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November
22, 2005: After the Presidential Elections: A wake-up call to all!
By
Sathya
The outcome
of the Presidential Election with all the excitement and disappointments
of a one-day match is in the opinion of Sathya a wake up call to all,
including Sathya whose hibernation was once again rudely disturbed.
Firstly,
it was a wake up to the Tamil People. It was indeed a cruel irony that
their self-proclaimed "sole representative" was bent on defeating
Ranil Wickremesinghe, the Presidential candidate that the vast majority
of the Tamil people wanted to see emerge as the victor! Of course, it
was not the love for Ranil, but the fear of the Sinhala hardliners arrayed
behind Mahinda Rajapakse that propelled the Tamil voters in Ranil's
direction.
Ultimately,
the Tamil people living in areas under the direct military-intelligence
and propaganda control of the LTTE were disenfranchised by the LTTE.
It was not a boycott by the Tamil people. It was instead a boycott call
by the LTTE backed by coercion, intimidation and force. So how come
that the Tamil people behaved in a manner that was diametrically opposed
to that of their "sole representative", as evidenced by their
preference when they came out in their numbers and voted for Ranil in
areas where the Tigers could not directly and physically enforce their
control? Well, that is the question that the LTTE will have to ponder
over.
Meanwhile,
the decision of the LTTE to disenfranchise the Tamil voter at this Presidential
Election (in contrast to the creation of phantom voters at the last
General Elections!) could well be the third historical blunder of the
LTTE - the other two historical blunders being the expulsion of the
Muslim people from the "traditional Tamil homeland" compelling
the Muslim people to distance themselves from the Tamil national struggle
and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi which compelled India to list
the LTTE supremo and his intelligence chief as the most wanted criminals
in India.
If the LTTE reckoned that the International Community would empathise
with it if Mahinda Rajapakse is elected with the support of Sinhala
hardliners, they are in for another rude shock which is bound to follow
the earlier shock treatment meted out by the European Union by imposing
a travel ban on LTTE delegations.
If Anton
Balasingham, Thamilselvan or LTTE's international lobbyists were to
complain to the West about the "hardliners" in Colombo, they
are bound to be admonished for not allowing the people that they claim
to "solely" represent to vote and ensure a victory for Ranil
Wickremesinghe, their favoured candidate.
The writing
is already on the wall with the comment by John Cushnahan, EUs Head
of the Election Monitoring Mission at the media briefing following the
elections that he would take up LTTE "discriminatory" and
"unacceptable" behaviour with the Council of the European
Union.The second wake up call is to Ranil Wickremisnghe. His policy
of appeasement of the LTTE is not winning him any votes amongst broad
sections of the Sinhala people as well as the Muslim people - not to
mention the remnants as well as the fledgling Tamil democratic alternatives
to the LTTE. Further, the emphasis on negative peace (i.e. the mere
absence of war) with a so-called international security net to bail
him out if things go wrong and the notion of an agreement only with
the LTTE, with the SLFP being made a fait accompli is not exactly firing
the imagination of the people in the South.
Ranil would
also have realised that this is not the first time that the Tiger bit
the hand that fed it. It is imperative that Ranil should now put into
practice his campaign preachings about removing the peace process from
partisan politics and to extend support to Mahinda Rajapakse's fresh
approach to the peace process based on inclusivity and human rights
that goes beyond a mere "deal" between the Government of the
day and the LTTE.
The third
wake up call is to Mahinda Rajapakse. He must put into practice and
in deed his stirring words following the taking of oaths that he no
longer represents his voters and allies, but all sections of the Sri
Lanka society. He can neither pursue the peace process, manage a mixed
economy aimed at equitable growth or for that matter govern the country
if he allows himself to be held hostage to the forces of ethnic and
religious extremism and obscurantism in the south.
He has
to put into practice and deed his words following the taking of oaths
ceremony that he stands for an honourable peace for all the Peoples
of Sri Lanka. While inclusivity in the peace process was sorely lacking
in the manner in which it was being managed by Norway, LTTE and the
Government of the day since the signing of the ceasefire agreement,
Mahinda Rajapakse should recognize that once the process of consultations
aimed at a broad consensus is advanced, there will come a time when
the principle of "sufficient" consensus may have to be put
into place based on the principles of democracy, secularism, pluralism.
It is a consensus based on these principles that would ensure sustainability
and equality.
The fourth
wake up call is to the JVP. The JVP must realize that democracy, devolution
and development are inseparably linked and that one cannot be advanced
without the other.
In fact
power-sharing and resource-sharing could well be the key link between
democracy and development and is imperative particularly in a multi-ethnic,
multi-religious and multi-cultural country like Sri Lanka. Diversity
and differentiation rather than uniformity and homogeneity is the essence
of Marxist ideology and philosophy. It is incumbent on the JVP, if it
is truly a vanguard of the working people and the oppressed masses as
it perceives itself to be, to take forward the cry of devolution rather
than dismiss it as being archaic and obsolete.
In this
regard, statements by the JVP during the election campaign that if the
LTTE were to give up its demand for a separate state then the South
would be prepared to go beyond a unitary State is welcome and could
well be the basis for future negotiations. The responsibility now lies
with the JVP as the vanguard of the working people to go before the
people with that message rather than wait for a referendum and then
call on the people to vote against devolution.
The role
of a vanguard Marxist party (as the JVP perceives itself to be) is to
raise the level of mass consciousness, rather than to get bogged down
in false consciousness.
The fifth wake up call is to the religious organizations which are bent
on playing politics. Every religion has its essentials and non-essentials.
While the essentials of all religions are the same, it is the non-essentials
like rites, rituals, and the institutionalization of religion with their
personality cults that divide Peoples along religious lines.
State patronage to one religion in a multi-religious society leads to
the alienation of other religions, just as much as the proselytizing
based on global financial networks is the worst form of intolerance
and threat to religious freedom and harmony between religions. The despicable
manner in which religious organizations and personalities dabbled in
politics during the election campaign is a wake up call to the people
who espouse those religions to be vigilant against self-proclaimed messengers
and servants of God.
The final
wake up call is of course to Sathya to stop throwing brickbats at others
and to start looking inwards into the chasm that governs word and deed
of Colombo-based "civil" society to which he belongs! More
on this at an "appropriate" time!
November
22, 2005
[Previous:June
21, 2005]
June
21, 2005: JM, P-TOMS, TRC or “WHATEVER”: The fear of the
unknown
By
Sathya
The last
time that Sathya woke from his deep slumber was when tsunami wrecked
havoc with the lives and livelihood of peoples of Sri Lanka, irrespective
of religion, ethnicity or any other identity for which we are prepared
to lay down our lives as well as consume the lives of others.
In that
column, Sathya made a passionate case for imagination and courage in
converting the tragedy into an opportunity of linking tsunami recovery
and rebuilding with a redesigned peace process. To recall, “What
we need at this moment is imagination, creativity and singularity of
purpose.
Perhaps,
then we may still stand a chance. If not we are all doomed. Disasters,
natural or man-made, can well lead to a new era of opportunities and
equality for all peoples of Sri Lanka, if we so will collectively and
act in unison. (See Daily Mirror, January 4, 2005).
With those
wise words Sathya went into hibernation till he was rudely woken by
the thunder and lighting associated with the proposed Tsunami Joint
Mechanism (JM), which later metamorphosed into P-TOMS (Post-tsunami
Operations Management Structure) and the Tsunami Relief Council (TRC).
The term “mechanism” apparently when translated into Sinhala
had a terrifying impact on the Sinhala psyche. However, it was not so
terrifying on the Tamil psyche which when translated into Tamil (podhu
kattamaippu) means a “common structure” and comes closer
to the reality that a “joint mechanism”.
But then
I guess Sinhala opinion is what matters and therefore the term “joint
mechanism” which the President said was a creation of the media
in any case, was replaced with the term “Post-Tsunami Operational
Management Structure” and subsequently with the more populist
and less technical “Tsunami Refugee Council”. In a fit of
extreme exasperation Sathya will in this column use the term “WHATEVER”,
till the name is settled one way or the other.
The most
convincing argument in favour of “WHATEVER” is that this
the first time since the militarization of the ethnic conflict and after
several interludes of peace processes that the LTTE would be part of
a structured institution of the Sri Lankan State. This would be by way
of representation of the Government, the LTTE and the Muslim polity
in the apex, regional and district-level institutions which would work
closely with the State’s existing bureaucratic structures.
This however
should not be confused as a case of democratization of the LTTE, since
bureaucratic control is not sufficient to ensure the democratization
process, just as much as the capacity building of the LTTE does not
necessarily lead to transformation. On the contrary, the empowerment
of the LTTE without transformation, can only lead to the reinforcement
of what is.
The second
argument advanced in support of the “WHATEVER” is that the
rights of the Sinhalese and Muslims in the North-East would be both
represented and guaranteed. That is certainly reassuring, but it implies
that the LTTE would look after the Tamil interests (i.e. LTTE=Tamils),
while the Government and the Muslim polity would look after the Sinhalese
and Muslim interests, respectively.
The recent
media blitz by the National Peace Council (NPC) in advocating a case
for the “WHATEVER”, for instance, observed with absolute
sanctity that the ‘WHATEVER” would bring together the Government,
Muslim community and the LTTE in a common endeavour.
But, how
about bringing together the “Peoples” (in the plural). Why
did the NPC forget the Peoples? And, what of the rights of the Tamils
living in the North-East who live under the diktat of the LTTE and have
to contribute cash to the LTTEs coffers and children to its fighting
forces and all the other rights that we cherish like the right to dissent
and the right to life? Are we therefore saying that it is a matter between
the LTTE and the Tamil people to sort out as some Sinhalese democrats
with a Sinhala guilt seem to argue and who feel that the North-East
is not ready for democracy? But then can it be otherwise? These are
questions that arise not from Sinhala chauvinists, but by Tamil democrats.
In this context, the absence of a human rights clause in the WHATEVER
document is indeed worrying.
The third
argument advanced in support of the “WHATEVER” is the classic
“what then is the alternative argument”. It is premised
that the existing `No War, No Peace” scenario could be threatened
by not conceding to the LTTE its fetishism of being the “sole
representative” and the “sole arbiter” of Tamil interests
hinged on the notion that nothing shall reach the Tamil people till
it reaches the LTTE first.
It is argued
that any move to check this fetishism would lead to the LTTE raising
its clarion call of “War or Peace”. But then, for how long
can one allow the peace process to be held hostage to the repeated and
constant threats of war? And, can one have a peaceful environment in
a “No War, No Peace” situation where children continue to
be conscripted, dissidents on both sides continue to be killed, and
dissent is silenced by terror? For that matter, can the prevailing “No
War, No Peace” situation be sustained in the absence of peace
negotiations aimed at a durable, just and a permanent solution? But
then, can it be otherwise?
These are
some questions that is haunting Sathya. But, on the other hand, as Sathya
the rational thinker as opposed to Sathya the conscience keeper keeps
reminding, should we confine ourselves to the strait jacket of looking
at the future, only through the past. Does it matter to the victims
of tsunami what lies ahead, when their concerns are located in the here
and the now? And, cannot today’s terrorist become a pacifist democrat
tomorrow? (Of course, a peacenik may go further and pose the question
cannot the Tiger change its stripes?!) Has Sathya forgotten his passionate
appeal soon after tsunami to seize the opportunity and to link post-tsunami
recovery and reconstruction to advance the peace process? Should not
the President who, when compared to her predecessors and contemporaries
amongst Sinhala political leaders in Sri Lanka, clearly has the vision
and the determination to address the unresolved Tamil Question but is
impeded by Sinhala extremism and obscurantism, be given another chance
of restarting the stalled peace negotiations and the peace process through
the evolving WHATEVER?
These are
also questions that Sathya cannot simply dismiss.
Hence,
Sathya has taken the decision to support the “WHATEVER”
as well as the bold and courageous initiative taken by the President
as a necessity based on humanitarian and practical considerations, but
not as a principled position since there are many principles that will
be violated in the name of peace, just as many lives were consumed and
human rights violated during the ceasefire period in the name of peace.
As to whether
the JVPs concern that the country’s territorial integrity and
sovereignty would also be violated, although remote given the safeguards
built into the “WHATEVER”, cannot be ignored given LTTE’s
singularity of purpose in seizing every opportunity in its march towards
“Thamil Eelam” and the donor community’s vacillation.
The concerns
of the JHU and religious extremists, on the other hand, stems more from
Sinhala racism rather than from the teachings of Lord Buddha and will
ironically only pave the way for LTTE’s ‘Thamil Eelam”
and its perceived manifest destiny.
With that
Sathya returns to his deep slumber till the next time he is woken up.
Hopefully, then it would be the sound of the peace tolls and not the
death knell.
June
21, 2005
[Previous:June
4, 2005]
9th
August, 2004: The Troubled Peace Process – Time for a Reality
Check
By
Sathya
The peace
process is clearly stalled. There are no signs of the recommencement
of direct negotiations which was suspended last year when the LTTE sent
a letter to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe dated 21st April, 2003
that it had “decided to suspend its participation in the negotiations
for the time being”. However, the LTTE stressed that it was still
committed to a negotiated settlement and was not pulling out of the
peace process, although its spokespersons on several occasions characterised
the 6 rounds of talks from September 2002 to March 2003 in venues spanning
Oslo to Hakone as a “waste of time”.
While direct
negotiations ( “Track One” Negotiations in conflict resolution
jargon) remains suspended, the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) signed on 22nd
February 2002 by then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and LTTE leader
Velupillai Pirabhakaran with the stated objective of “bringing
an end to armed hostilities” and create “a positive atmosphere
in which further steps towards negotiations on a lasting solution can
be taken” has so far prevented a large scale outbreak of hostilities
or war between the two parties. However, the period since the signing
of the ceasefire agreement also witnessed gross human rights violations
that included child conscription, political killings, abductions and
extortion from the very inception. The perpetrator was the LTTE. The
recent round of killings and child re-recruitment, particularly in the
Eastern province, although a direct fall-out of the internecine conflict
within the LTTE has spilled over into the heart of Colombo city as well
as, according to unconfirmed reports trickling in last week, into the
LTTE’s nerve centre in Vanni.
To further compound the deteriorating security situation, neither Colombo
nor Kilinochchi seem to be clear about the agenda of talks, if and when
they do start. While the LTTE has been consistently insisting that “institutionalizing”
its Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) Proposal forwarded to the
UNF Government in November, 2003 should form the sole basis for negotiations
and should be de-linked from the process of seeking a final political
solution, the present UPFA Government has been equally persistent that
any interim arrangement should be part of a final political and constitutional
settlement.
However, it now appears that President Chandrika Kumaratunga is willing
to show some flexibility in commencing negotiation on an interim authority
as indicated by the press release, following her meeting with Norwegian
deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgessen on 27th July, where it was stated
that her government was “willing and is keen to commence negotiations
on an interim authority within the framework of a united state”.
The hawks in her ranks, however, managed to insert a lead story in the
Daily News of last Wednesday (4th August) with screaming headlines,
“UPFA says `no’ to LTTE’s ISGA proposals”. The
story attributed this stance to President Kumaratunga and cited SLFP
General Secretary Maitripala Sirisena as the source. As a case of confusion
confounded or as confusion clarified, the Daily News the following day
carried the following clarification that “ the Government emphasises
that that these media reports attributed to the statement said to have
been made by the President at the Executive Committee Meeting of the
Alliance Government at the President’s House recently are totally
misleading the public. In fact, what was stated at the meeting by the
President was that the Government’s stance on the resumption of
peace talks with the LTTE remains unchanged.”
So, what exactly is the stance of the Government? This was clarified
in the Government’s official website which comes directly under
the President’s secretariat, where it was stated that “The
president maintains that the government of Sri Lanka is willing to discuss
with the LTTE its proposals for an interim administration alongside
the talks to reach a final solution acceptable to all communities”.
But, the issue remains contentious since the LTTE has been insistent
on its position that its ISGA proposal should constitute the sole basis
for negotiations. In other words, we may well be heading towards a uni-linear
and a single-issue agenda trajectory which is precisely what the LTTE
has been propelling the peace process towards.
One may
recall that at the 2nd Session of Talks at Rose Gardens, Thailand from
31 October to 3 November, 2002, a decision was taken by the Government
and the LTTE to set up 3 Sub-committees. These were the Sub-Committee
on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North-East
(SIHRN), the Sub-Committee on De-escalation and Normalization and the
Sub-Committee to commence work in connection with relevant political
matters.
As regards
SIHRN, great pains were taken to demonstrate that it was not an interim
administration. This was once again seen as a pragmatic and innovative
measure to accommodate LTTE concerns that the formation of an interim
administration within existing constitutional provisions would tantamount
to it accepting the Sri Lankan constitution as it presently stands.
This is seen as an anathema by the LTTE After several months of intense
activities centred around SIHRN the LTTE in a letter addressed to the
Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister on 21st May 2003, requested him to
inform Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe that the LTTE now wanted
an “interim administrative structure” to be set-up with
“adequate powers to undertake Northeastern reconstruction and
development activities”. Several months earlier the LTTE had already
withdrawn from the Sub-Committee on De-escalation and Normalization
in view of issues relating to High Security Zones (HSZs) in Jaffna.
What is
further revealing is that the Sub-Committee on political parties where
it was decided that “the parties will jointly and separately address
in depth, at the current stage of the peace process, relevant subjects
such as other peace processes, political solutions to ethnic conflicts,
models and systems of governments, issues of post-conflict transition,
coordination of international assistance, and reconciliation processes”
never even met. As a matter of fact at the 6th Session of talks in Hakone
Japan from 18-24 March, 2003 the Government and the LTTE decided to
“expand some preliminary issues and a framework for political
matters into a `complete plan’ at the 7th Session of talks. This
of course did not take place since a month later the LTTE opted out
of direct negotiations and Track One negotiations went into a state
of limbo.
From the
above it is evident that the LTTE set the agenda and shaped events where
the agenda for talks finally became reduced to a single issue, namely
the setting up of an interim administration for the North-East with
full plenary powers of governance over the North-East under the hegemony
of the LTTE, ideally through extra-constitutional means. This is clearly
spelt out in the ISGA proposals of the LTTE which was unveiled with
much fanfare in late October, 2004.
So, where
does one proceed from here? Firstly, it is imperative that the UPFA
Government should assume a clear and a consistent position as regards
the agenda for negotiations. The constituent members of the UPFA Government
should understand that the term “Government” includes all
its consistent members. In this, it is imperative that the SLFP and
the JVP, should clarify their respective position on the agenda for
talks. Despite differences between the JVP and President Chandrika Kumaratunga
on how to advance the peace process, which may have well prompted her
to step down from the chair of the Executive Committee of the UPFA as
a signal that she would proceed with her peace strategy with or without
the JVP, the observation made by a high ranking member of the JVP and
Minister of Agriculture and Livestock Anura Kumara Dissanayaka at the
Cabinet briefing last Thursday is encouraging and should be a sufficient
basis for the SLFP and the JVP to formulate a common negotiation strategy
vis a vis the LTTE. The observation was that, “there should be
an administrative structure for the North and East, during the transition
period from the current situation to a final settlement. But our stand
is that the Interim Authority must be part of the final solution”.
It is for
the UPFA Government and its “think tank” now to formulate
a clear proposal that embodies the above and link the entire transitional
process spanning the interim to the final. Where appropriate the proposal
should draw on the LTTE’s ISGA proposal which in fact contains
core political issues as perceived by the LTTE. The time has also come
for civil society to take a more proactive role in formulating its own
proposals which may be placed before the Government and the LTTE and
all other stakeholders as a means of breaking the current impasse.
Meanwhile
all steps should be taken to ensure that the ceasefire holds and that
the parties adhere to the ceasefire agreement. Despite the deficiencies
in the ceasefire agreement, the entire peace process at present hinges
on the scrupulous adherence to the provisions in the ceasefire agreement.
Any tendency towards adventurism at this stage by the two parties could
well signal the total collapse of the peace process and the renewal
of war. However, it is also imperative that adherence does not mean
appeasement. The transition from an administrative mechanism to the
interim to the final cannot be just a mechanical process that is devoid
of human rights, including pluralism, democracy and the right to life.
Contrary to perceptions in sections of civil society as well as the
international community that human rights, pluralism and democracy over-burden
a fragile peace process, it is the recognition and observance of these
principles that nourishes and sustains any peace process. If today the
peace process in Sri Lanka is fragile it is precisely due to the violation
of human rights, and the principles of pluralism and democracy. This
is something that we in civil society should understand, even if the
Government and the LTTE fail to do so.
09th
August, 2004
[Previous:August
02] [Next: August 16]
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January
4, 2005: After tsunami: Linking peace building with reconstruction
By Satiya
Reports of
Sinhalese volunteers, from districts adjoining the North-East and elsewhere,
streaming into the affected areas to give relief and succour to their
Tamil and Muslim brethren is reflective of the sentiments in the south.
There were also reports of security personnel in the North contributing
300 pints of blood to the Vavunia base hospital. Further, the statements
issued by the Presidential Secretariat and the Peace Secretariat calling
on the LTTE to join hands with the Government in a concerted and coordinated
effort at overcoming the calamity were timely.
Tsunami,
which washed away lives and wrecked havoc on properties and sources of
livelihood regardless of religion and ethnicity, has undoubtedly contributed
to the bonding of human relations across the ethnic divide.
As President
Chandrika Kumaratunga reflected in her address to the nation, "the
tsunami has devastated our land with relentless indifference to regions,
provinces, ethnicities and religions and all other man-made frontiers".
Reports of
Sinhalese volunteers, from districts adjoining the North-East and elsewhere,
streaming into the affected areas to give relief and succour to their
Tamil and Muslim brethren is reflective of the sentiments in the south.
There were
also reports of security personnel in the North contributing 300 pints
of blood to the Vavunia base hospital. Further, the statements issued
by the Presidential Secretariat and the Peace Secretariat calling on the
LTTE to join hands with the Government in a concerted and coordinated
effort at overcoming the calamity were timely.
These sentiments
were also reciprocated by the head of the LTTE's political wing, S.P.Thamilselvan
following his meeting with the Norwegian Ambassador. He is reported to
have said that "this new tragic situation has laid the foundation
for both parties to come together and work towards closing the division
between the two parties.
The LTTE
is very happy and encouraged by the government's offer and this would
help break the rift between the two parties". But there have been
other reports which are deeply disturbing. Reports of the LTTE preventing
relief operations in areas under their control, the seizure of relief
items from relief convoys elsewhere and the stage-managed protest against
the visiting Government delegation headed by Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse
in Jaffna and Valvettithurai once again reveals the innate hegemonic trait
of the LTTE that nothing can move in the North-East without passing through
it.
Further,
the puerile and infantile attitude of the TNA Members of Parliament in
boycotting the national efforts initiated by the Government has only served
to bring disrepute to the Tamil people who are only too willing to share
their grief and succour with their Muslim and Sinhala brethren.
Likewise,
the Government should ensure that politico-military strategy and agenda
is not introduced into relief efforts in the North-East and that the sole
driving force should be its responsibility as a government to its citizens
irrespective of class, caste and ethnicity - not to mention politics.
There are
similarly shocking reports of vultures in the south swooping on the relief
items being sent to the North-East. In particular there seems to be an
organized move by certain Sinhala extremists' forces in Trincomalee to
prevent supplies sent by TRO from reaching the besieged and the suffering
people of the North-East.
Although
it is known that TRO is an arm of the LTTE that is no reason for preventing
it from engaging in relief and humanitarian work. That these vultures
are also swooping down on their own people in the south by stealing jewellery
items and other valuables from the deceased victims of Tsunami is another
matter.
In all this
gloom and agony left behind by Tsunami, perhaps there is a silver-lining
as is the case with most disasters.
The Tsunami
waves may have in fact rolled back the war clouds by venting its fury
on the naval infrastructure of the security forces and the LTTE in Jaffna,
Mullaitivu and Trincomalee.
Yet another
factor that would make both the LTTE and the GoSL think twice, if not
ten times, before embarking on or provoking hostilities is the combined
might of national and international opinion following the Tsunami horror.
As far as
national opinion is concerned, the sheer weight of the tragedy, the immediate
priority relating to relief efforts and the magnitude of the future task
of reconstruction will surely make the people, irrespective of their ethnicity,
rise up against any military adventurism by their sole or democratic representatives.
As far as international opinion is concerned, any move by the two parties
to resort to war mongering and sabre rattling will lead to both the Government
and the LTTE being reduced to a pariah status.
The LTTE
in particular which prior to the tsunami had intensified its conscription
drive and appear to be continuing after tsunami by exploiting the vulnerability
of the survivors and the displaced should take note.
But this
alone is not sufficient if one is to ensure that the task of relief, rehabilitation
and reconstruction of the war-ravaged areas that stalled because of the
stalemate in the peace process, as well as the challenge of relief and
reconstruction of the areas ravaged by Tsunami is to proceed without threats
of war breaking out.
Firstly,
the LTTE or its proxies the TNA should immediately join the Special Disaster
Management Task Force set up by the President in the national effort at
providing immediate relief to the people affected, salvaging the destruction
caused by Tsunami and taking forward the task of reconstruction.
Such a move
in addition to benefiting the besieged and suffering people in the North-East
would contribute to confidence-building measures and allay any distrust
and suspicion in the South as regards LTTE's motives and intentions.
The Government
should reciprocate by giving priority to the establishment of an interim
authority for the North-East with due pride of place to the LTTE, while
guaranteeing pluralism.
The LTTE,
similarly, should take the initiative in bringing to an end the bloody
internecine killings, which should be reciprocated by the coalition formed
by Karuna following the split within LTTE.
Other Tamil
political parties like the EPDP, EPRLF and PLOTE should be allowed to
engage in relief and reconstruction activities in the North-East without
hindrance by the LTTE in a spirit of cooperation and fraternity.
Secondly
the Government and the LTTE should jointly amend the ceasefire agreement
(CFA) to remove the clause which allows the parties to withdraw from the
CFA after giving two weeks notice and replace it with a moratorium against
all forms of offensive military operations for a period of 4 years.
In addition,
the districts of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi, which were excluded from
the CFA in a misplaced exercise in creative ambiguity, should be brought
within the ambit of the CFA. During this 4-year period all attempts should
be made to go beyond the establishment of an Interim Authority for the
North-East with pride of place to the LTTE, to the forging of a final
constitutional and political settlement to the Ethnic Question that guarantees
democracy, pluralism and power sharing based on self rule and shared rule.
Simultaneously
and parallel, all parties in the South should declare a moratorium against
all forms of narrow partisan politics and strive to form an Interim National
Government of Reconciliation and Reconstruction.
An Interim
Constitution may be considered for the purpose of institutionalising an
Interim Authority for the North-East with pride of place to the LTTE,
the abolition or reform of the Executive Presidential System and power
sharing between the ruling coalition and the opposition during this period.
A final and
a comprehensive constitution that addresses all other areas relating to
governance, including an equitable and a durable solution to the vital
Ethnic Question, should be finalized before the completion of the 4-year
period. A framework on Fundamental and Human Rights should inform the
process from the outset.
Thirdly the
international donor community, based on the above commitments by the relevant
actors and forces within Sri Lanka, should release the aid commitment
totaling US$ 4.5 billion made at the Tokyo donor conference of last year
without any delay.
In order
to ensure that the commitments by the Government and the LTTE are adhered
to and funds distributed equitably, a group of countries representing
the donor community as well as India may consider sending a Multi-National
Peacekeeping and Reconstruction Force which would monitor and enforce
the ceasefire agreement as well as assist in the task of reconstruction.
Norway could
concentrate on its role as the facilitator and not be burdened with the
monitoring of the CFA which has proven to be ineffective and contentious
in any case.
What Sathya
has spelt out above may sound out of the world. But so was tsunami till
it hit us. Peace-building and Reconstruction, with international support
and monitoring, need to go hand in hand.
Further it
needs no elaboration that Peace and Reconstruction are indivisible and
cannot be confined to just one part of the country. What we need at this
moment is imagination, creativity and singularity of purpose. Perhaps
then we may still stand a chance. If not we are all doomed.
Disasters,
natural or man-made, can well lead to a new era of opportunities and equality
for all peoples of Sri Lanka, if we so will collectively and act in unison.
May we all face up to the challenge in the year 2005 and years to come
with unity and purity in thought, word and action.
January
4, 2005
[Previous:August
09] [Next: June 21, 2005]
2nd
August, 2004: July 1983 Pogrom – An Historical Apology
By Sathya
Twenty-One
Years after one of the most meticulously planned and executed state-sponsored
pogrom in world’s contemporary history by the then President J.R.Jayawardene
and his henchmen in the cabinet, the present Head of State President Chandrika
Kumaratunga apologized to the Tamil people and the Nation. The occasion
for this historic apology was a symbolic ceremony on Friday 23rd July
at the Presidential Secretariat, where some of the victims of `Black July’
were awarded compensation, following the findings and recommendations
of the Presidential Truth Commission. Although the setting-up of the Truth
Commission under the PA Government a few years ago was dictated largely
by partisan politics aimed at creating maximum embarrassment for the UNP
and did not conform to the norms and practices of Truth Commission elsewhere,
the apology by the President was unconditional and was by no means partisan.
The operative section in her address needs to be etched in our collective
memory, so that the barbarism demonstrated by the State and by the mobs
mobilized by it for the purpose of terrorising the Tamil people into submission
is never repeated. Sathya likewise wishes to etch these words in his column.
To quote:
“At least now I believe that I and we as a nation and especially
the Sri Lankan State should come of age, look the truth in the face and
make a national apology, first to all the victims of that day in Black
July and then beyond them to the entire Nation. Perhaps it is the responsibility
of the State and the Government to engage in that exercise first and foremost,
and then all of us as the Nation, every citizen in this country should
collectively accept the blame and make that apology to all of you here
who are the representatives or the direct victims of that violence, and
through you to all the other tens of thousands who suffered by these incidents.
I would like to assign to myself the necessary task on behalf of the State
of Sri Lanka, the Government and on behalf of all of us, all the citizens
of Sri Lanka to extend that apology. It is late but I think it is still
not too late”.
The response
on the part of the LTTE and their proxies in parliament was typical. For
instance, S. Elilan Trincomalee District political head of the LTTE at
a public meeting in Trincomalee in memory of the victims of the Welikada
prison massacre in July 1983 is reported by the TamilNet website as saying,
“We regard Sri Lanka’s President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s
public apology for the 1983 pogrom against the Tamils as a deceptive attempt,
driven by political expediency rather than principles to placate the Tamils”.
The TNA parliamentarians present typically took the cue and in their speeches
cast aspersions on the motives of Chandrika Kumaratunga.
Sathya, who
left the professional and social mainstream to join the Tamil National
Movement precisely because of July 1983 pogrom, accepts the apology of
the President unconditionally and without inhibitions. It was indeed an
act of courage for Chandrika Kumaratunga to have articulated not only
her sentiments, but the sentiments of the vast majority of the Sinhalese
who were themselves horrified by the 1983 July pogrom. The burning of
the Jaffna Library in 1981 and the anti-Tamil pogrom of 1983 which were
entirely State-sponsored stand as symbols of eternal shame to the UNP.
Sathya recalls the anger he felt when President J.R.Jayawardene and his
key UNP cabinet ministers paraded before the TV after maintaining a deafening
sound of silence for four long and bloody days of sheer barbarism by hoodlums
and security personnel under the patronage of prominent UNP politicians.
They in their statements simply ignored the traumatized Tamil People and
instead sought the apology of the Sinhalese people for the shortages and
long queues that had formed to buy bread because of the riots. The Tamils
who had survived the carnage, of course, were either in refugee camps
or too terrified to join any queues. Ranil Wickremesinghe was then a cabinet
minister. He must acknowledge this, assume individual and collective responsibility,
and apologise to the Tamil People if he is serious about reconciliation.
Likewise,
it would have been morally, politically and historically more correct
had the President also referred to mistakes made by her Government as
well as the party that she belongs to. The passage of the “Sinhala
Only” Act of 1956, the attack on Federal Party MPs by hoodlums in
Galle Face Green as they were staging a satyagraha facing the Parliament,
and the heckling of these Tamil MPS as they walked into parliament with
blood-drenched shirts by Sinhalese parliamentarians, including Prime Minister
S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike, the anti-Tamil riots of 1956 and 1958, the discriminatory
education policy under the guise of `standardization’ in the early
70s, and the indiscriminate arrests and incarceration in prison of Tamil
youth political activists all contributed to the erosion of self-respect
of the Tamils and the eventual resort to armed resistance by Tamil youths
as a means of re-establishing that self-respect that their parents had
lost.
Sathya also
recalls with regret the feudal ceremony that was conducted to celebrate
the capture of Jaffna from the grip of the LTTE following Operation Riviresa
in 1995. Although the Tamil People also abhorred the manner in which the
LTTE engineered a forced exodus of civilians out of Jaffna during Operation
Riviresa that led to immense deprivation and massive displacement of the
people of Jaffna, it is clear that the public ceremony with Colonel Ratwatte
walking up to President Kumaratunga to hand over the scroll announcing
the capture of Jaffna was feudal, silly and pompous. It also hurt the
sensitivities of the Tamil people, including those who bitterly resented
the LTTE. Victories in battles are not something to be celebrated, since
there are also defeats that may follow. That is the nature of War as the
disastrous “War for Peace” campaign later revealed, when the
State lost territory as well as manpower.
Be that as
it may, this is supposed to be peace times. Although, we are not in a
post-conflict situation, the time for reconciliation is NOW. It is neither
too early nor too late. In this context, the time has also come for the
LTTE as well as other Tamil ex-militant organizations which entered the
democratic mainstream, to extend an apology to the Sinhala and Muslim
Peoples for attacks against innocent civilians and ethnic cleansing that
took place in the name of “liberation”. The Anuradhapura massacre
on Poya Day on May 14, 1985 when more than 150 pilgrims who had thronged
the city were mowed down and the ethnic cleansing of the Muslims from
the North, including massacres in mosques in the East, in the 90s although
carried out by the LTTE are just two of numerous such atrocities that
were carried out by the LTTE and other Tamil militant organizations. They,
in the same manner that President Kumaratunga extended an apology on the
part of the State as well as all Sri Lankans for the 1983 July pogrom,
owe the Sinhala and Muslim Peoples an unconditional apology on behalf
of the Tamil People in whose name these atrocities were committed. In
any event, Sathya, a one time spokesperson and a member of the leadership
of a Tamil politico-military organization which later joined the democratic
mainstream only to soil its hands in that polluted stream, extends an
apology to the Sinhalese and Muslim peoples. He expects his former comrades
to do likewise.
The lessons
that Sathya learnt about the seeds of violence in relation to the ethnic
conflict can be summed as follows. Firstly, the peaceful and non-violent
forms of struggle against institutionalised discrimination by the State
may not have taken a violent form if not for the use of violence by the
State to crush these non-violent and democratic forms of struggle. The
ethnic conflict may well have become protracted and intractable. But,
it was the violence unleashed by the State to crush all forms of dissent
that led to the ethnic conflict itself becoming violent. Secondly, the
victims of violence soon become the mirror image of the perpetrators of
violence. That is what happened to Tamil militancy. It began to acquire
the ugly face of the State that it was fighting against.
The lesson
that Sathya learnt (or is in the process of learning) on the seeds of
peace and reconciliation can be summed as follows. While the past must
be addressed in order to reach the future, the present is an all important
key to reconciliation, since it is in the present that the past ends and
the future begins. Let us acknowledge the past, but not get bogged down
in it. Let us rectify ourselves in the present and envision a better future,
since the future is always carved out in the present. To be overburdened
by both the remorse of the past and the anxieties of the future only lead
to a state of paralysis.
In sum, let
us walk hand in hand in the collective endeavour of making this island
of ours one country that belongs to all, while recognizing the full richness
of our respective ethnic, religious and cultural diversities. It is not
utopia. It is the only existential path to survival.
2nd
August, 2004
[Previous:July
26] [Next: August 09]
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July
26, 2004: Unethical religious conversions: Is there a role for legislation?
By
Sathya
Now that
an Anti-Conversion Bill has been placed on the Order Paper in parliament
by the JHU, the issue of unethical conversion as well as responses to
it are back again on the agenda. Another proposal initiated by Minister
Ratnasiri Wickremanayake but diplomatically titled, "Act for Protection
of Religious Freedom", although not tabled in parliament is doing
its rounds.
The responses
to the Bill itself by way of a flurry of petitions before the Supreme
Court challenging the constitutionality of the Bill is further bound
to keep alive the issue. The purpose of this week's Sathya column is
not to bring the draft bill and the proposed legislation under scrutiny,
but to pose the more fundamental question, is there a role for legislation
aimed at preventing unethical conversions and, if not, what then is
the remedy.
My simple
answer to the question is No, there is no role for legislation, but,
Yes, there is something called `unethical' religious conversions which
needs to be addressed and redressed. Sathya does not accept the argument
that there is no such thing as unethical religious conversions in Sri
Lanka and that nothing can or must be done to neutralise the threat
that unethical conversions pose to religious co-existence, social stability
and cohesiveness.
Let me
elaborate on both these positions which may appear to be a contradiction
- but, is not.
Let us
begin with the question of recourse to legislation in a bid to prevent
religious conversions. I do not believe that it would work. Neither
is it desirable. The reason is not that, as some would argue, such legislations
cannot be implemented or its implementation regulated. There are numerous
legislations on social issues spanning child labour to ragging which
cannot be totally implemented or regulated to our satisfaction. Yet,
these legislations are important since they act as an indicator of basic
norms of conduct - they set certain social standards which are necessary
for the establishment of a humane society as well as basic decency in
human conduct.
The reason
that I do not accept legislations to curb religious conversions is also
not because it infringes on basic choice as some would argue. Religious
conversions are in fact a fundamental right based on personal faith
and beliefs. However, when conversions are justified on grounds that
religion is no different from market place transactions and that there
is no such thing as a "free lunch", then it militates against
my notion of religion. Unhindered "freedom" is akin to the
Elephant singing "Each Man for Himself and God for All" as
it danced amongst the chickens.
Sathya's
primary opposition to legislation to curb religious conversions stems
from his perception and belief that there is no single path to salvation
and that faith is essentially also about choice. That path could vary
from intense devotion (Bhakthi), to intense self-less action (Karma),
to the search for knowledge and wisdom (Gnana). Hinduism, the religion
that Sathya was born into, rebelled against and has returned to like
the prodigal son, caters to individuals with diverse personalities who
may be located at varying levels of consciousness and existence. For
instance, the concluding section of Bhagavad Gita, following a discourse
on the different paths to salvation and liberation between Krishna and
Arjuna, has Krishna proclaiming: " Thus, has the Wisdom, more secret
than all secrets, been declared to you by Me; having reflected over
it fully, you act as you choose". (Ch 28, Sloga 63).
My opposition
to legislation to curb religious conversions also stems from my social
democratic instinct that opposes any form of hegemony. In the Sri Lankan
context any legislation to curb religious conversions is bound to proclaim
the pride of place that our constitution bestows on Buddhism. This opens
up space whereby any legislation to curb religious conversions may actually
be used to establish the hegemony of one religion over the others. Such
legislation could also be used against charitable and social service
organizations set up by religious bodies (other than Buddhist) to help
the needy and the destitute.
But, as
a social democrat who leans more towards social rights and duties as
opposed to the unfettered rights of individuals, Sathya is also concerned
about the manner in which ‘unethical’ conversions adversely
impact on the individual psyche as well as our society which is multi-religious
and where stability can be maintained only through religious co-existence
- not, religious hegemony. We would be playing the ostrich if we were
to pretend that the `unethical' conversions taking place at present
and the reactions and resistance to it are not social issues. In fact
`unethical' conversions are a real issue that could lead to an explosive
situation if not addressed and contained.
But, how
does one define "unethical" conversions? In order to answer
this, one needs to look a bit more closely into the concept of Christian
`charity'. The doling out of material benefits and charity certainly
is a laudable act. But, the motive and intentions are equally important.
An act
in itself is neither good nor bad. It is the intention behind that act
that determines the quality of that act in relation to the doer. That
act of charity also becomes an issue if in the process it does violence
to the self-respect and self-esteem of those who receive them. In this
context, instances where converts are asked by their "shepherd"
to demonstrate their renunciation by burning the scriptures and the
symbols of the religion that they hitherto believed in are clearly acts
of violence. It also does violence and is a case of intolerance, if
the recipient of charity is urged to embrace another religion not out
of conviction, but out of economic and material necessity. The methods
used range from the crude to the subtle, but there is no doubt in Sathya's
mind that those who seek to convert know this.
So, how
does one respond to "unethical" conversions without recourse
to legislation? Clearly and needless to say, violence and attacks on
churches is unacceptable and should be met with the full force of the
law and order machinery.
The response
to unethical religious conversions is a matter that must be addressed
at the level of the community as well as inter-faith dialogue and self-criticisms.
The exact modalities and areas of intervention should be explored and
made use of.
Firstly,
it must be clearly recognized and acknowledged that there is something
called "unethical" conversion. To call for empirical evidence
as the prerequisite for a dialogue is a non-starter, since the methods
employed are ever so subtle and sophisticated. Further, the mainstream
Christian institutions have on several occasions conceded that some
fundamentalist Christian sects do in fact practice an aggressive form
of proselytizing that demonstrates intolerance to other religions and
insensitivity to the adherents of those religions. The public perception
that stands testimony to this also cannot be ignored.
Secondly,
it must be recognized that Religion to an individual can either be one
of faith or of identity - or, both. As a faith, attempts at conversion
cease to be a problem. Anyone grounded in a particular religion out
of faith and is anchored in that faith is in all likelihood bound to
look at all religions as one, but with different trajectories all ultimately
heading towards the same orbit and destination. To such persons conversions,
ethical or unethical, ceases to be a problem. But, such persons who
have reached that high level of spiritual evolution and consciousness
are in a clear minority. The vast majority, however, see religion as
an identity.
It is precisely
when one religious identity purports to be superior to another religious
identity and seeks to convert on that basis or alternatively where one
religious identity uses violence or the full might of the State to prevent
such conversions, that the seeds of disharmony, discontent and violence
are planted.
The alternative
to legislation clearly lies in an on-going inter-religious dialogue
between religions as well as within local communities and civic organizations.
However, it is imperative that there is a parallel process of intra-faith
dialogue that takes place within religions or their institutions. All
religions or ideologies, when they become institutionalized invariably
begin to subordinate that ideology or theology to that institution.
All religions
and their institutions need to be introspective and examine their role
and location within society if Sri Lanka is to continue to boast that
it is an Island cohabited by the believers of the four great religions
of the world. If we fail in this endeavour that boast could well turn
out to be a curse.
19th
July,2004
[Previous:July
12] [Next:
July26th]
July
5, 2004: Forgotten Children of War: Whose Responsibility?
By
Sathya
The treatment
of the Karuna affair, if it may be called that, by the media (including
last week’s Sathya column) as well as by policymakers has largely
focused on matters relating to security and impact on the peace process.
In the process, a humanitarian problem of immense proportion has been
by and large ignored. This is the plight of the under-age recruits who
were demobilized by Karuna following the `Good Friday’ putsch
against his forces by the Vanni-based leadership in April. This then
constitutes the theme of this week’s Sathya column which was prompted
by two reports that he chanced to read last week.
The two
reports in question are that of the Human Rights Watch and a document
circulated by human rights activists under the name `Collective for
Batticaloa’, both of which portray a bleak and a heart wrenching
situation facing the demobilized children of war in the Batti-Amparai
region. Incidentally Sathya prefers the term `children of war’
to child soldiers, since not all of the under-age recruits were deployed
in direct combat, though a considerable number were.
The Human
Rights Watch report prepared by its South Asia researcher Tej Thapa
highlighted the fact that over the last three weeks, the LTTE had commenced
the forced “re-recruitment” of child combatants released
by Karuna. In a stinging indictment, the report accused the LTTE of,
“stealing children from their homes to put them on the firing
line. Despite all their promises, they are demonstrating absolute disregard
for the most vulnerable part of the population it claims to represent”.
Although
the above issue has been in the public domain for some time, Sathya
also wishes to share with the readers a lengthy passage from a report
issued by the `Collective for Batticaloa’, which refers to a humanitarian
problem that remains etched in Sathya’s psyche and has tormented
him over the past week . To quote: “It has been estimated that
approximately 60 percent of the returned children are young girls. Many
of them are instantly recognizable because of their very short hair.
While the hair may grow longer, issues of anxiety that these young women
face may not disappear. Returning to school is not easy. Some have outgrown
in age their level of school knowledge…Social ostracization and
fear surrounding the returnee impedes easy integration. As one respondent
said, the child has to walk alone to school. Nobody would walk along
with her out of fear. Parents of the other children are scared that
their own children might be recruited in a new wave of recruitment if
they befriend these children…Schools too are worried about how
returning children might either `lure’ other children into the
fold of the LTTE or be a threat to the well being of their own children.
They are marked people. They, the children are `shy’, reticent
and withdrawn for the most part….Girls with their closely cropped
hair are highly visible and are marked. At many check points they are
singled out for scrutiny, making all heads turn and look at them. Previously,
before the release, the short hair, acted as a deterrent to their running
away as they would have been easily discovered. At present they are
targets for re-recruitment and social ostracization. It is a psychologically
traumatic state of mind for the child”.
Yes, it
is psychologically traumatic not only to the child, but to all those
who come face to face with these children of war or read reports that
high light their plight. Those of us who are not traumatized, need to
have our heads examined.
And, this
brings Sathya to the issue relating to who is responsible and what is
to be done? Certainly, one `actor’ (to use a hackneyed cliché)
is of course the LTTE. But, it is futile appealing to that `actor’
since like all good actors the LTTE would deny responsibility. The other
actor or actors who shoulder responsibility is the Government as well
as the UNICEF. It is these actors who need to be told to stop acting
and to fulfill their responsibilities, not only in addressing the cause
of the problem (which may be beyond their control), but certainly in
addressing the consequences of the problem. Reports from the ground
indicate that the proverbial buck is being passed around. NGOs dealing
with humanitarian and psycho-social trauma seem to think that the under-age
recruits are the concern of the UNICEF which is mandated with an Action
Plan for the rehabilitation of child soldiers. The UNICEF on the other
hand while having a mandate to intervene, seem to think that their mandate
is only the ‘Action Plan’ that involves the setting-up of
Transit Centres for the rehabilitation of child combatants handed over
by the LTTE directly to UNICEF.
But, herein
lies the `Catch 22’. The Action Plan that the UNICEF entered into
with the LTTE through its humanitarian arm, the TRO, covers only the
child combatants handed over by the LTTE to UNICEF. Notwithstanding
that the LTTE continue to release children with one hand while recruiting
with the other, the UNICEF’s Action Plan does not cover the child
combatants and under-age recruits who were demobilized by Karuna and
who went directly to their homes and respective families. UNICEF must
be credited for going public on these recruitments in recent times,
despite its earlier stance of appeasement of the LTTE and remaining
mum. It is also commendable that UNICEF is going through the rituals
of registering these children. But having registered them, the UN agency
does not seem to have a clue as to what to do next. Further, it is ridiculous
to expect the affected families of the children of war demobilized by
Karuna to hand over their children to the UNICEF-TRO run Transit Centres
in Kilinochchi, and with no guarantee that UNICEF will be able to take
the children out of the LTTE-controlled areas in the event of outbreak
of hostilities..
Likewise,
the Government cannot wash their hands off this humanitarian catastrophe
and treat the issue of demobilization of the children of war in the
East as a matter that is internal to the LTTE. The Government would
then be abdicating its responsibilities to its citizens. In Sathya’s
opinion, what is required is for the Government and UNICEF to formulate
a separate Action Plan that involves the families of the demobilized
children as well as the local community. For obvious reasons, this can
be made operational only in Government-controlled areas, with the option
of setting-up rehabilitation centres in areas outside the East, if the
need arises. Care must be taken that these rehabilitation centres do
not end up as another Bindunuwewa. In view of the forces of chauvinism
and vigilantes lurking within State structures, the UNICEF and other
international humanitarian NGOs should be given the primary responsibility
for the running of these camps as well as the rehabilitation and re-integration
programmes for the affected children.
In this
regards, Sathya also wishes to address a related issue. There have been
reports of some families showing resistance against the LTTE’s
recruitment drive. There are some intellectuals who feel that ultimately
this is the most effective deterrence to the LTTE’s recruitment
drive. Some of these intellectuals and activists seem to feel that the
`liberal’ intervention that involves lobbying with the Government
and the international community would come to naught and that what is
required is the `radical’ intervention aimed at strengthening
the resistance capacity of the families and local community against
the LTTE.
The latter
option suggested by arm chair radicals, in the opinion of Sathya, is
more romantic than radical. Or as Subramanya Bharathi, the Tamil poet
penned, “brave only in words” (Vaaisolil Veerar). The resistance
being shown by some families in the East to the LTTE is largely individual
and based on a parental instinct to protect their children. It is yet
to assume the form of collective resistance. In fact, recent reports
indicate that the LTTE has already commenced a drive against the parents
who are defying the LTTE that includes physical assault as well as death
threats. Given the LTTE character, it will not be long before these
death threats are executed, literally speaking.
Given the
magnitude of the humanitarian problem highlighted above and the nature
of the LTTE which has scant regard for human rights and continue to
feed children to their war machinery, the responsibility lies squarely
with the Government and the international community, through the UNICEF
and INGOs, to rehabilitate the demobilized children of war and to protect
them from re-recruitment, at least in the Government-controlled areas.
It is then that the local community can become empowered or at least
feel empowered enough to collectively resist the inhumane practice of
child recruitment. To romanticize individual resistance from families
at this juncture and giving it exaggerated publicity will only do more
harm than good to the children and their families.
5th
July, 2004
[Previous:
June 28][Next:July 12]
June
21, 2004: An Emerging Proxy War via the Media?
By
Sathya
The day
following President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s address to the Nation
on Saturday the 12th June, the trilingual print and electronic private
media gave full publicity to a TamilNet website lead story datelined
Sunday the 13th June and headlined, “Tigers lambast Kumaratunga’s
political duplicity”. By Monday it was generally assumed by the
public, policymakers and the international community that the LTTE had
officially rejected the President’s thinking on the modality to
be followed in recommencing the peace talks with the LTTE. On a closer
scrutiny it would have become obvious that the TamilNet was in fact
citing a lead story of the LTTE official organ, “Liberation Tigers”
which appeared in May 2004!
This perception
that the LTTE had officially responded to the President’s address
to the Nation was on the assumption that the TamilNet website is a front
of the LTTE which, of course, no one would deny. However, the TamilNet
is not LTTE’s official organ. Further our private print and electronic
media did not check the veracity and the sequencing that went behind
the report. It was as though the media was either relishing the sensationalism
that goes along with bad news or were taking an overtly partisan line
aimed at embarrassing the Government. As to what impact that this form
of reporting would have on the peace process was lost sight of. In this
particular case, the private media clearly lacked conflict sensitivity,
not to mention professionalism.
However,
it would also be somewhat naïve to assume that the TamilNet would
have re-carried the story the day after the President’s address
without clearance from the LTTE. And, the lead story in “Liberation
Tigers” issue of May’ 2004 did castigate the President for
her perceived dilatory tactics and duplicity by resorting to a “dilapidated
and timeworn strategy of cheating of the LTTE and the donor nations”,
further adding that, “weakening the LTTE, diluting the strength
of Tamil nationalism, distorting Tamil unity are the areas in which
the President’s forces are keenly interested in”. The article
in LTTE’s official organ, the “Liberation Tigers”
did also end with a chilling message that if the international community
did not prevail on the President to mend her ways, to quote, “the
foundation for peace laid with international assistance during the last
three years would be shattered and Sri Lanka will again be converted
into bloodbath. War or Peace? The answer as of date is in the hands
of donor nations and their actions alone will decide whether it is war
or peace”.
Hence,
while the above is not an official reaction by the LTTE to the broad
peace strategy that the President enunciated in her address to the Nation,
the fact that the TamilNet chose to carry an earlier article in LTTE’s
official organ, “Liberation Tigers” the day after the address,
is a clear case of a proxy propaganda war that is presently being carried
out by the LTTE. In fact, another LTTE proxy, Suresh Premachandran of
the TNA, did repeat the same chilling message in a telephone interview
to the MTV Newline Programme on Friday the 18th June in response to
a question on the significance of the detection of the suicide kit in
Grandpass, Colombo the previous day. He said that while it was not clear
to him as to whom the suicide kit belonged, ultimately it is for the
President and her UNFA Government to decide whether there would be war
or peace.
This is
indeed a perverse reversal of the clarion call addressed at the TULF
by Prime Minister J.R. Jayawardene following the 1977 anti-Tamil riots,
“if you want to fight, let there be a fight; if it is peace, let
there be peace….It is not what I am saying. The people of Sri
Lanka say that”. The proxy of the people of Sri Lanka repeated
it once again in 1983, when following the anti-Tamil pogrom of the July
1983, President J.R.Jayawardene (he had meanwhile made the quantum leap
by transforming himself from a Prime Minister to an Executive President)
took steps to remove the TULF from parliament on the grounds that “it
is the natural request and desire of the Sinhala people to prevent the
country being divided”. He was now speaking as the proxy of the
“Sinhala people”.
Coming back to the proxy propaganda war being waged in the media and
by the media, one cannot similarly ignore the complaint made to the
Norwegians by the LTTE as regards the SLBC direct broadcast of a one
hour programme of the Tamil Broadcasting Corporation (TBC) London called
`Oorodu Uravada’ (i.e. “In Conversation with our community”).
According to the TamilNet, the LTTE head of its political wing, S.P.Thamilchelvan
complained to the Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar, during their meeting
in Kilinochchi on 16th June that Sri Lanka’s state media engaged
in a `malicious and false’ propaganda regarding the situation
in Batticaloa district.
While Sathya
is strongly supportive of space and air time being given in the State
media to an “alternative” democratic Tamil opinion at a
time when the Tamil private print and electronic media either engage
in false and malicious propaganda for the LTTE or are silenced, Sathya
is also of the opinion that the TBCs “Oorodu Uravada” programme
in SLBCs Tamil National Service does tend to transgress the divide between
projecting an alternative opinion and crass propaganda aimed at justifying
some of the counter-terrorism engaged in by Karuna and his faction against
sympathizers of the Vanni-based LTTE leadership. This has clearly got
to stop, if the broadcast is to continue to play its legitimate role
in projecting an independent as well as an alternative Tamil democratic
opinion to its Tamil listeners, who are starved of an independent and
an alternative opinion. But under no circumstances can any programme
in the State media be used to justify killings of civilians, irrespective
of who does the killings and who the victims are. As regards reports
of fighting between the armed formations of the LTTE and the Karuna
factions, it is indeed the responsibility of the State and private media
to highlight the dangerous situation developing in the Eastern province,
after having checked the veracity of these reports.
In conclusion,
the State as well as the private print and electronic media have a responsible
role to play in ensuring that there is objectivity and sensitivity in
reporting events and analysis, particularly when it come to the peace
process. The LTTE, similarly, having obtained funding from donor agencies
for its Peace Secretariat and acquired license from the previous Government
to import sophisticated radio and transmission equipments, has to be
more responsible in how they engage in propaganda. There is a distinct
danger that while during the 1994-95 PA-LTTE talks, the heavy reliance
on exchange of letters between the two parties led to that exchange
turning into a propaganda war, we may now have a classic case of propaganda
war by proxy using the media.
This is
indeed detrimental to trust building and the articulation of the respective
interests of the parties and other stakeholders in the peace process
in a manner that recognizes their self-respect as well as mutual respect.
21st
June, 2004
[Previous:
June 14] [Next:June 28]
June
7, 2004: Duplicity in Killings
By
Sathya
The cowardly
killing of Aiyadurai Nadesan a reputed political columnist, writer and
a Tamil nationalist, is yet another act of brutality in the on-going
serial internecine killings that plagues the Batti-Amparai region, following
the split in the LTTE. These killings have generated both a fear psychosis
as well as revulsion amongst the people, with neither the Vanni-based
leadership nor the Karuna faction paying heed to these concerns and
condemnations. It is meaningless looking into who started it first,
although it is no secret that the Vanni-based LTTE leadership did choose
to resort to the force of arms to quell dissent from Karuna and his
rank and file in the Batti-Amparai region.
Although
the initial victims in the bloodletting, following the move by the Vanni-based
LTTE leadership to wrest control of the Batti-Amaparai region from the
Karuna faction, were the functionaries and cadres on both sides, the
victims in the recent spate of killings are what could be termed as
“soft targets”. These soft targets include a politician
(Sathyamurthy), an academic (Thambiah) and a journalist (Nadesan), while
a senior bureaucrat (Maunaguruswamy) and another academic (Thirchelvam)
survived an assassination attempt. The “soft targets” also
include pauperized sections of society as well as former members, whose
only mistake may have been to give food and shelter or provide information
to this or that faction of the LTTE under duress and paid a heavy price
as a result.
That, in
all these cowardly acts, both the LTTE as well as the breakaway Karuna
faction were involved is beyond any doubt. In this bloodletting, there
is also an interesting difference in the propaganda and rhetoric adopted
by both sides. On the part of the LTTE, it has consistently claimed
that the perpetrators of these killings are the military and Tamil paramilitary
groups. There is almost an aversion at pointing the finger directly
at Karuna’s group, lest this belies its claim that the Batti-Amaparai
region has been cleared of the Karuna menace. Further, in those cases
where the LTTE is the perpetrator, it adopts its usual stoic silence,
while allowing its media fronts to do the necessary justification, cover-up
or plain news blackout in the Tamil media. The Karuna faction on the
other hand appears to be falling over backwards in a might hurry to
either claim responsibility for some of these killings or justifying
them, so as to register their presence on the ground to the public as
well as the international community.
In all
this the role of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission is typically ambivalent.
When the LTTE went on the rampage last year by resorting to an orgy
of political killings of its adversaries who do not recognize them as
the sole representatives, as well as Tamil members of the Sri Lankan
intelligence, the SLMM took the position that they came within the ambit
of a law and order problem and not a violation of the ceasefire agreement
and, therefore, was not within its mandate. However, in the present
spree of killings where the supporters of Vanni-based LTTE had suffered
more at the hands of the Karuna faction, as Nadesan pointed out in his
last article in the Sunday Veerakesari, the SLMM has suddenly begun
expressing horror at the barbaric killings. They have also secured the
commitment of the LTTE to track down the “criminal” elements.
It is to its credit that Norway has suddenly woken-up, although it may
have prevented the killings in the past had they done so then. It now
remains to be seen as to how the SLMM would respond when the Vanni-based
LTTE leadership unleashes its counter- retaliatory killings (if there
is such a term) against soft targets in the endless orgy of killings
and counter-killings. The recent firing on devotees at a Hindu temple
in Batticaloa and the decapitating of two persons who were abducted
from the temple is indicative of the anarchy prevailing in the Batti-Amparai
region is a case in point.
Another
factor which needs close scrutiny is the Sri Lankan security apparatus
in the Eastern province. The killings, in particular, of Thambiah, the
don from Eastern University and Nadesan in the heart of Batticaloa,
widely believed to be the work of the Karuna faction, have led to allegations
of complicity in the killings by the military-intelligence apparatus.
Whether it is true or not, it is somewhat naïve to assume that
the security personnel would be unhappy about the internecine killings.
When the politicians and policymakers in Colombo associated with the
peace process under the UNF Government (with temptations on the part
of the UPFA government to follow suit) were not too disturbed about
handing over the Tamil people to the LTTE as their “sole representative”
(and may have even cynically thought to themselves, “they deserve
each other in any case”), one cannot rule out the temptation on
the part of the security apparatus to fish in troubled waters.
Be that
as it may, Tamil society continues to be bedeviled by internecine and
fratricidal killings. It has spread like cancer and has eroded the very
legitimacy of the struggle for justice and equality vis a vis the Sri
Lanka State. The LTTE, including its alienated Karuna faction, continue
on the path of nihilism of destroying everything that stands in its
way. The Tamil people, despite the military might of the LTTE and their
sabre-rattling proxies in parliament, are becoming increasingly orphaned
and powerless. Other
ex-militant groups who have entered the so called democratic mainstream
are yet to go beyond being half-democrats with ambitions of becoming
the sole alternative to the sole representative. Their failure in projecting
a common democratic front to the LTTE proxies is a case in point. The
notion that “if you are not one of us, then you are a traitor”
is what consumed the lives of Tamil intellectuals and political activists
who were committed to ensuring the dignity, security and socio-economic
advancement of the People of the North-East, along with the Peoples
of other regions. The list is far too long to be cited in this column.
In fact it may need a separate column to merely list out the names.
Pluralism and political diversity has become an anathema to those who
claim to struggle for emancipation and justice. It is also a contradiction
that will continue to dog Tamil nationalism in its struggle against
Sinhala chauvinism. Tamil nationalism is fast losing its high moral
ground. Perhaps it already has and is fast decaying.
Aiyadurai
Nadesan (or G.Nadesan as he signed off his columns in the Veerakesari)
loved his People more than his pen. He was more a Tamil nationalist
than a journalist. Hence he embodied all the contradictions contained
in Tamil nationalism. The Tiger flag placed across his body at the funeral
perhaps epitomizes this contradiction. As D.B.S.Jeyaraj observed about
Nadesan in his column in the Sunday Leader, “His comments too
never go to the extent of unbridled LTTE sycophancy like some others,
since he himself is a Tamil nationalist and much of what he wrote was
from that perspective….Since he was a `pro-Tiger’ due to
compulsion rather than conviction, he sometimes took on a `Tigerish’
line. This was the case with many journalists in his position.”.
Sathya
couldn’t agree more. Yet, whatever be the contradictions, Nadesan
had the right to live and write as he sought fit, in keeping with his
conscience. That right was denied to him by his assassins.
7th
June, 2004.
[Previous: May 31][Next:
June 14]
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July
12, 2004: Colombo Suicide Blast – LTTE denies and Government ponders
By Sathya
Yet another
female suicide bomber attained martyrdom and entered the famed photo gallery
of Black Tigers by blowing herself up after having failed to get her target
Douglas Devananda, the leader of EPDP and cabinet minister. The LTTE,
promptly and predictably, denied responsibility, condemned the suicide
attack and blamed it on “some elements who are working to disrupt
peace efforts”, aimed at confusing the “people who are hoping
for peace and disrupt the prevailing environment”. The LTTE in short
said all the right things in public with the Canadian Foreign Minister
giving the denial credibility by proclaiming that, “No person or
group has claimed responsibility for this deplorable act. I urge all parties
to refrain from casting blame while an investigation is under way”.
It was as though the Canadian Government’s intelligence services
never really knew that the LTTE never claims responsibility to suicide
attacks and that martyrdom is bestowed and publicly proclaimed only after
a period of time. But the targets are rarely admitted in public.
The US Embassy,
on the other hand, in its statement wagged its finger at the LTTE which
was carried in the Government-controlled Daily News with screaming headlines.
Contrary to the feigned wisdom shown by the Canadian Government, the statement
issued by the US Embassy, obviously with clearance from the US State Department,
said that “although no one has claimed responsibility for the bombing,
the incident bears the hallmarks of an LTTE attack”.
So, what
has our own Government got to say as to who is responsible and why? Before
Sathya turns his antenna in that direction, suffice it to say that the
LTTE would certainly be disappointed if the Government actually believed
its denial, since the suicide attack was in fact meant to be a message
to the Government! The denial of the LTTE was of course for international
consumption.
Now, what
would have prompted the LTTE to strike at that given time and at that
particular target? The answer in Sathya’s opinion is that the hit
on LTTE members in Batticaloa on Black Tigers Day on July 5, a day venerated
by the LTTE in recognition of its martyrs (but, undoubtedly despised by
the loved ones of the victims of Black Tigers and by those who see such
suicide attacks as acts of cowardice by those who order it), it was just
a matter of time that LTTE leader Pirabhakaran would order a retaliation
to what was clearly a case of extreme provocation. It was a message to
the Government in the language that the LTTE speaks and unfortunately
thinks is the only language that its enemies understand. In this instance,
it was the language of the suicide blast in the vicinity of the Prime
Minister’s Office, a strategically located police station, three
foreign missions and two ministries. The message was, literally speaking,
loud and, figuratively speaking, clear.
In short
the message was that if the Government does not rein in Karuna’s
hit squads or cease what the LTTE perceives as a “proxy war”
waged through Karuna or in the name of Karuna, then it will strike. And,
such strikes would not be confined to the Eastern theatre, but will reach
into the heart of the capital city. If Douglas Devananda was targeted,
it was a case of trying to kill two birds with one stone by also removing
a threat to its `sole representative’ status. That Douglas Devananda
had always been in LTTE’s hit list and will continue to be so is
another matter.
The Government
clearly had no illusions about LTTE’s involvement when it issued
a statement that “the perpetrators of this act show callous disregard
for human lives and are reverting to violence as means of settling disputes”.
Although the LTTE was not named, the reference to “reverting”
to violence was an oblique reference to the LTTE. Yet, the Government
could not get itself to even say that it had the hallmarks of an LTTE
attack, while its political spokespersons have gone out of their way to
say that even if it was the LTTE, the target was after all a Tamil political
opponent and therefore not a matter of grave concern as far as the peace
process is concerned.
Every government
of the day have this uncanny way of demonizing the LTTE when a war is
on and having to dress the LTTE up as an angel or as an enemy of someone
else, if it wants to talk to the LTTE. Why the devil cannot one speak
to the demon? (Pardon the cynical pun, which has now become a habit to
Sathya). Certainly, the LTTE does not come forward to negotiate with the
Government of the day, because it sees it to be an angel? The pendulum
swing from demonizing to evangelizing the LTTE is what makes successive
Governments suspect in the eyes of the Tamil people as well as the international
community, not to mention its own people – the Sinhalese. Sathya
regrets having to refer to the Government in relation to ethnicity. But,
that is precisely what the Governments have done by washing its hands
off internecine and fratricidal killings within the Tamil community. This
takes Sathya to two cases of black humour which invariably accompanies
tragedy.
The first
is the wisdom displayed in sections of the Tamil media that since the
suicide bomber wore a nylon suicide jacket, as opposed to the denim jackets
normally worn by LTTE suicide bombers, that it could not have been the
LTTE. And, another newspaper while carrying the caption that the LTTE
denies responsibility, indicated in its second heading that the female
accomplice of the suicide bomber and worked in the EPDP office in Jaffna.
The implication was that the LTTE could not have done it. Somehow the
Tamil journalists who either filed the story or gave those stories the
loaded headings seem to think that the readers are so gullible to think
that the LTTE is not capable of technological innovation by switching
from a bulky denim jacket to a less conspicuous nylon jacket. Or, that
LTTE does not know the art of infiltration.
The other
case of humour was the statement issued by the UPFA General Secretary
Susil Premjayanth that “it was revealed in the police investigations
that the sole intention of the suicide bomber was to kill Douglas Devananda’.
So, the sole representative was after the sole alternative. That humour
turned black when the Reuters quoted a Government spokesman of saying
“It is the LTTE going after a political opponent. It is that and
absolutely nothing else. It is resorting to violence to kill an opponent;
it is not reverting to hostilities”. Clearly the Government was
trying to neutralize the UNPs prankish campaign that peace was on the
rocks and that the suicide bombers were back in Colombo in view the UPFA’s
mishandling of peace process. Pirabhakaran must indeed be gnashing his
teeth if he thought that the Government had not really got his message
and may well be tempted to repeat the message. But, this time around it
may not be a Tamil political opponent.
But, coming
back to the point, the several statements coming from politicians in the
SLFP also revealed a lurking chauvinism that grips most southern politicians.
This is manifest in the mindset that as long as Tamils kill Tamils, there
is no problem. So, when the LTTE engaged in its orgy of political killings
including the killing of Tamil intelligence officers during the UNP’s
lap around the peace track, the UNP and the Colombo establishment turned
a blind eye. It was after all a case of Tamils killing Tamils. Now, it
is the turn of the SLFP taking a similar position. Some things do not
change. Chauvinism is not always crude. It can be very subtle indeed,
akin to the commonly heard refrain “some of our best friends are
Tamils” or “some of our best friends are Sinhalese”.
Sathya’s antenna never fails to go up when such patronizing statements
are made. In fact, with such friends who needs enemies!
In this case,
the Sinhalese progressive are also not above guilt. In this context, Sathya
wishes to reproduce a paragraph from his very first column titled, “Peace
and Democracy are Indivisible” which was penned several months ago,
but in another context. To quote: “It is forgotten by those well-meaning
Sinhalese progressives who, perhaps as a result of their Sinhala “guilt”,
see the LTTE as having given the Tamils their self-respect…. Those
who speak eloquently today about the need to empower the LTTE in the process
of transforming them were quite unconcerned when other Tamil ex-militant
organizations were going through the painful process of transforming themselves
in the face of continuing chauvinism by the State and adventurism on the
part of the LTTE. The same applies to international NGOs who take the
task of engaging the LTTE with a missionary zeal, but view with contempt
those Tamil militant organizations which laid down arms and entered the
democratic mainstream. It is about time that Sinhalese progressives and
democrats, who give expression to a collective Sinhala `guilt’ by
extending to LTTE the credit of giving the Tamil people their self-respect
and dignity, do some soul searching. Their position is untenable and also
contrary to the principles of Democracy, Human Rights and Peace. These
principles cannot be realized and enjoyed in one of the part of the country,
while the people living in another part are denied these cherished values
which alone give meaning to human existence, dignity and self-respect.”
Sathya’s
stand taken then has become reinforced now in view of the utterances by
spokespersons of the UPFA Government that the bomb blast in Colombo was
no big deal, since the target was “only” a Tamil political
opponent.
12th
July,2004
[Previous:July
05] [Next: July 19]
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June
28, 2004: The `Karuna Factor’: A Challenge or Obstacle to the Peace
Process?
By Sathya
`Colonel’
Karuna is once again in the news, after his retreat and demobilization
following the `Good Friday’ (9th April) putsch by the Vanni-based
LTTE leadership against the Karuna forces in the Batti-Amparai region.
The `news’ as revealed to the media by Karuna’s woman comrade
Nilavini, who surrendered to the Vanni-based LTTE last week, is that the
military-intelligence establishment provided Karuna, his family and some
of his comrades protection in Colombo, a few days after the Good Friday
offensive. Further, Ali Zahir Moulana a UNP National List Member of Parliament
and a close confidante of Ranil Wickremesinghe, with equally close contacts
with the Vanni-based LTTE leadership, revealed publicly that he had established
contacts with Karuna at the request of LTTE Batti-Amparai leader Ramesh
in order to escort Karuna and his comrades to Colombo as part of a deal
aimed at offering Karuna an `exit’. He explained that he had done
so on humanitarian grounds.
Following
these revelations Ali Zahir Moulana resigned his seat from parliament
so as to save his leader Ranil Wickremesinghe and the UNP from any embarrassment.
That the UPFA was going to seize the opportunity to embarrass the UNP
was also evident in the press briefing by Media Minister Mangala Samarasinghe
and the reportage in the State media institutions which went to town on
the Ali Moulana-LTTE nexus (read UNP-LTTE nexus). The UNP (indirectly)
and the LTTE (directly) , on the other hand, accused the UPFA Government
of duplicity and adventurism in extending support to Karuna and that its
action could threaten the peace process and the ceasefire agreement. This
allegation was denied by the UPFA Government, although the Media Minister
Mangala Samaraweera did not rule out the possibility of individuals in
the military-intelligence apparatus of establishing contacts with Karuna.
Meanwhile
Douglas Devananda, leader of EPDP and cabinet minister, went public and
declared that he had established contacts with Karuna after his retreat
to extend political and morale support, but that he did not intend extending
such support if Karuna resorted to armed action against the Vanni-based
LTTE leadership.
It is clear
from all these developments that the `Karuna factor’ is very much
an issue that either needs to be `factored’ into the peace process
or neutralised. It is not something that can be ignored or would fade
away. It is for this reason that Sathya has posed the question as to whether
the `Karuna Factor’ is a challenge or an obstacle to the peace process,
which constitutes the theme of this week’s column. The answer to
this key question is possible only after having considered the following
series of ancillary questions most of which are, in the typical Sathya
style, leading questions!
Firstly,
why should anyone, UPFA Government and opposition UNP included, be apologetic
about giving protection to Karuna at a time when the Vanni-based LTTE
leadership deployed its fighting forces to quell an internal dissent through
the force of arms and, in the process, violated many provision in the
ceasefire agreement? It must be noted that the incidents exposed by Nilaveni,
the one time comrade of Karuna, refers to the period immediately following
the `Good Friday’ military putsch by the Vanni-based leadership
against the Karuna forces, which resulted in him demobilizing his main
armed formation and abandoning or destroying some of the heavy weaponry.
Further, Karuna had then clearly stated his position that his decision
to withdraw was to avoid a bloodbath and that his intention was to work
towards the upliftment of the People of the Eastern province.
So, why should
any Government of the day have any qualms or inhibitions in having given
Karuna and his comrades protection either on humanitarian or on political
grounds? Further, the issue of protection also applies to a large number
of child soldiers who were demobilized by Karuna before retreating and
who found their way to their respective homes and families, only to be
hounded and re-recruited by the Vanni-based LTTE leadership. So, why should
not the Government, including UNICEF and other humanitarian agencies,
give protection to these underage recruits who had voluntarily returned
to their homes? And, if they do give protection, why be apologetic?
In this context,
despite attempts by the Media Minister Mangala Samaraweera to discredit
the UNP through the Ali Zahir Moulana-Karuna episode by using the State
media institutions in an highly partisan and unethical manner, one must
give him credit for making a principled position that the Government’s
offer to provide security to Karuna stands to date. Further one should
welcome his mature statement, “We are duty bound to provide security
to any citizen whose life is under threat. That offer stands, but the
internal conflicts in the LTTE must be resolved within”. (Cited
in Daily Mirror, 25th June).
But, there
is the proverbial “other side of the coin” as well, which
can be best summed through another series of (leading) questions. Having
enjoyed the protection of the State, should Karuna and his forces be allowed
to abuse the protection extended on political or humanitarian grounds
by engaging in hostile operations or a proxy war against the Vanni-based
LTTE in the Eastern province and elsewhere, including the intimidation
and killing of their civilian sympathizers, particularly when there is
a peace process on? Should the Tamil Broadcasting Corporation, London
(TBC), which has a daily one hour prime slot in the Tamil National Service
of the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation(SLBC) and whose Board members
domiciled in Europe were subject to death threats from the LTTE for carrying
news and analysis focusing on issues relating to human rights, pluralism
and democracy in Tamil society and polity, now compromise itself by functioning
as an `organ’ supportive of what the Karuna faction says and does
(explicitly as well as implicitly) by carrying statements in a manner
that is clearly propagandistic, provocative and inflammatory? This was
already highlighted by Sathya in last week’s column.
In fact,
during the whole of last week, the TBC broadcast in the state-owned SLBC
carried interviews and an “Appeal to the Tamil people” by
one Maaran, identified as spokesperson Batti-Amparai LTTE (Karuna Wing),
virtually declaring war on Pirabhakaran and the “Vanni LTTE”
and promising to bring the Eastern province under its total control within
three months. The tone and the voice modulation behind the broadcast of
these statements were clearly unprofessional, biased and jingoistic. By
abusing the prime time obtained in the State-owned SLBC to engage in propagandistic
materials aimed at fuelling an already inflammatory situation prevailing
in the Batti-Amparai region and in endorsing the armed propaganda strategy
of the Karuna faction, has made some including Sathya wonder whether the
TBC is deviating from its original commitment of instilling a culture
of tolerance, democratic dissent, humanism, pluralism and democracy to
a brutalized and a dehumanized Tamil society and polity. While the Karuna
faction has every right to exercise its right to self-defence, it should
not be allowed to take the form of a proxy war that could scuttle the
ceasefire and lead to the collapse of the peace process.
At the same
time, maximum pressure should be exerted on the LTTE by the international
community, the Government and the human rights lobby to cease immediately
the hounding and the targeting of members and civilian sympathizers of
the Karuna faction, the re-recruitment and conscription of underage recruits
and adults demobilized by Karuna and who chose to return to their homes
to lead a normal life. The genesis of the on-going orgy of killings and
the climate of fear in the Eastern province clearly lies in the use of
force by the Vanni-based LTTE leadership to settle internal differences
and its failure (or inability) to recognize the specificity of the Eastern
province as well as the principle of pluralism.
In conclusion,
Sathya fully agrees with Jayadeva Uyangoda in his last weeks’ column
to the Daily Mirror, where following a recent visit to Batticaloa he observed,
“The issues raised in the Vanni-Karuna dispute are essentially political
ones and should be resolved through political means, and not by means
of internecine war and violence. Actually, the present crisis in the Tamil
nationalist movement is one that will test the capacity of the LTTE as
well as its breakaway faction to bring about any degree of political emancipation
to the Tamil nation. It is quite an irony that both factions of the LTTE
on this particular issue of the split have proved the critics of Tamil
national struggle correct”.
Of course,
Jayadeva Uyangoda, as a Sinhalese will not face any danger to his life
for having made the above observation. However, Sathya being a Tamil,
and who had got used to looking behind only one shoulder, now will have
to learn to look behind both shoulders! Of course, in the process he may
forget to look at the danger lying in front of him!! Such has been the
plight of Tamil intellectuals, political activists and social reformers
whose lives were claimed by self-appointed sole representatives and sole
protectors of all variants for trying to arrest the slide into nihilism
of the just and (once) peaceful struggle of the Tamil people for their
identity, self-respect and social progress within a unified Sri Lanka.
But, Sathya
is not prepared to roll over and play dead, so that he may live, while
others around him die. That would be the most degrading form of existence.
28th
June, 2004
[Previous:June 21] [Next:July
05]
June
14, 2004: Chandrika-TNA Talks – Cautious Optimism
By Sathya
The meeting
that President Chandrika Kumaratunga had with members of the Tamil National
Alliance on the night 10th June was eventful, to say the least. The first
indicator of the seriousness of the talks was that the President did not
keep them waiting (for too long) and that the meeting went on till around
mid-night. That was certainly a good beginning. The second indicator was
the responsible and an objective account of what transpired at the meeting
given to the media by the TNA spokesperson R.Sampanthan, who is usually
more prone to theatrics.
And, basically
what transpired was that Chandrika Kumaratunga had agreed to commence
negotiations with the LTTE, centered around the LTTE’s ISGA proposals,
despite some reservations about the LTTE proposals for an interim mechanism
for the North-East. The President, according to R.Sampanthan, had further
indicated that negotiations on the core political issues will have to
be taken up for negotiations at some stage, in the not too distant future.
The above account was confirmed by the President in her address to the
Nation on 12th night. She said that while the Government was committed
to a dialogue with the LTTE on a lasting solution (read “core issues”),
the Government was also ready to discuss with the LTTE interim measures
(read “ISGA proposals”) that addresses the urgent need for
development work in the North and East.
The green
light given by the LTTE to the TNA to go ahead with the meeting with President
Kumaratunga and Mr. R.Sampathan’s responsible rendition of the broad
areas discussed to the media, despite attempts by our favourite morning
telephone talk show moderator in the electronic media to ask him and Gunadasa
Amerasekera the usual provocative and leading questions aimed more at
embarrassing the UPFA Government than in enlightening the public of events
and analysis, augurs well for the recommencement of peace talks between
the Government and the LTTE. In this, the media has a responsible role
to play as a custodian and watchdog, rather than as an agent provocateur.
Mr Sampanthan,
of course, also had to engage in the public posturing that invariably
goes parallely with negotiations. The Tamil Net cited the TNA spokesperson
of having raised issues relating to the High Security Zones, the Prevention
of Terrorism Act and that “the Tamils couldn’t be deceived
any more by the Sinhala political leadership”. The Daily News of
12th June, on the other hand, in an inspired leak reported that Government
sources said that the talks with the TNA were “cordial and constructive”
and that “as a sequel to the discussions, the Government was `cautiously
optimistic’ that direct talks would resume soon and that direct
talks with the LTTE would be resumed soon and the peace process would
go forward”.
But, this
is only the beginning and there is a long way to go before we can go to
sleep – including Sathya. The cynics would argue that Chandrika
Kumaratunga’s move has an ulterior motive. The motive being, the
need to neutralise the TNA members in parliament and secure their support
to her Government. or, at least prevent its collapse. But, then it is
motives and enlightened self-interest that galvanizes people into action.
In that, it could also be argued that the Government was also galvanized
into action by the communiqué of 1st June issued by the Sri Lanka
donor Co-Chairs (i.e. the United States, the European Union, Japan and
Norway) following their review meeting in Brussels. The Joint Press Release,
began with the rather ominous tone, “in a world of competing crises,
Sri Lanka Co-chairs came together and urged in the strongest possible
terms a rapid resumption of the peace negotiations so that Sri Lanka can
benefit from the generosity of the international community. They noted
that, with so many other demands on donors, donor attention and funding
might go elsewhere unless the peace process makes progress”.
While the
above operative section in the Joint Press Release of the Co-Chairs was
a clear signal to the Government, it is also clear that a strong signal
was sent to the LTTE, both, in relation to human rights as well as the
need for a pragmatic interim-interim arrangement for the North-East, till
such time as negotiations conclude on the LTTE’s ISGA proposals.
In addition to the ritualistic call on the LTTE to cease recruitment of
children, not to mention the problem of re-recruitment of children following
their demobilization by Karuna, and to release all remaining “underage
soldiers”, the Co-Chairs appear to have recognized the reality that
the ISGA Proposals do not contain the ingredients for a speedy agreement
between the two parties. In its concluding paragraph, the Co-Chairs noted
that “until effective administrative structures are in place in
the North and East, the Co-Chairs encouraged the parties to agree on the
establishment of effective delivery mechanisms for donor-financed development
activities in the North-East”. (read” interim-interim measures”)
However,
where the Co-Chairs are unclear is as to what they exactly mean by “progress”
in the peace talks. The fact of the matter is that the two parties (i.e.
the Government and the LTTE) have different perceptions of “progress”.
To the LTTE, progress implies institutionalizing the ISGA and ensuring
absolute control over the North-East for a protracted period. The “core”
issue to the LTTE is precisely this, while the task of addressing the
causes of the conflict has become more academic in view of its self-projection
as a ‘state-in-the-making’. To the UPFA Government, “progress”
implies addressing the core issues (i.e. the causes of the conflict) as
a means of forging a durable and a permanent settlement that would eventually
lead to the demilitarization and demobilization of the LTTE.
The paradox,
as Sathya pointed out in an earlier column, is that while the ISGA proposals
of the LTTE contain all the elements of the `core’ issues relating
to self-rule for the North-East, but bereft of shared rule, the UPFA has
embarked on a process of constitutional reforms in the South that is bereft
of core issues (i.e. Self-rule and devolution of power to the North-East).
This contradiction must surely make the Co-Chairs swivel in their chairs!
But, as President Chandrika Kumaratunga observed in her address to the
Nation, there is a “coincidence of interests” between the
Government and the LTTE and it is perhaps this which may yet lead to a
breakthrough – or a speedy collapse, after the coincidence of interests
reach their maturity and the conflicts of interest resurface.
Be that as
it may, confidence building measures, such as the meeting between CBK
and TNA, should be intensified, while the fears and apprehensions of other
political formations in the North-East and the South should be addressed
and allayed through parallel negotiations aimed at making the process
truly inclusive and durable. On its part, the LTTE should abandon its
dubious claim to be the sole representative of the Tamil People and cease
its attempts at establishing its hegemony over Tamil polity and society
through the silencing and annihilation of dissent, and the denial of political
diversity and pluralism through violence. Likewise, the security apparatus
should stop fishing in troubled waters aimed at exacerbating internecine
conflicts and rivalries within the Tamil movement.
But if all
this can be achieved, then where is the problem? This is where Sathya
is prone to the criticism that his advocacy is replete with idealism and
bereft of real politic and pragmatism. It also raises an interesting debate
on choice and free will, on the one hand, and fate and determinism, on
the other. The answer lies concealed in a discourse between a sage and
his disciple on an inquiry into fate and free will that Sathya came across
recently. To paraphrase the conclusion that the sage and his disciple
reached through their dialectical conversation: “The problem of
conflict will be solved only at the end of conflict. But at that time
the problem will have ceased to have any practical significance. Not only
so, it will cease to exist. In other words, before the conflict begins,
the problem is incapable of solution and, after the conflict ends, it
is no longer necessary to find solution.”
Likewise.
the debate as to whether the ISGA (not to be confused with interim-interim)
or the Core Issues should come first is as fruitless as embarking on the
inquiry as to the relative strength of fate and free will. Since, they
are in fact one and the same.
Any takers for this Sathya riddle?
14th
June 2004
[Previous: June 07] [Next: June
21]
May
31, 2004: Sole Representative
– Much Ado About Nothing!
By Sathya
The UPFA
Secretary Susil Premjayanth on Saturday 9th May issued a statement which
sought to clarify the UPFA’s stand on LTTE claim that they are the
sole representative of the Tamil People. The statement further sought
to clarify an observation made by Lakshman Kadirgamar that the Government
by “implication” recognizes the LTTE as sole representative
of the Tamils.
The JVP,
a constituent member of the UPFA, however, issued a statement the following
day on 10th May, that “that the LTTE should be a principal party
to the negotiations. We will not accept the LTTE as the sole representative
of the Tamils”.
So, what
exactly is LTTE’s status? This then constitutes this week’s
Sathya Column.
Going back
to the UPFA statement, the following is the operative section: “Negotiations
concerning the resolution of the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka have always
been conducted between the Government of the day and the LTTE except at
Thimpu. On all such occasions the Government and the LTTE have been the
principal negotiating partners. This was so during the time of President
Premadasa, during the first administration of President Kumaratunga and
during the two year regime in which former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremsinghe’s
government was conducting the negotiations on behalf of Sri Lanka. This
historical fact is reflected in the current Ceasefire Agreement which
was signed only by the leader of the LTTE and the former Prime Minister
of Sri Lanka. Thus, taking into account the political and ground realities
concerning the conduct of the negotiations it is clear that the two principal
parties at the negotiation table can only be the Government and the LTTE.
It is on this basis that Foreign Minister Kadirgamar was correctly quoted
by the “Island” Newspaper on 30th April 2004 under the headline,
“Govt recognizes by implication LTTE as sole representative of Tamils”.
Firstly,
it is factually incorrect that all negotiations after Thimpu on finding
a negotiated settlement had taken place only between the Government and
the LTTE. To set the record straight, following the collapse of the Thimpu
Talks in mid-1985. the Government of India, playing the role of a mediator,
initiated a series of “proximity talks” that involved primarily
the Sri Lankan Government and the TULF. However, all other Tamil politico-military
organizations represented at Thimpu (i.e. LTTE, EPRLF, TELO, EROS and
PLOTE) continued to be consulted. The “proximity” talks were
based initially on what was called the “Draft Framework of Accord
and Understanding” of 30th August 1985 which later evolved into
what came to be termed the “December 19” proposals of 1986.
The Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987 recognized these two proposals as the basis
for future negotiations. Unfortunately and, this remains the main flaw
in the Accord, future negotiations on “residual matters” were
to be conducted only between the two Governments. But, the point to be
noted is that all Tamil parties that took part in Thimpu were invited
to a meeting with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on the eve of the signing
of the Indo-Lanka Accord in July 29, 1987 to ascertain any apprehensions
or observations that they may have on the terms of the Accord and related
matters. This meeting took place the day before Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
left for Colombo
If one moves
on to the tragic developments following the signing of the Indo-Lanka
Accord and the renewal of armed hostilities, this time between the LTTE
and the IPKF, what we had was the passage of the 13th Amendment which
was rushed through parliament without any meaningful negotiations on “residual
matters”. Be that as it may, elections to the North-East Provincial
Council were held in November 1988 and the EPRLF-led coalition formed
the first and the only elected N-E Provincial Council to date. That the
polls were severely flawed with the EPRLF-led coalition enjoying the full
patronage of the IPKF is no secret. But, what is relevant to the issue
is that negotiations commenced between Chief Minister Varadarajaperumal
of North-East Provincial Government and President Premadasa on giving
effect to devolution of power embodied in the 13th Amendment to the Constitution.
In fact, the North-East Provincial Government in its first policy statement
on assuming office declared that the powers devolved under the 13th Amendment
“hardly satisfy the aspirations of the Tamil speaking people of
the North East province” and that it would commence negotiations
with the Premadasa Government with a view to “working out a satisfactory
package of devolution”. That the outcome of these negotiations was
far from satisfactory is another matter. But the fact of the matter is
that negotiations did take place with Tamil political parties other than
the LTTE. This again belies the statement issued by the UPFA that negotiations
after the Thimpu Talks, concerning the resolution of the ethnic problem,
had been held only between the LTTE and the Sri Lanka Government.
Again, one
cannot ignore that in both the All Party Conference convened by President
Premadasa in 1989-90 as well as in the Mangala Moonesinghe Parliamentary
Select Committee of 1991-92, the Tamil interests were represented by Tamil
political parties other than the LTTE. Neither were these parties the
“proxies” of the LTTE. In fact, when the issue of de-merger
cropped-up, seven Tamil organizations, TULF, EPRLF, ENDLF, ACTC, EROS
and PLOTE presented a Joint Memorandum to the Chairman of the Select Committee
stressing that “We are of the considered view that, as far as the
Tamil People are concerned, any meaningful attempt at solving the Tamil
Question can only be on the basis of an unified politico-administrative
entity” for the merged North-East”. Here again, the issue
that Sathya is raising here is not the pros and cons of merger/de-merger,
but the fact that Tamil political parties, other than the LTTE were in
fact engaged in negotiations on resolving the Ethnic Question during this
period.
Still again,
following the collapse of the PA-LTTE peace talks of 1994-95, for the
first time in Sri Lankan contemporary history, the Government of the day
recommended the dismantling of the unitary state and its replacement with
a “union of regions” based on the federal idea. One of the
architects was the late Dr Neelan Tiruchelvam, a Tamil intellectual cum
politician, who was by no means a LTTE ideologue or a LTTE proxy! He was
in fact blown to bits by a LTTE suicide bomber!
In sum, the
stand taken in the UPFA statement that “Negotiations concerning
the resolution of the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka have always been conducted
between the Government of the day and the LTTE except at Thimpu.”
is, to put it mildly, untenable.
Now let us
proceed to the claim by the LTTE that it is the sole representative of
the Tamil People and the statement of the UPFA that the LTTE are the sole
representative by “implication”. That the LTTE should explicitly
assert that it is the sole representative of the Tamil people is understandable
and predictable. It cannot be otherwise. That is the very nature of the
LTTE which stands for everything that is a negation of democracy!
But, pray
how could anyone else imply or confer the “sole representative”
of the Tamil people on the LTTE or on anyone else for that matter? The
LTTE, obviously, has a role to play as the principal negotiator when it
comes to negotiations and the direct talks. But that is negotiations.
How does that make the LTTE the sole representative of a People? While
the term “principal” negotiator is consistent with the principles
and norms of negotiations given the ground politico-military reality,
the term “sole representative” has far reaching connotations
and consequences. The very term itself is obsolete, archaic and un-democratic.
It is indeed
ironic that many cite the outcome of the polls in the North-East as sufficient
cause to extend to LTTE this status of “sole representative”.
That the manner in which both the election campaigning and the electoral
process was conducted was farcical is now well recorded and will no doubt
resurface if the election petition of the EPDP and the Fundamental Rights
Case of Anandasangary are taken up by the judiciary . But, even if one
were to assume that the LTTE proxies swept the polls in a free and fair
elections, does it make the victors the sole representative of an entire
people for all times? Are we then saying that there is no need for elections
in the North-East in the future? Are we not ignoring the fact that although
the LTTE may be monolithic, Tamil society is not? Are we not rejecting
the principles of pluralism and political diversity? Or, if one takes
the national level, is it in fact necessary for a political party to be
represented in parliament to be considered as representing the interests
of those who voted for them? For instance prior to 1994, when the JVP
had no representation in parliament, could one have argued that the JVP
did not represent sections of the Sinhalese People? Or. Conversely could
one have argued that the UNP and the SLFP together constitute the sole
representatives of the Sinhalese People?
As H.L.de
Silva, with whom Sathya had locked horns on several occasions in the past
and across the ethnic divide, noted in a recent public lecture, “there
can be no question of a single group being the `sole representative’
of a people, even though they claim to be their liberators and the repositories
of ultimate wisdom. That is naked hegemonism which is the very anti-thesis
of self-determination”. Suffice it to say, the concept of Sole Representation
has no place in any discourse on democracy or for that matter in any democratic
society.
The notion
of a principal negotiator, on the other hand, is quite consistent with
acceptable norms and principles of negotiations. In this context, the
clarification of Lakshman Kadirgamar during the discussion that followed
his presentation at the Brookings Institute in Washington D.C last week
that the Government sees the LTTE by implication as the sole representative
of the Tamil people only “at the negotiating table” and would
include “the whole community outside the negotiating table to ensure
that everyone understands the issues and the progress in negotiations”
somewhat salvages the confusion created by the earlier reported comment
when he was in India.
It was in
the end all a case of much ado about nothing!
May
31, 2004
[Previous: May 24] [Next: June
07]
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May
24, 2004: Core Issues or ISGA? – A Classic Case of a False Question!
By
Sathya
“
Institutionalize ISGA, then the core issues can be discussed!”.
This was the headline in the LTTE Peace Secretariat website given to
a lead news item as regards LTTE’s position on the agenda for
future talks, following the meeting that Norway’s Special Envoy
Erik Solheim had with Thamilselvan, the Head of LTTE’s Political
Wing on 26th May. In further elaborating, Thamilselvan is quoted as
saying, “institutionalizing the ISGA should take place first so
that we can demonstrate to the people that their urgent humanitarian
needs would be effectively met with by the ISGA”.
Although
the official position of the Government is not known at the time of
writing this column, the LTTE website quotes Erik Solheim of saying
that the “President is of the view that the discussion on ISGA
proposals should take place parallel to the discussion on core issues”.
To digress a bit, the LTTE Peace Secretariat’s added observation
that “the Norwegian team agreed with the sentiments expressed
by Mr. Tamilselvan” must clearly be an embarrassment to Norway,
who continue to claim that they are only a postman and a facilitator
and not a mediator.
Be that
as it may, the theme of this week’s Sathya column is not Norway’s
role, but the implications of “parallely vs stage-by-stage”
debate that dominated the 1994-95 peace talks between the then Kumaratunga
Government and the LTTE and which has now come back to haunt the on-going
peace process.
The 1994-95
PA-LTTE Talks perhaps is the forum where the interconnectedness between
Substance (or core issues) and Process were discussed extensively –
but, with no agreement reached on the relative importance of each at
a given conjuncture. To digress once again, that these “discussions”
took place through a series of exchange of letters perhaps also underscores
the importance of a neutral third party facilitator. To return to the
theme of this column, the PA Government’s position perhaps was
most explicitly stated in the letter of 9th March 1995 by President
Chandrika Kumaratunga to LTTE leader Velupillai Pirabhakaran, when the
negotiations were already beginning to go awry. To quote: “The
government has also insistently stated that negotiations to (these matters)
need not delay the commencement of political talks since the two could
proceed parallely”. The letter further proposed that “ talks
regarding the political settlement of the ethnic problem should commence
on any dates between 2nd to 10th April…Our package of proposals
for a political settlement would be sent to you in advance.” These
talks, of course never took place. The LTTE pulled out leading to the
commencement of Eelam War 3, hence reinforcing the commonly held belief
that the LTTE shuns negotiations on core political issues, since it
would necessitate the public abandonment of its goal of a separate and
a sovereign State of Tamil Eelam.
The LTTE’s
perspective on this issue, on the other hand, is best brought out by
Anton Balasingham in his analysis of the 1994-95 talks in his book Duplicity
in Politics: “…there was a total misreading in the government
circles that the LTTE was avoiding political negotiations…. It
was our concern that a permanent political settlement should satisfy
the political aspirations of the Tamil people and also alleviate the
apprehensions of the Sinhala masses. We knew this to be a difficult
task. It would require a great deal of mutual dialogue; possibly over
a long period of time. It was precisely for this reason we wanted the
urgent day to day problems of the people to be addressed and resolved
in the initial stages of the dialogue”.
It is not
the intention here to look into the pros and cons of the stance taken
by both sides, then. What is relevant now is that the debate (i.e. parallely
or stage-by-stage) is once again occupying centre-stage in the peace
process, except that this time around there is a concrete proposal by
the LTTE to establish what it terms “An Agreement to Establish
an Interim Self-Governing Authority for the NorthEast of the Island
of Sri Lanka” or popularly known as the ISGA. The explicit purpose
according to the proposal is to provide for the urgent needs of the
people of the NorthEast relating to resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction
and development in the NorthEast.
However,
what the LTTE refuses to concede in public is that its ISGA proposals
go far beyond the task of setting up an appropriate institutional mechanism
to absorb and disburse humanitarian assistance so as to address the
day-to-day problems of the people of the NorthEast. On the contrary,
the ISGA embodies core political issues and is in a sense a proto-model
of both an autonomous State within a unified Sri Lanka or a separate
and a sovereign State of Tamil Eelam State. The ISGA proposals address
issues that span “plenary power for the governance of the NorthEast”
and “revenue raising including imposition of taxes, revenue, levies
and duties, law and order, and over land”, “separate institutions
for the administration of justice”, all expenditures in or for
the NorthEast “shall be subject to the control of the ISGA”,
“powers to borrow internally and externally, provide guarantees
and indemnities, receive aid directly, and engage in or regulate internal
and external trade” and, if Sathya is allowed to take a deep breath,
so on.
If all
of the above are not core political issues relating to self-rule and
autonomy, then what are core political issues? This clearly demonstrates
that the debate between core political issues versus ISGA or the debate
relating to addressing the causes of the conflict as opposed to the
consequences of the conflict, in fact becomes a false debate. Paradoxically,
the LTTE by placing its ISGA proposals has in effect brought the core
political issues into agenda for talks, and the sooner it acknowledges
this reality the better as far as the re-commencement of peace talks
are concerned. Alternatively, the LTTE, if it wants an interim administration
only for the purpose of addressing the day-to-day problems of the people
and related humanitarian and developmental activities, then its proposal
for an interim administration should be so structured.
Likewise,
if the UPFA Government insists on parallel negotiations on core political
issues, then it has to reveal its package of proposals relating to devolution
and regional autonomy. It is conceivable that the Government may well
refer the LTTE to the devolution proposals spanning the 1995 August
proposals to the 2000 Draft Bill. It is not clear, however, as to how
JVP, a key constituent member of the UPFA, would respond to these sets
of proposals. A Party that considers devolution to be obsolete and speaks
only of decentralization of administration will have to go through the
same process of transformation that the LTTE will have to undergo in
being able to address the issue of self-rule and shared-rule within
a transformed Sri Lanka State. The same applies to the UNP which although
remaining coy on the ISGA issue and despite the Oslo declaration on
exploring federal structures has not taken a clear position on these
vital issues.
So, how
does one break the impasse?
Para 4
of the Preamble to the ISGA proposals in fact states that the LTTE is
“Determined to establish an interim self-governing authority for
the NorthEast region and to provide for the urgent needs of the people
of the NorthEast by formulating laws and policies and, effectively and
expeditiously executing all resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction,
and development in the NorthEast, while the process for reaching a final
settlement remains ongoing” (Italics mine). This is a clear recognition
of the reality that any interim arrangement can only be an integral
part of a final negotiated political and a constitutional settlement
to the Ethnic Question. Is this not a sufficient base to commence negotiations
on the in interim as well as the final? So why is the LTTE balking at
stating the obvious and why is the Government excluding devolution from
the brief given to Advisory Committee on Constitutional reforms, if
it is committed to negotiating on core political issues?
The answer
to Sathya is obvious. The principal parties in the history of our past
attempts at a negotiated settlement are invariably the principal culprits
in violating all the norms and rules of principled negotiations. To
Sathya principled negotiations is all about firstly knowing one’s
own interests and then placing them at the table up-front, so that both
sides know exactly what they are negotiating about and why. In the context
of a lack of either clarity or a surfeit of duplicity on both sides,
a dignified and a just peace will remain elusive to all peoples of this
country.
May
24, 2004
[Previous: May 17] [Next: May
31]
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May
10, 2004: Recommencement of the Peace Process – Continuity or
Change?
By
Sathya
The agency
wires, print media as well as the grapevine were clogged with reports
and analysis relating to the renewal of the stalled peace talks between
the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. The catalyst was, of course,
the recent visit to Colombo by the Norwegian deputy foreign minister
Vidar Helgessen and Special Envoy Erik Solheim, to be followed by a
high-ranking visit by the Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Peterson scheduled
for next week. The itinerary includes meetings with President Chandrika
Kumaratunga and the LTTE leader, Velupillai Pirabhakaran.
Some of
the issues currently occupying centre stage can be listed as follows:
Will the LTTE continue to be recognized as the `sole representative’
in the talks or will there be greater inclusivity? Will the Interim
Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) be the sole basis for negotiations or
would it be based on a multiple-agenda? Will Norway continue to wear
the two hats as the sole mediator in negotiations and the Head Monitor
of the Ceasefire Agreement? Would the CFA itself undergo any fundamental
change?
In fact
all of the above boils down to one key question, namely, will the recommencement
of the stalled peace talks as well as the advancing of the peace process
be a continuity from where it stopped (or stalled), or would there be
any re-designing of the process and a possible disjuncture? In short,
will there be continuity or change?
At the
outset it can be safely assumed that the LTTE clearly prefers a continuity
and to proceed along the same “principles” and “atmosphere”,
as it indicated in a recent press release issued from Kilinochchi .
In fact it has every right to prefer a continuity given that the peace
process, as it was conducted by the UNF Government with inputs from
Norway over the past 2 years, led to the LTTE consolidating itself in
terms of territory, arms and ammunition, cadres and legitimacy, not
to mention the extermination of perceived “traitors”, whether
be it Tamil members of the Sri Lankan military-intelligence operatives
or activists and leaders of Tamil political parties which refuse to
recognize the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil people.
The LTTE’s
perception of “continuity” is based on the assumption that
the peace talks stalled only after President Chandrika Kumaratunga assumed
the Defence Portfolio on November 4, 2003, just a week after the LTTE
unveiled its proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority for the
North-East (ISGA). It is therefore assumed that
the peace talks should commence with the ISGA as the “sole”
basis for negotiations. It is also an assumption that the opposition
UNP seems to favour, although it remains conveniently coy on its actual
position on the ISGA.
It is Sathya’s
contention that the above assumption is fundamentally flawed. The official
peace talks or Track One negotiations in fact stalled not in November
2003, but in April of 2003 when the LTTE took the decision to suspend
its participation in official talks with the Government. In a letter
sent to then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe dated 21st April, 2003,
the LTTE declared that it had “decided to suspend its participation
in the negotiations for the time being” and to not attend the
Tokyo donor conference in June 2003. The reasons cited by the LTTE included
frustration at not being invited for the international donor conference
in Washington on 14 April 2004 and delays in restoring normalcy in the
Tamil areas and in addressing the grievances of the internally displaced
persons.
However,
it is interesting that the LTTE should have decided to suspend its participation
in official negotiations precisely at the moment when human rights issues
as well as core political issues were being brought into the agenda.
It may be recalled that at the 6th Session of Talks in Hakone, Japan
from 18-24 March 2003, the parties asked their international human rights
advisor, Ian Martin, to draft a Declaration of Human Rights and Humanitarian
Principles, the planning of a programme of human rights training for
LTTE cadres and government officials and the strengthening of the Human
Rights Commission of Sri Lanka to enable it to develop the capacity
for increasingly effective monitoring throughout the country.
It was
further agreed to expand some preliminary issues and a framework for
political matters into a “complete plan” at the 7th Session
of talks. This was in reference to the Sub-Committee on Political Matters
which was mandated to go into federal structures in accordance with
the Oslo Declaration of December 2002, which committed the Government
and the LTTE to “explore a solution founded on the principle of
internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the
Tamil speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united
Sri Lanka.” It is Sathya’s contention that the un-stated
reasons for the LTTE to suspend its participation in direct talks in
April 2003 were its reluctance to engage on issues relating to human
rights as well as on matters relating to a final negotiated political
and constitutional settlement.
Be that
as it may, if there is to be any continuity in the peace talks, it is
logical to argue that it must continue not from the ISGA proposals unveiled
in October 2003, but from the decisions taken at the 6th Session of
Talks in March 2003 and from the situation prevailing when the LTTE
opted out of the talks in April 2003. Herein lies the duplicity in LTTE’s
stand as well as in the stance of those who argue in favour of continuity
having only the ISGA in mind, whilst ignoring matters relating to humanitarian
issues, human rights and a final constitutional and political settlement.
In this context, it is unrealistic to demand that the ISGA should be
the “sole” basis for negotiations, although it can and must
constitute one of many items in a multiple peace agenda.
Let us
now take the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). It is clear that from the time
it was signed in February 2002 by LTTE leader Velupillai Pirabhakaran
and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, without the knowledge and consent
of President Kumaratunga, the Head of State and the Commander-in-Chief,
the CFA had undergone numerous changes. In fact, the LTTE did at one
time demand its re-negotiation so as to incorporate sea movement of
LTTE cadres into the agreement, , with Norway coming out with a proposal
that sought to give de jure status to the de facto LTTE naval units.
In addition, it is now abundantly clear that the UNF Government was
prepared to look the other way when the LTTE brought in shiploads of
arms and ammunitions. This was all done in the name of maintaining a
“military balance”. As Austin Fernando the former Secretary
to the Ministry of Defence conceded recently in an article to the Daily
Mirror (8th May,2004), “many are not aware that the Ministry of
Defence, Peace Secretariat, Security Forces, SLMM and LTTE have come
into provisional arrangements, which are not clear in the CFA”.
It is therefore
clear that the CFA is not something that can be expected to be static.
It is bound to evolve to such a point that it would either require formal
amendments to give its many ad hoc measures a legal standing or the
removal and replacement of those provisions that are inimical to the
smooth implementation of the CFA. Further, the CFA has to go beyond
being an instrument that only regulates relations between the two standing
armed forces and venture into areas where these forces infringe on the
collective and individual human rights of civilians. This includes political
killings, child recruitment, the High Security Zones, extra-judicial
killings and so on which continue to plague the peace process. In short
the re-negotiation of the CFA is unavoidable when the peace talks recommence.
To argue otherwise is to play the ostrich.
Finally,
one cannot run away from LTTE’s insistent claims that it is the
sole representative of the Tamils and that the Government should speak
to no one other than itself. But, does that mean that the principle
of inclusivity should be sacrificed? The answer is simply NO. The LTTE
can be conferred the status of “sole” representative at
the “head table” as before where only three actors were
seated, namely representatives of the Government of Sri Lanka, LTTE
and Norway. Even here, injustice was done to the Muslims of the Eastern
province when despite assurances given that there shall be a separate
Muslim delegation, it was never implemented. This lacunae needs to bridged
when peace talks recommence. Further, the LTTE cannot insist on its
“sole representative” status at the “long table”
comprising other political parties and legitimate stakeholders, including
civil society. That ‘long table”, where broad consultations
could take place, was not evident in the UNF-Norway-LTTE scheme of things.
In fact, this was seen as an hindrance by the holy trinity. This must
change. Inclusivity is an essential prerequisite to ensure the durability,
sustainability and equity in any peace process. This does not necessarily
mean that the “head table” and the “long table”
should be located at the same venue and at the same time.
Lastly,
the LTTE should realise that it is a part of the Tamil people and society
and not vice versa, In fact, when the ISGA proposals were being formulated,
the LTTE merely informed its parliamentary proxies, the TNA of its decisions.
The TNA was not in any way consulted or even allowed to partake in the
deliberations that led to the formulation of the ISGA. It is therefore
clear that even in relation to Tamil interests the “sole representative”
status of the LTTE should be qualified and confined only to the “head
table”. It should not obstruct the wider Tamil opinion and interest
from being articulated and incorporated into the wider peace process.
In sum,
it is Sathya’s contention that continuity for the sake of continuity
is not necessarily a good thing. At times a disjuncture is necessary
to take a process forward and evolve to a higher stage. Neither the
LTTE, the UNF nor Norway should in any way feel threatened by the notions
of re-designing the peace process, if there is such a need. Likewise,
the UNFA and, in particular, the JVP should not try to use the re-designing
of the peace process as a means of scuttling it. Herein lies the need
for civil society to intervene so as to ensure that a balance between
change and continuity is maintained.
May
10, 2004
[Previous: May 03] [Next: May
17]
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May
3, 2004: Resumption of Norwegian Role: A Reassessment
By
Sathya
The Norwegians
are back in town! By the time this column appears in print, the Norwegian
delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgessen and including
Special Advisor Erik Solheim would have arrived in Colombo with a meeting
scheduled with President Chandrika Kumaratunga and the leader of LTTE
Political Wing Thamilchelvan in Kilinochchi. The turn of events followed
a telephone conversation between the President and the Norwegian Prime
Minister on April 22, which was highlighted in a press release issued
by the President’s Secretariat, calling on the Norwegian Government
to resume its facilitator role. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
likewise issued a press release a few days later on 27th April stating
that “the Norwegian delegation will explore with the two parties
possible ways to take the peace process forward and how Norway might
assist in this regard”.
So, what
are the implications of this development? This then the theme of this
week’s Sathya’s column.
Firstly,
it may be recalled that at a media briefing in Colombo on Friday the
15th November, 2003 the Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgessen
announced quite dramatically that Norway will “go home and wait”
till there is clarity as to who is holding responsibility on the side
of the government. Further, the operative paragraph in the prepared
text that was circulated to journalists at the media briefing stated,
“ As far as our mandate goes, we have one clear conclusion: peace
talks could have started tomorrow, provided there was clarity about
who is holding responsibility on behalf of the Government for the continuation
of the Ceasefire Agreement. Until last week there was such clarity.
Today there is no such clarity”.
This was
in relation to the move by President Chandrika Kumaratunga to assume
the Defence portfolio, amongst other portfolios, on 4th November, 2003,
sparking a political crisis and paving the way for the subsequent holding
of General Elections of February 2, 2004. The timing as well as the
manner in which Norway temporarily halted its role as a facilitator/mediator
was widely interpreted by many political commentators, as an attempt
at shaping events in the national political scene as well as in forging
international opinion against the move by President Chandrika Kumaratunga.
The fact that Norway took no such decision to suspend its role, when
the LTTE decided to pull out of official negotiations in April last
year, was often cited as a case of duplicity on the part of Norway.
In this context, it was also predictable that when the Karuna episode
erupted the SLMM pulled-out, allowing the Vanni-based LTTE leadership
to send in reinforcements to the East in clear violation of the ceasefire
agreement.
That is now history. The recently concluded General Election has thrown
up a Government which, although a minority Government, does not face
the problem of cohabitation between an Executive President and a Prime
Minister who belong to different political formations. However, it remains
to be seen whether the constituent members of the UNFA can cohabit amongst
themselves! But, that is another matter. The fact of the matter now
is that the UNFA in its election manifesto clearly stated that the ceasefire
would continue and negotiations will recommence with the LTTE, but along
a “correct” path.
So, what
is the “correct” path envisaged by the UNFA and would the
LTTE agree? For instance, LTTE’s chief negotiator and political
advisor (also known as the “ideologue”) Anton Balasingham,
soon after the President’s announcement calling on Norway to resume
its role, told the Jaffna-based Uthayan newspaper, “Before resuming
the peace process, our leadership is deeply and clearly examining President
Chandrika Kumaratunga government’s true position in relation to
the key areas of the process. We will invite Norway on our part only
if the leadership is satisfied with the situation. Our leadership will
not show any urgency in this regard”.
The LTTE
has also clearly stipulated that its proposal for an Interim Self-Governing
Authority (ISGA) will constitute the basis for future negotiations.
It can be expected that the LTTE may want to re-define the Ceasefire
Agreement (CFA) in a manner that addresses the issue of High Security
Zones (HSZs) and sea movement. And, if the issue of re-negotiating the
CFA were to crop up, it is conceivable that the Government may want
the districts of Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu, which were excluded from
the CFA as well as from the purview of the SLMM, to be included. The
other vexed issue relates to inclusivity vs sole representative status
for the LTTE. These are issues that will be addressed as the peace process
gains momentum. On the other hand, it is conceivable that they may well
be placed on the back-burner, while a process of Confidence-building
Measures (CBMs) are initiated and implemented prior to the commencement
of direct talks, facilitated/mediated by Norway.
But returning
to Norway’s role, one area that needs to be re-examined is its
hitherto dual role as the facilitator/mediator and monitor. As a facilitator/mediator,
Norway’s primary concern is to the peace process and not rocking
the peace boat. As such, when it comes to its role as the Head of the
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), it has sought to subordinate its
monitoring role to its mediatory role, to the extent of turning a blind
eye to gross ceasefire and human rights violations by the LTTE and sometimes
the Government. In the context that the SLMM has no powers of enforcement,
it has to rely on “naming and shaming” as the main instrument
of deterrence. This, Norway has unfortunately desisted from doing for
fear of embarrassing the LTTE. It also goes contrary to its agenda of
empowerment and legitimization of the LTTE as a “partner”
in the peace process. The outcome of this deficiency has been the virtual
granting of a licence to the LTTE to engage in child conscription and
political killings.
It is in
this context that Norway should take seriously the recommendation made
by a team of concerned academics and intellectuals (i.e. Tyrol Ferdinands,
Kumar Rupesinghe, Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, Jayadeva Uyangoda and Norbert
Ropers) in their monograph, “The Sri Lankan Peace Process at Crossroads”.
To quote: “ Explore together with the parties how the leadership
of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) could be handed over to another
country without endangering the stability of the truce in order to ensure
no conflicts of interest between the roles of facilitator and of the
monitor”.
In conclusion,
while Sathya is appreciative of the intentions of Norway which is to
assist the parties in taking the peace process forward, the consequences
of the methodology adopted by it so far has been inimical to pluralism,
democracy and human rights. The Norwegian Government must realise that
when it involves itself in the affairs and problems of the peoples of
other countries and nations, it has a far greater responsibility than
when handling the affairs of its own people. This applies to Sates as
well as individuals.
May
3, 2004
[Previous: April 26] [Next: May
10]
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May
17, 2004: Some Lessons from the two General Elections across the Palk
Strait
By Sathya
The recently
concluded General Election in India came as more of a shock to the pollsters
and stock exchange speculators than to the masses. All election forecasts
relating to the outcome of the elections turned out to be woefully wrong.
They were so badly off the mark that they sounded more like weather forecasts.
All polls predicted that the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
would get the most number of seats. Where the various polls differed was
in relation to the margin of the victory and over whether the NDA would
be able to get an absolute majority. In the end Congress Party(I) ended
up getting more seats than the BJP.
In contrast,
the pollsters in Sri Lanka came out with flying colours. Although the
various polls conducted and published were not exactly election forecasts,
but polls on election-related issues, a reading between the lines clearly
indicated that there was widespread alienation with the UNP. It was clear
from these polls that except on matters relating to the absence of war,
the UNP had alienated itself from the broad cross-sections of the Sinhalese
People, barring the urban rich and the rural-urban middle classes.
So,
Lesson One is that while election forecasts are as fickle as weather forecasts,
polling on election-related issues are safer. In the case of the latter,
one cannot be proven to be totally wrong with immense possibilities for
multiple correlations and multiple interpretations to get away with, if
the projections go wrong.
Another matter
of stark contrast between the two General Elections across the Palk Strait
is the manner in which the out-going Prime Ministers interpreted the outcome
of the polls. Atal Behari Vajpayee, in his address to the Nation even
before the Election Commission had announced the final results, epitomized
dignity and won over the hearts of even those who voted against him when
he declared that although his party had lost, the elections was a victory
for India. Our own Ranil Wickremsinghe, on the other hand, was all defiance
in his first public statement after it had become clear that his party
had suffered a comprehensive defeat. Not only did he take some time to
resign, but also when he did he made it clear that he would anxiously
be-in-waiting!
On the other
hand, the immediate post-election situation, in both cases, were punctuated
by controversies and delays in the formation of the Government. In the
case of Sri Lanka, the standoff between the SLFP and the JVP over the
allocation of portfolios led to a considerable delay in the formation
of the full cabinet. In the case of India, there was again a delay in
the formation of a Government, although of a shorter duration, over the
high drama linked to Sonia Gandhi’s decision not to assume the Prime
Ministerial portfolio and the left parties deciding not to join the government,
but to support it from outside. The gimmicks by the inimitable Laloo Prasad
Yadav further added colour to the proceedings in the run-up to the formation
of the Cong (I) led Government.
Hence,
Lesson Two is while there should be dignity in defeat, victory by itself
does not imply stability, in the short run. As to what happens in the
long run is any body’s guess. But what cannot be disputed is Maynard
Keynes’ wry comment that, “in the long run we are all dead”.
There were
also striking similarities in the factors that led to the outcome of the
two General Elections across the Palk Strait. For one, despite impressive
macro economic indicators in India and fairly stable indicators in Sri
Lanka, they clearly did not have an impact on the micro situation. In
particular the trickle down effect was non-existent or not enough to ameliorate
rural poverty and low agricultural incomes. The rural masses voted overwhelmingly
against neo-liberal economic reforms programmes advocated by the IMF and
the World Bank and faithfully implemented by the two Governments, but
with some differences in emphasis.
The “Shining
India” slogan of the BJP and the “Regaining Sri Lanka”
slogan of the UNP were based largely on what is now popularly known as
“euphoric” economies. Those who were euphoric, incidentally,
were the urban rich and the upper-middle classes, the business sector,
stock exchange speculators and the Central Banks which release the figures.
At least in the case of India, the growing middle class to a large extent
acts as a cushion by providing a large domestic market and an effective
demand. In the case of Sri Lanka, the “Regaining Sri Lanka”
document, which was placed before the Donor Forum, spoke of a target growth
rate of 10 % - a figure that was unquestionably euphoric, but with nothing
to sustain it. The assumption that rural-urban migration is an inevitable
outcome of economic growth and, hence, the emphasis on urban and infrastructural
development to link the rural areas to the cities without any programmes
for rural industrialization, not only left the problem of rural poverty
and under-employment unaddressed, but further compounded the problem of
urban ghetoization. The “Regaining Sri Lanka” strategy of
the UNP was also largely based on the casino economy and the service sector,
with little value added and forward and backward linkages within the national
economy.
Both Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh, widely known as the father of liberalization
and market economy in India, and Sri Lanka’s Finance Minister Sarath
Amunugama known for his advocacy of capitalism with a human face, have
their work cut out for them. They have to while addressing the rising
expectations of the rural masses and the youths generated by the change
of Governments, cannot at the same time ignore the compulsions of globalization.
In this, India once again is better placed to counter the negative aspects
of globalization, while absorbing the positive, in view of its large domestic
manufacturing sector which is beginning to go beyond and outside the domestic
market, as well as its relatively strong negotiating positions vis a vis
the Bretton Woods twins (i.e. the World Bank and IMF). In the case of
Sri Lanka, the heavy reliance on the garments export sector at a time
when the quotas are being phased out and the absence of a domestic manufacturing
sector and a large home market is more vulnerable. Further, the burden
of a war economy is still present, while the much expected peace dividends
continues to be elusive.
So,
Lesson Three is that the `euphoric economy’ is not enough to win
elections. High rates of growth should be accompanied by a more equitable
distribution of income, employment generation and balanced growth with
due recognition of the fact that the bulk of the masses in India and Sri
Lanka reside in the rural sector and are dependent on agriculture.
In conclusion,
if anyone says that Sathya does not know his economics and can only talk
and write about the ethnic conflict, peace process and related matters,
they are dead wrong!
May
17, 2004
[Previous: May 10] [Next: May 24]
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April
26, 2004:
Reassertion of Tamil Nationalism – A Time Bomb!
By Sathya
“ Time
is running out” said a re-elected Tamil member of parliament affiliated
to the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) in a recent telephone interview to
the morning News line programme. That telling remark which was made following
the meeting that the elected TNA members of parliament had with the LTTE
leader Velupillai Pirabhakaran following the General Election , in a way,
is a wake-up call to all concerned and constitutes the theme of this week’s
Sathya column. That the Member of Parliament is the son of a first cousin
of Sathya, whose father is also a first cousin of the grand-father of
the Tamil Member of Parliament, is another matter. So much for Sathya’s
family tree which today stands like the Palmyra bereft of branches. Now
to theme of this week’s column .
The message
that has been emanating from the election campaign conducted so democratically
by the TNA with the able-bodied backing of the LTTE conforming to all
the norms of the electoral process in Sri Lanka, including impersonations,
rigging and killing, and the message emanating after the elections could
be paraphrased as follows: “The Tamil people have overwhelmingly
accepted the LTTE as their sole, authentic representative and have given
an overwhelming mandate for the implementation of the Interim Self-Governing
Authority (ISGA) proposal of the LTTE. It is now for the Sinhala People
and their polity to decide whether they recognize this mandate or not.
This would ultimately decide whether we will continue to be a part of
Sri Lanka or go our separate ways. The ball is now in your court and Tamil
Nationalism is the name of the game”. But such phraseology is not
alien to Sathya.
It may be
recalled that the TULF based its 1977 General Election campaign on high-voltage
Tamil nationalism. In its manifesto, it called for the establishment of
“an independent, sovereign, secular, socialist state of Tamil Eelam”.
The manifesto also made explicit its intention of forming a Constituent
Assembly comprising the TULF members elected into the National Assembly
(as the Legislature was then referred to) for the purpose of establishing
“the independence of Tamil Eelam by bringing that constitution into
operation either by peaceful means or by direct action or struggle”.
The TULF ended up the second largest party in Parliament and the main
opposition in an election that gave the UNP a 5/6ths majority. The SLFP
was virtually decimated.
However,
soon after the General Elections of July 1977, Prime Minister J.R.Jayawardene
(he made himself the all-powerful Executive President the following year)
issued the “if you want to fight, let there be a fight, if it is
peace let there be peace” challenge to the TULF and to the Tamil
People after having softened up the Tamil psyche through a state-sponsored
anti-Tamil pogrom just one month after the General Election. The TULF
ultimately settled for the District Development Councils (DDCs) in 1981.
It was indeed a giant leap backwards from “Tamil Eelam” to
the DDCs. Incidentally, J.R.Jayawardene assured a delegation of Buddhist
clergy who had protested against the DDC Bill, that the District Councils
did not even have powers enjoyed by the Municipal and Village Councils!
Further, the leader of TULF and leader of the opposition in explaining
to David Selbourne, a British academic cum journalist, as to why the TULF
had accepted the DDCs, mentioned, “If I had told Jayawardene to
go to hell, so many Tamils would have gone to heaven”.
Coming to
the present, the TNA parliamentarians, the avatar of the TULF, continue
to engage in high-voltage nationalist rhetoric for their political existence
and physical survival. What is different now is that then the TULF had
only the “boys” to contend with when they exerted pressure
on them not to compromise. Likewise, J.R.Jayawardene was then certain
that “terrorism” could be wiped out in one year. Well, it
was to last till now! Now, the State has an entire conventional LTTE army
staring at them across lines of control in the North and a long porous
“border” in the East. The TNA parliamentarians have the conventional
suicide bombers and pistol gangs to contend with waiting with “garlands”
and the “pottu” in case they compromise or violate the oath
they took before the photograph of the “national leader” before
the elections. As to whether they re-took the oath in Kilinochchi after
the election is a moot point. The presence of Pottu Amman, the head of
LTTE’s Intelligence Wing, in all the meetings that the TNA have
had with the LTTE in Kilinochchi must be somewhat disconcerting to the
TNA parliamentarians, to say the least. Media reports and other “sources”
indicate that the LTTE leader Velupillai Pirabhakaran had stipulated to
the TNA parliamentarians in no uncertain terms that if the ISGA is not
obtainable, then all steps should be taken to expose Colombo before the
international community and proceed thereafter to asserting the external
right to self-determination and, if necessary, separation. The Supremo
does not mince words, although he certainly knows how to mix it with much
humour.
On the flip
side of the coin, the political instability in the South with a hung-parliament
and a cohabitation crisis of a totally different nature within the ruling
political alliance, the strident Sinhala-Buddhist platform of the JHU
and the anti-devolution stance of the JVP all contribute to an unfolding
scenario that clearly threatens the peace process. The recent statement
of the Presidential Secretariat, confirmed by the Norwegian Government,
calling on Norway to reassume its role in facilitating direct talks between
the Government and the LTTE gives some assurance that the stalled peace
talks will recommence, although with some delay. But, to sustain the peace
process requires a sense of commitment and singularity of purpose on all
sides.
So, what
is to be done? Firstly, the UPFA should subordinate their petty political
rivalries and get down to the task of Governance as expected by at least
those who they claim have given them a mandate. The UPFA should further
“hasten slowly” as Sathya argued in his column last week on
its Constituent Assembly project that hinges on a unilinear or a bilinear
agenda (i.e. Abolition of the executive Presidency and electoral reforms)
and strive towards a wider and an incremental consensus, which includes
devolution. Secondly, the UNP should play the role of a responsible opposition
and not count the days when they can topple the Government, as hinted
by Ranil Wickreminghe in his address following the elections. The UNP
should also give a firm commitment to federal structures, which it has
dodged so far, as stipulated in the Oslo Declaration of December, 2003.
Needless to say, the urgent task of rehabilitation and the reconstruction
of the devastated North-East, to which the UNF and the UNFA manifestos
referred to, should be given top priority. Thirdly, the stalled peace
talks with the LTTE should recommence unconditionally on both sides. The
LTTE must realize that the notion of exposing Colombo before international
opinion would only apply if the ISGA proposals are seen to be realistic.
The notion of “take it or leave and if you leave it we will go our
own way” is not negotiations. It is arrogance and, it is conceivable
that it is the LTTE that may end up being exposed before international
opinion. The LTTE should further realize that there is something called
national opinion that includes Tamil opinion. And, Tamil opinion is for
a peace that ensures their identity, dignity and security. It would indeed
be ironic if the LTTE, the “sole representative” denies the
Tamil People the above in their own homeland.
If the above
conditions are not satisfied, then not only is time running out, but the
time bomb would start ticking – assuming that it has not already.
Sathya as
usual finds it difficult to conclude his columns without digressing into
paradoxes which are profoundly trivial! A case in point is the news item
that the LTTE has declared the “Karthigai Poo” (a variant
of the Lily flower) as the national flower. Following this announcement,
numerous Tamil websites have been attributing the flower to Lord Murugan
who is characterized in these websites as the “Tamil God”
and the “War God”. In Sathya’s opinion, this characterization
is an anathema to everything that Lord Murugan stands for. The feet of
Lord Murugan or Karthikeyan stands for surrender – the surrender
of one’s own ego. It is following that surrender of one’s
ego and megalomania should one call on His “Vel” (the spear)
to protect oneself from the forces of evil. To think of the “Vel”
as the destroyer of others, without having destroyed one’s own ego
and megalomania is asking for trouble. And, finally the face of Lord Murugan,
radiates nothing but serenity and love. There is no hatred or venom. Suffice
it to say, none of these attributes of Lord Murugan symbolizes the ferocity
of the Tiger emblem. It is a negation of everything that Lord Murugan
stands for.
April
26, 2004
[Previous: April 19] [Next: May
3]
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April
19, 2004: Constitutional Reforms – Hasten Slowly!
By
Sathya
A statement
from the Presidential Secretariat last week announced that the first
step had been taken towards the implementation of the pledge made by
the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) in its election manifesto
to carry out a programme on constitutional reforms. The first step referred
to a meeting that President Chandrika Kumaratunga had with a team of
advisors and legal consultants which was expected to be followed by
a meeting with newly elected political leaders and representatives of
the constituent parties of the UPFA. The statement further recalled
that the manifesto sought the peoples mandate to formulate and promulgate
a new Constitution since the 1978 Constitution had caused problems for
effective governance and the “inherent” difficulty of securing
the stipulated majorities in Parliament to bring about constitutional
reforms. Hence a mandate was sought to overcome this “inherent”
obstacle by convening a Constituent assembly comprising the newly elected
members of the 13th Parliament. The statement also claimed a mandate
at the General Elections as expressed in 106 of the 160 electorates
and 14 of the islands 22 electoral districts. The draft of the new constitution
to be formulated by the Constituent assembly would be placed before
the people’s consent by way of a referendum thereby bowing to
the will and the sovereignty of the People.
It is therefore
clear that the newly elected UPFA has embarked on the tortuous process
of constitution-making and constitutional reforms. That the present
1978 Constitution is severely, if not “inherently”, flawed
and authoritarian in nature is now widely accepted. So what are the
elements that need to be introduced and how, is the challenge that faces
the newly elected UNFA. A greater challenge, however, is how to harness
support from the political formations present in a hung-parliament as
well as mobilize public legitimacy and acceptance. Both these are essential
prerequisites to sustain and lead the constitutional reforms process
to a successful conclusion in repealing or replacing the 1978 Constitution.
This then is the theme of Sathya’s column this week.
It is abundantly
clear that the UNF suffered a comprehensive defeat at the recently concluded
General Election, although it is not that clear whether the UNFA enjoyed
a comprehensive victory as in the case of the sweep enjoyed by the SLFP-led
coalition in 1972 or the UNP romping to a victory with a 5/6ths majority
in the 1977 General Election. However, it must be recognized that if
the votes obtained are translated into the first-past-the-post equation,
the UPFA would have indeed scored a comprehensive victory. However,
the present Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system, which
is the prevailing ground political reality, has denied the UPFA that
sweeping victory in terms of seats in parliament. Further, it may be
argued that the diverse ideological orientation and political priorities
of the key constituent members of the UNFA, the SLFP and the JVP, makes
it difficult for them to claim a mandate collectively. In fact media
reports indicate that the JVP has claimed a mandate for itself, while
the SLFP leadership is becoming increasingly concerned about losing
its electoral base to the JVP. The fundamental difference relating to
devolution of power or administrative decentralization as the basis
for a political solution to the Ethnic Question is also a case in point.
On the
other hand, it is conceivable that the UNFA would only introduce into
the constitutional reforms process those elements on which there is
agreement between the SLFP and the JVP. These are the abolition of the
Executive Presidency and the reform of the electoral system. All indications
are that the main focus of constitutional reforms by the UNFA would
be unilinear or bilinear and not a comprehensive one. Let us look at
the implications of this unfolding scenario.
As regards
the Executive Presidential system, it clearly has to go. The office
of the Executive President is so-powerful and authoritarian, that anyone
occupying that office will necessarily conduct themselves as despots,
just to do justice to that office! However, it is often argued that
the minority parties prefer an Executive President elected directly
by the people, since the Presidential candidate would have to rely on
minority votes in a closely contested battle. But, this argument is
untenable, since there is no guarantee that the elected Executive President
would continue to be responsive to minority aspirations and grievances,
in between elections. What could undermine the legitimacy of the constitutional
reforms project is the perception that the UNFA is seeking to abolition
the office of the Executive Presidency in view of the existing constitutional
provision that prevents President Chandrika Kumaratunga from contesting
for the third term. The fact that the SLFP-led People’s Alliance
Government did not initiate a constitutional reforms process aimed at
the abolition or the reform of the executive presidential system when
it was elected into power in 1994 gives credence to this growing perception.
On the other it is conceivable that the UNP would obstruct the steps
being taken to abolition the executive presidential system, for reasons
of political expediency and power equation, so as to enable Ranil Wickremesinghe
to occupy the office that was so craftily created by his uncle, J.R.Jayawardene.
Be that
as it may, the debate is bound to veer away from the issue of whether
the office of the Executive Presidency should be abolished or reformed
and traverse into narrow partisan politics and personality conflicts.
This does not augur well for the proposed constituent assembly as well
as public legitimacy.
As regards
reforms to the electoral system, the PR system clearly stands in the
way of political stability as well as the denial of majority aspirations.
By majority, Sathya is referring to the numerical majority. On the other
hand, it is undeniable that the PR system introduced balance of power
into the Sri Lankan polity and created space for minority parties and
other small political entities to make their presence in parliament,
as well as to make their presence felt when it came to the formation
of coalition governments. Any reform of the electoral system, therefore,
needs to ensure that while the majority will is reflected in parliament,
it does not lead to a tyranny of the majority. Hence, the need to combine
the first-past-the-post system and the PR system, akin to the German
model or its variants. This is an area which does no involve too much
difficulty and should lend itself to a broad-based consensus. Likewise,
issue pertaining to Good Governance and related Independent Commissions
are amenable to a broad consensus and should not pose too much difficulties
in having them introduced or re-introduced into the proposed new Constitution.
The same applies to Fundamental and Human Rights.
The sticky
issue as Sathya pointed out earlier is the differences in emphasis,
if not actual fundamental differences, between the SLFP/People’s
Alliance and the JVP on devolution of power and power-sharing, and on
issues relating to the nature of relations between the proposed constituent
assembly and the peace process. In all likelihood the UNFA is bound
to leave devolution out of the process envisaged in the next few months
and to incorporate devolution at a latter stage. However, it is imperative
that some indication be brought into the Constitution as regards the
contours of a final political and constitutional settlement, in addition
to giving constitutional status and validity to any interim administration
that may be established for the North-East.
On this
issue, the LTTE and its proxies, the Tamil National Alliance which commands
a sizeable number of seats in parliament, are bound to take a conveniently
ambivalent position. On the one hand, LTTE clearly favours extra-constitutional
or even contra-constitutional processes of setting up its proposed Interim
Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) for the North-East. On the other, its
proxies, the Tamil National Alliance will be instructed to cry foul
if the issue of devolution is kept out of the agenda of the proposed
Constituent Assembly. In sum, it will be a case of the LTTE seeking
to de-legitimize the Constituent Assembly while pushing for an extra-constitutional
ISGA.
In view
of the problematic sketched above, one may have to seriously consider
the prospects of shaping an Interim Constitution to
push through urgent reforms of the electoral system, the abolition or
the reform of the Executive Presidency, the setting-up of Independent
Commissions in order to de-politicize the public sector and the establishment
of an interim administration for the North-East with pride of place
to the LTTE, but not exclusively so. Issues relating to a final power
sharing arrangement at the centre and the periphery as a means of addressing
the Ethnic Question may be brought in at a latter stage, based on progress
at the peace talks with the LTTE. The talks itself will have to be made
inclusive and the proposed Constituent Assembly or an All Party Conference
may continue to deliberate, even after the establishment of an Interim
Constitution, on the issues arising out of the talks with the LTTE,
thereby bringing about a link between the interim and the final. This
would also ensure a linkage between official negotiations between the
Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE and a broader, more inclusive process
that would accommodate all other legitimate stakeholders. Another parallel
process may have to be initiated to accommodate the concerns and proposals
of civil society.
In sum,
there are no short-cuts or quick-fixes when it comes to giving constitutional
shape and form to the collective as well as shared vision and destiny
of a People. The sovereignty of a People cannot be bartered away for
the sake of political expediency. Similarly, the project of constitutional
reforms cannot be postponed indefinitely, for the same reasons cited
above.
Hasten
slowly, may sound paradoxical. But, it is not. It is an ancient wisdom.
April
19, 2004
Next:
[April 26]
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