a large domestic market and an effective demand. In the case of Sri Lanka, the “Regaining Sri Lanka” document, which was placed before the Donor Forum, spoke of a target growth rate of 10 % - a figure that was unquestionably euphoric, but with nothing to sustain it. The assumption that rural-urban migration is an inevitable outcome of economic growth and, hence, the emphasis on urban and infrastructural development to link the rural areas to the cities without any programmes for rural industrialization, not only left the problem of rural poverty and under-employment unaddressed, but further compounded the problem of urban ghetoization. The “Regaining Sri Lanka” strategy of the UNP was also largely based on the casino economy and the service sector, with little value added and forward and backward linkages within the national economy.
Both Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, widely known as the father of liberalization and market economy in India, and Sri Lanka’s Finance Minister Sarath Amunugama known for his advocacy of capitalism with a human face, have their work cut out for them. They have to while addressing the rising expectations of the rural masses and the youths generated by the change of Governments, cannot at the same time ignore the compulsions of globalization. In this, India once again is better placed to counter the negative aspects of globalization, while absorbing the positive, in view of its large domestic manufacturing sector which is beginning to go beyond and outside the domestic market, as well as its relatively strong negotiating positions vis a vis the Bretton Woods twins (i.e. the World Bank and IMF). In the case of Sri Lanka, the heavy reliance on the garments export sector at a time when the quotas are being phased out and the absence of a domestic manufacturing sector and a large home market is more vulnerable. Further, the burden of a war economy is still present, while the much expected peace dividends continues to be elusive.
So, Lesson Three is that the `euphoric economy’ is not enough to win elections. High rates of growth should be accompanied by a more equitable distribution of income, employment generation and balanced growth with due recognition of the fact that the bulk of the masses in India and Sri Lanka reside in the rural sector and are dependent on agriculture.
In conclusion, if anyone says that Sathya does not know his economics and can only talk and write about the ethnic conflict, peace process and related matters, they are dead wrong!
May 17, 2004
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April
26, 2004:
Reassertion of Tamil Nationalism – A Time Bomb!
By Sathya
“ Time is running out” said a re-elected Tamil member of parliament affiliated to the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) in a recent telephone interview to the morning News line programme. That telling remark which was made following the meeting that the elected TNA members of parliament had with the LTTE leader Velupillai Pirabhakaran following the General Election , in a way, is a wake-up call to all concerned and constitutes the theme of this week’s Sathya column. That the Member of Parliament is the son of a first cousin of Sathya, whose father is also a first cousin of the grand-father of the Tamil Member of Parliament, is another matter. So much for Sathya’s family tree which today stands like the Palmyra bereft of branches. Now to theme of this week’s column .
The message that has been emanating from the election campaign conducted so democratically by the TNA with the able-bodied backing of the LTTE conforming to all the norms of the electoral process in Sri Lanka, including impersonations, rigging and killing, and the message emanating after the elections could be paraphrased as follows: “The Tamil people have overwhelmingly accepted the LTTE as their sole, authentic representative and have given an overwhelming mandate for the implementation of the Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal of the LTTE. It is now for the Sinhala People and their polity to decide whether they recognize this mandate or not. This would ultimately decide whether we will continue to be a part of Sri Lanka or go our separate ways. The ball is now in your court and Tamil Nationalism is the name of the game”. But such phraseology is not alien to Sathya.
It may be recalled that the TULF based its 1977 General Election campaign on high-voltage Tamil nationalism. In its manifesto, it called for the establishment of “an independent, sovereign, secular, socialist state of Tamil Eelam”. The manifesto also made explicit its intention of forming a Constituent Assembly comprising the TULF members elected into the National Assembly (as the Legislature was then referred to) for the purpose of establishing “the independence of Tamil Eelam by bringing that constitution into operation either by peaceful means or by direct action or struggle”. The TULF ended up the second largest party in Parliament and the main opposition in an election that gave the UNP a 5/6ths majority. The SLFP was virtually decimated.
However, soon after the General Elections of July 1977, Prime Minister J.R.Jayawardene (he made himself the all-powerful Executive President the following year) issued the “if you want to fight, let there be a fight, if it is peace let there be peace” challenge to the TULF and to the Tamil People after having softened up the Tamil psyche through a state-sponsored anti-Tamil pogrom just one month after the General Election. The TULF ultimately settled for the District Development Councils (DDCs) in 1981. It was indeed a giant leap backwards from “Tamil Eelam” to the DDCs. Incidentally, J.R.Jayawardene assured a delegation of Buddhist clergy who had protested against the DDC Bill, that the District Councils did not even have powers enjoyed by the Municipal and Village Councils! Further, the leader of TULF and leader of the opposition in explaining to David Selbourne, a British academic cum journalist, as to why the TULF had accepted the DDCs, mentioned, “If I had told Jayawardene to go to hell, so many Tamils would have gone to heaven”.
Coming to the present, the TNA parliamentarians, the avatar of the TULF, continue to engage in high-voltage nationalist rhetoric for their political existence and physical survival. What is different now is that then the TULF had only the “boys” to contend with when they exerted pressure on them not to compromise. Likewise, J.R.Jayawardene was then certain that “terrorism” could be wiped out in one year. Well, it was to last till now! Now, the State has an entire conventional LTTE army staring at them across lines of control in the North and a long porous “border” in the East. The TNA parliamentarians have the conventional suicide bombers and pistol gangs to contend with waiting with “garlands” and the “pottu” in case they compromise or violate the oath they took before the photograph of the “national leader” before the elections. As to whether they re-took the oath in Kilinochchi after the election is a moot point. The presence of Pottu Amman, the head of LTTE’s Intelligence Wing, in all the meetings that the TNA have had with the LTTE in Kilinochchi must be somewhat disconcerting to the TNA parliamentarians, to say the least. Media reports and other “sources” indicate that the LTTE leader Velupillai Pirabhakaran had stipulated to the TNA parliamentarians in no uncertain terms that if the ISGA is not obtainable, then all steps should be taken to expose Colombo before the international community and proceed thereafter to asserting the external right to self-determination and, if necessary, separation. The Supremo does not mince words, although he certainly knows how to mix it with much humour.
On the flip side of the coin, the political instability in the South with a hung-parliament and a cohabitation crisis of a totally different nature within the ruling political alliance, the strident Sinhala-Buddhist platform of the JHU and the anti-devolution stance of the JVP all contribute to an unfolding scenario that clearly threatens the peace process. The recent statement of the Presidential Secretariat, confirmed by the Norwegian Government, calling on Norway to reassume its role in facilitating direct talks between the Government and the LTTE gives some assurance that the stalled peace talks will recommence, although with some delay. But, to sustain the peace process requires a sense of commitment and singularity of purpose on all sides.
So, what is to be done? Firstly, the UPFA should subordinate their petty political rivalries and get down to the task of Governance as expected by at least those who they claim have given them a mandate. The UPFA should further “hasten slowly” as Sathya argued in his column last week on its Constituent Assembly project that hinges on a unilinear or a bilinear agenda (i.e. Abolition of the executive Presidency and electoral reforms) and strive towards a wider and an incremental consensus, which includes devolution. Secondly, the UNP should play the role of a responsible opposition and not count the days when they can topple the Government, as hinted by Ranil Wickreminghe in his address following the elections. The UNP should also give a firm commitment to federal structures, which it has dodged so far, as stipulated in the Oslo Declaration of December, 2003. Needless to say, the urgent task of rehabilitation and the reconstruction of the devastated North-East, to which the UNF and the UNFA manifestos referred to, should be given top priority. Thirdly, the stalled peace talks with the LTTE should recommence unconditionally on both sides. The LTTE must realize that the notion of exposing Colombo before international opinion would only apply if the ISGA proposals are seen to be realistic. The notion of “take it or leave and if you leave it we will go our own way” is not negotiations. It is arrogance and, it is conceivable that it is the LTTE that may end up being exposed before international opinion. The LTTE should further realize that there is something called national opinion that includes Tamil opinion. And, Tamil opinion is for a peace that ensures their identity, dignity and security. It would indeed be ironic if the LTTE, the “sole representative” denies the Tamil People the above in their own homeland.
If the above conditions are not satisfied, then not only is time running out, but the time bomb would start ticking – assuming that it has not already.
Sathya as usual finds it difficult to conclude his columns without digressing into paradoxes which are profoundly trivial! A case in point is the news item that the LTTE has declared the “Karthigai Poo” (a variant of the Lily flower) as the national flower. Following this announcement, numerous Tamil websites have been attributing the flower to Lord Murugan who is characterized in these websites as the “Tamil God” and the “War God”. In Sathya’s opinion, this characterization is an anathema to everything that Lord Murugan stands for. The feet of Lord Murugan or Karthikeyan stands for surrender – the surrender of one’s own ego. It is following that surrender of one’s ego and megalomania should one call on His “Vel” (the spear) to protect oneself from the forces of evil. To think of the “Vel” as the destroyer of others, without having destroyed one’s own ego and megalomania is asking for trouble. And, finally the face of Lord Murugan, radiates nothing but serenity and love. There is no hatred or venom. Suffice it to say, none of these attributes of Lord Murugan symbolizes the ferocity of the Tiger emblem. It is a negation of everything that Lord Murugan stands for.
April 26, 2004
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April 19, 2004: Constitutional Reforms – Hasten Slowly!
By Sathya
A statement from the Presidential Secretariat last week announced that the first step had been taken towards the implementation of the pledge made by the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) in its election manifesto to carry out a programme on constitutional reforms. The first step referred to a meeting that President Chandrika Kumaratunga had with a team of advisors and legal consultants which was expected to be followed by a meeting with newly elected political leaders and representatives of the constituent parties of the UPFA. The statement further recalled that the manifesto sought the peoples mandate to formulate and promulgate a new Constitution since the 1978 Constitution had caused problems for effective governance and the “inherent” difficulty of securing the stipulated majorities in Parliament to bring about constitutional reforms. Hence a mandate was sought to overcome this “inherent” obstacle by convening a Constituent assembly comprising the newly elected members of the 13th Parliament. The statement also claimed a mandate at the General Elections as expressed in 106 of the 160 electorates and 14 of the islands 22 electoral districts. The draft of the new constitution to be formulated by the Constituent assembly would be placed before the people’s consent by way of a referendum thereby bowing to the will and the sovereignty of the People.
It is therefore clear that the newly elected UPFA has embarked on the tortuous process of constitution-making and constitutional reforms. That the present 1978 Constitution is severely, if not “inherently”, flawed and authoritarian in nature is now widely accepted. So what are the elements that need to be introduced and how, is the challenge that faces the newly elected UNFA. A greater challenge, however, is how to harness support from the political formations present in a hung-parliament as well as mobilize public legitimacy and acceptance. Both these are essential prerequisites to sustain and lead the constitutional reforms process to a successful conclusion in repealing or replacing the 1978 Constitution. This then is the theme of Sathya’s column this week.
It is abundantly clear that the UNF suffered a comprehensive defeat at the recently concluded General Election, although it is not that clear whether the UNFA enjoyed a comprehensive victory as in the case of the sweep enjoyed by the SLFP-led coalition in 1972 or the UNP romping to a victory with a 5/6ths majority in the 1977 General Election. However, it must be recognized that if the votes obtained are translated into the first-past-the-post equation, the UPFA would have indeed scored a comprehensive victory. However, the present Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system, which is the prevailing ground political reality, has denied the UPFA that sweeping victory in terms of seats in parliament. Further, it may be argued that the diverse ideological orientation and political priorities of the key constituent members of the UNFA, the SLFP and the JVP, makes it difficult for them to claim a mandate collectively. In fact media reports indicate that the JVP has claimed a mandate for itself, while the SLFP leadership is becoming increasingly concerned about losing its electoral base to the JVP. The fundamental difference relating to devolution of power or administrative decentralization as the basis for a political solution to the Ethnic Question is also a case in point.
On the other hand, it is conceivable that the UNFA would only introduce into the constitutional reforms process those elements on which there is agreement between the SLFP and the JVP. These are the abolition of the Executive Presidency and the reform of the electoral system. All indications are that the main focus of constitutional reforms by the UNFA would be unilinear or bilinear and not a comprehensive one. Let us look at the implications of this unfolding scenario.
As regards the Executive Presidential system, it clearly has to go. The office of the Executive President is so-powerful and authoritarian, that anyone occupying that office will necessarily conduct themselves as despots, just to do justice to that office! However, it is often argued that the minority parties prefer an Executive President elected directly by the people, since the Presidential candidate would have to rely on minority votes in a closely contested battle. But, this argument is untenable, since there is no guarantee that the elected Executive President would continue to be responsive to minority aspirations and grievances, in between elections. What could undermine the legitimacy of the constitutional reforms project is the perception that the UNFA is seeking to abolition the office of the Executive Presidency in view of the existing constitutional provision that prevents President Chandrika Kumaratunga from contesting for the third term. The fact that the SLFP-led People’s Alliance Government did not initiate a constitutional reforms process aimed at the abolition or the reform of the executive presidential system when it was elected into power in 1994 gives credence to this growing perception. On the other it is conceivable that the UNP would obstruct the steps being taken to abolition the executive presidential system, for reasons of political expediency and power equation, so as to enable Ranil Wickremesinghe to occupy the office that was so craftily created by his uncle, J.R.Jayawardene.
Be that as it may, the debate is bound to veer away from the issue of whether the office of the Executive Presidency should be abolished or reformed and traverse into narrow partisan politics and personality conflicts. This does not augur well for the proposed constituent assembly as well as public legitimacy.
As regards reforms to the electoral system, the PR system clearly stands in the way of political stability as well as the denial of majority aspirations. By majority, Sathya is referring to the numerical majority. On the other hand, it is undeniable that the PR system introduced balance of power into the Sri Lankan polity and created space for minority parties and other small political entities to make their presence in parliament, as well as to make their presence felt when it came to the formation of coalition governments. Any reform of the electoral system, therefore, needs to ensure that while the majority will is reflected in parliament, it does not lead to a tyranny of the majority. Hence, the need to combine the first-past-the-post system and the PR system, akin to the German model or its variants. This is an area which does no involve too much difficulty and should lend itself to a broad-based consensus. Likewise, issue pertaining to Good Governance and related Independent Commissions are amenable to a broad consensus and should not pose too much difficulties in having them introduced or re-introduced into the proposed new Constitution. The same applies to Fundamental and Human Rights.
The sticky issue as Sathya pointed out earlier is the differences in emphasis, if not actual fundamental differences, between the SLFP/People’s Alliance and the JVP on devolution of power and power-sharing, and on issues relating to the nature of relations between the proposed constituent assembly and the peace process. In all likelihood the UNFA is bound to leave devolution out of the process envisaged in the next few months and to incorporate devolution at a latter stage. However, it is imperative that some indication be brought into the Constitution as regards the contours of a final political and constitutional settlement, in addition to giving constitutional status and validity to any interim administration that may be established for the North-East.
On this issue, the LTTE and its proxies, the Tamil National Alliance which commands a sizeable number of seats in parliament, are bound to take a conveniently ambivalent position. On the one hand, LTTE clearly favours extra-constitutional or even contra-constitutional processes of setting up its proposed Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) for the North-East. On the other, its proxies, the Tamil National Alliance will be instructed to cry foul if the issue of devolution is kept out of the agenda of the proposed Constituent Assembly. In sum, it will be a case of the LTTE seeking to de-legitimize the Constituent Assembly while pushing for an extra-constitutional ISGA.
In view of the problematic sketched above, one may have to seriously consider the prospects of shaping an Interim Constitution to push through urgent reforms of the electoral system, the abolition or the reform of the Executive Presidency, the setting-up of Independent Commissions in order to de-politicize the public sector and the establishment of an interim administration for the North-East with pride of place to the LTTE, but not exclusively so. Issues relating to a final power sharing arrangement at the centre and the periphery as a means of addressing the Ethnic Question may be brought in at a latter stage, based on progress at the peace talks with the LTTE. The talks itself will have to be made inclusive and the proposed Constituent Assembly or an All Party Conference may continue to deliberate, even after the establishment of an Interim Constitution, on the issues arising out of the talks with the LTTE, thereby bringing about a link between the interim and the final. This would also ensure a linkage between official negotiations between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE and a broader, more inclusive process that would accommodate all other legitimate stakeholders. Another parallel process may have to be initiated to accommodate the concerns and proposals of civil society.
In sum, there are no short-cuts or quick-fixes when it comes to giving constitutional shape and form to the collective as well as shared vision and destiny of a People. The sovereignty of a People cannot be bartered away for the sake of political expediency. Similarly, the project of constitutional reforms cannot be postponed indefinitely, for the same reasons cited above.
Hasten slowly, may sound paradoxical. But, it is not. It is an ancient wisdom.
April 19, 2004
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